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Conservatism reflects a general attitude structure characterized by a preference for traditional 
social practices and an aversion to uncertainty and threat.  Though the social environment 
undoubtedly plays a role in shaping conservative attitudes, recent studies suggest that trait-level 
characteristics may contribute to their development as well.  The present research investigated 
trait-level cognitive threat detection ability as a factor which may influence the development and 
maintenance of conservative social attitudes.  A computer simulation indicated that socially 
conservative attitudes may function as a strategy for increasing the survival rate of an individual 
with poor threat detection ability living in a relatively dangerous environment.  Three studies 
were conducted to further investigate the hypothesis that individuals who are less accurate in 
detecting threats would report more conservative social attitudes, particularly when the 
surrounding environment is perceived to be highly dangerous.  In Study 1, participants who were 
 
 
 
 
less able to distinguish between images of safe and dangerous stimuli presented outside of 
conscious awareness tended to endorse higher levels of social dominance orientation, and 
participants who reported higher belief that the world is dangerous tended to endorse higher 
levels of social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism, as well as a more 
conservative political ideology.  In Study 2, less accurate detection of threats was associated with 
a more conservative political ideology.  In Studies 2 and 3, experimental manipulations of 
participants’ dangerous world beliefs failed to produce differences in the endorsement of socially 
conservative attitudes.  An additional experimental manipulation of participants’ perceptions of 
their own ability to detect threats in Study 3 did not affect the endorsement of socially 
conservative attitudes either.  Across the three studies, the results suggest that individual 
differences in cognitive mechanisms associated with the ability to differentiate between safe and 
dangerous stimuli presented outside of conscious awareness may hold a weak but significant 
relation to socially conservative attitudes.  Additionally, the results indicate that individuals who 
hold a stronger belief that the world is a dangerous place tend to endorse more conservative 
social attitudes; however, these views appear to be pervasive and persist in the face of short term 
fluctuations in perceptions of danger. 
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The Evolution of Conservative Attitudes as a Complement to Cognitive Threat Detection 
Mechanisms 
 
People born in the United States today are expected to live a generation longer than their 
ancestors of only a century ago.  At the turn of the 20
th
 century, life expectancy at birth for a U.S. 
citizen was 49.24 years, but by 2006, this figure rose by almost 60% to 77.70 years (Arias, 
2010).  There are likely to be many factors that have contributed to this drastic increase.  
Breakthroughs in healthcare such as the advent of vaccinations, improvements in surgical 
procedures, and the development of advanced screening and preventative care techniques have 
almost certainly had a positive effect on life expectancy.  Recent improvements in safety have 
been observed across a host of other aspects of life in the U.S. in recent years as well.  From 
1993 to 2010, violent crime decreased by almost 70 percent, plunging by nearly 12% from 2009 
to 2010 alone (Yost, 2011).  Additionally, automobile fatalities decreased by 17% from 1994 to 
2009 (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2011), workplace fatalities dropped to 
their lowest level ever in 2009 along with a 60% reduction in reported cases of injury and illness 
in the workplace since 1992 (United States Department of Labor, 2011), and the number of 
commercial airline fatalities due to accident dropped to 1 in every 333 million passengers in 
2010 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011).  In short, these statistics indicate that in recent 
decades, the U.S. has become an increasingly safe place to live. 
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However, juxtaposed to these trends, there remains a significant focus on the prevalence 
of danger in the public discourse.  Most major media outlets dedicate a portion of their reporting 
to the coverage of dangers, threats, and tragedies, but it can be argued that conservative 
politicians and news sources place considerably more emphasis on this type of content.  For 
example, Jan Brewer, the republican governor of Arizona (Montopoli, 2010) as well as 
republican presidential candidate Rick Perry (Associated Press, 2011) have both recently cited 
the potential for violence against U.S. citizens as a reason to increase security along the U.S. – 
Mexico border.  Additionally, Manny Alvarez, a medical contributor to Fox News ™, has 
warned that illegal immigration may increase the risk of disease transmission to U.S. citizens 
(Alvarez, 2010), furthering the push to tighten U.S. border security.  Fox News ™ also devotes 
entire subsections of their Website to the topics of ‘Terror’ and ‘Disasters’, providing daily 
updates on the potential dangers that residents of the United States face.   
These threat-based messages have resonated with U.S. residents.  Glenn Beck’s daily 
television show, in which he frequently discussed conspiracies and threats that he warned placed 
U.S. citizens at risk, drew an estimated 2.2 million daily viewers in January of 2009.  At the 
time, this made his show the third most watched program on cable news (Gold, 2009).  Ratings 
for conservative talk radio have been strong as well.  Rush Limbaugh currently has the nation’s 
highest rated radio show, just ahead of Sean Hannity’s daily program (Ortiz, 2011), both of 
which focus regularly on potential threats that face U.S. citizens. 
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In sum, there appears to be a discord between statistical trends which indicate that life in 
the U.S. has become increasingly safe, and the popular conservative perspective which maintains 
a strong focus on the many potential threats facing U.S. citizens.  The current research was 
aimed at investigating this phenomenon in order to build a better understanding of why 
individuals who have access to the same objective information about the safety of their 
environment differ in their subjective perceptions, and why these perceptions seem to fall along 
ideological lines.  It is argued that individual differences in the ability to accurately detect threats 
in the environment may play an important role in this relation, making some individuals more 
likely to adopt conservative attitudes than others. 
The pervasive view in the social sciences literature has historically been that conservative 
attitudes result from the influence of the surrounding social environment (Allsop & Weisberg, 
1998; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Niemi & Jennings, 1991).  More specifically, there is a commonly 
accepted view that conservative attitudes are passed down from parent to child or transmitted 
during social interactions between peers or through social information (originating from 
authority figures in social institutions, literature, or social media).  However, studies in 
behavioral genetics (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Hatemi, Gillespie, Eaves, Maher, Webb, 
Heath, Medland, et al., 2011) and developmental psychology (Block & Block, 2006) have called 
this view into question.  These recent studies have led to an emerging new perspective on 
conservatism; one that proposes that conservative attitudes develop out of a combination of trait-
level characteristics and social learning mechanisms rather than solely from social influence.   
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 In this vein, the current research examined the possibility that evolved cognitive systems, 
and specifically cognitive threat detection mechanisms (psychological mechanisms responsible 
for distinguishing between safe and dangerous objects in the environment), may play an 
important role in influencing perceptions of threat and uncertainty.  As such, these mechanisms 
may have a hand in the development of conservative attitudes.  Minor differences in the ability to 
detect threats are likely to impact one’s general ability to successfully navigate dangers in their 
environment.  An individual who is highly accurate at detecting threats is likely to be more 
successful in avoiding danger, thus experiencing the world as more predictable and less 
threatening.  On the other hand, an individual who is less accurate at detecting threats is likely to 
encounter more potential harm, and as a result, may develop a more cautious approach toward 
indications of potential danger in the social environment.  Consequently, individual differences 
in the ability to accurately detect threats hold the potential to have a pervasive downstream 
impact on attitudes and beliefs about the social world.  The current research sought to explore 
this theory; that socially conservative attitudes are a partial product of individual differences in 
the ability to accurately detect threats in the environment.   
The Paradigm of Evolutionary Psychology 
The ability to effectively manage threats is essential to human survival.  It is likely that 
this capability has been subject to strong natural selection pressures throughout history and has 
thus been shaped by the process of biological evolution.  As such, the current research proposal 
follows the paradigm of evolutionary psychology, an emerging approach to psychological 
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research that draws from the existing literature in evolutionary biology.  Evolutionary 
psychology is intended to be consistent with empirical knowledge stemming from all other 
domains in the natural sciences.  Thus, psychological theories following an evolutionary 
approach should be compatible with existing knowledge in the fields of biology, chemistry, and 
physics and should also take into consideration evidence and theoretical perspectives from the 
social sciences such as history, anthropology, economics, and sociology (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992).  More specifically, psychological theories following an evolutionary approach must not 
violate what is currently accepted as empirical knowledge stemming from other scientific areas.  
By building psychological theories based on existing knowledge in biology concerning evolution 
by the process of natural selection, psychological research can serve as a bridge between the 
natural sciences and the social sciences by providing a more unified framework in which to 
operate. 
 Natural selection acts at the level of individual genes, and genes direct the development 
of all forms of biologic life (Dawkins, 1976/1989).  Genes that increase the likelihood of their 
own replication tend to become more prevalent within a species.  This is generally accomplished 
by directing the development of biological structures which promote the survival and 
reproductive success of the larger organism.  In such cases, these biological structures are said to 
have high adaptive value.  Conversely, structures that decrease the chances of the replication of 
their associated genes are said to have low adaptive value.  These structures tend to become less 
prevalent within a species and are eventually eliminated altogether.   
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The adaptive value of any given biological structure is dependent on the ‘fit’ between the 
structure and its surrounding environment.  Some structures may be highly advantageous to 
survival and reproduction in one environment, but may provide little or no adaptive advantage in 
another.  For instance, the caudal fin (tail fin) of a fish is highly adaptive in an aquatic 
environment as it is useful for propulsion, allowing the fish to move quickly through water in 
pursuit of food or to escape predators.  However, the same structure is significantly less 
advantageous on land where the fish is no longer buoyant and the caudal fin cannot be used to 
help the fish move efficiently.  Thus, the adaptive value of any biological structure, such as the 
caudal fin of a fish, should only be considered relative to the environment in which it operates 
and not in any absolute manner. 
At the core of the evolutionary approach to psychology is the proposition that all 
psychological processes stem from biological structures in the brain.  As a biological organ, the 
brain is subject to natural selection pressures in the same manner as all other biological organs.  
Additionally, as psychological processes are inherently linked to biological brain processes, 
psychological processes are inherently subject to the influence of natural selection (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992).  From this standpoint, it is expected that human psychological mechanisms 
which have historically exhibited high adaptive value are likely to have become more prevalent 
in the species to the point that they are considered a normally occurring trait.   
A classic example of a psychological process that is likely to have evolved due to natural 
selection pressures is the ability to recognize faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997).  
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The recognition of other humans based on the distinctive characteristics of their facial features is 
extraordinarily important for human social interaction in that it can promote coalitional bonding, 
motivate the avoidance of known cheaters and rivals, and allows for the development of complex 
mating strategies based on recognition and recall of past interactions.  Thus, cognitive face 
recognition mechanisms have high adaptive value in that they are likely to contribute to the 
survival and reproductive success of the organism.   
The evolutionary approach to human psychology stands in stark contrast to the standard 
social science model (SSSM) which has been the dominant perspective in the social sciences for 
most of the past century.  Proponents of the SSSM view of psychology argue that the human 
mind is a content general mechanism which consists of little in the way of meaningful innate 
organization, and which is shaped in large part through environmental experience (Geertz, 1973; 
Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Rakison & Yermolayeva, 2011).  This view suggests that 
the mind which is present at birth in human infants is essentially identical across individuals, and 
that the variability that exists between individuals in adulthood is almost entirely the result of 
cultural influence.  This point is made emphatically by Geertz (1973): 
Becoming human is becoming individual, and we become individual under the 
guidance of cultural patterns, historically created systems of meaning in terms 
of which we give form, order, point, and direction to our lives…as culture 
shaped us as a single species – and is no doubt still shaping us – so too it 
shapes us as separate individuals (p. 52). 
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As Tooby and Cosmides (1992) point out, the SSSM perspective views the individual 
person to be a passive recipient of cultural information.  That is, according to the SSSM, the 
mind is a general information processor for which the content is largely determined by cultural 
influence.  Consequently, the study of human psychology should be an investigation of the 
manner in which cultural information is learned and processed by the mind.  According to the 
SSSM perspective, if evolution played a role in the development of the human mind, it was 
primarily in the evolution of the human capacity to learn.  As such, a deep understanding of the 
human capacity to learn would be sufficient to explain all other (acquired) characteristics of 
human psychology.   
The problem with a content-general theory of the human mind is that it provides an 
extremely weak system for solving adaptive problems.  Again, following the reasoning of Tooby 
and Cosmides (1992), content general information processing systems would seem to provide 
limitless flexibility that would be ideal for surviving in an ever-changing environment.  
However, the perceived advantage of a flexible information processing architecture would be, in 
reality, a curse.  This is primarily due to the fact that there are limitless interpretations for the 
complex perceptual information that is extracted from the environment.  However, only a small 
subset of these possibilities will ever be relevant in guiding an individual toward appropriate 
behavioral actions.  A content-general information processer would be extremely limiting in that 
it would have to search through such a large number of possible interpretations of social 
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information in order to reach one that is appropriate.  Only luck would determine whether an 
appropriate interpretation was arrived at quickly and efficiently.   
Conversely, content-specific psychological mechanisms would convey an advantage by 
restricting the set of possible interpretations of environmental information to a subset that, based 
on evolutionary history, is likely to be relevant.  This would allow the organism to interpret and 
respond to environmental information much more rapidly, in a manner that has been historically 
advantageous.  It is for this reason that an evolutionary approach is appropriate in the study of 
cognitive threat detection mechanisms.  Rapid detection of threats is essential for survival, and a 
threat detection system that went through an exhaustive set of possible interpretations in order to 
determine whether some environmental information should be perceived as a threat would be 
extremely inefficient and would potentially jeopardize survival.    
As views consistent with the SSSM approach are often taken for granted in current social 
science research, several important assumptions should be made clear in order to ground the 
theoretical considerations of the current research:  1) The human mind results from the 
functioning of the brain, and as such, the two are fundamentally linked by physical processes.  2) 
Evolved psychological processes tend to be specialized and domain-specific such that they are 
activated based on a restricted range of informational input and are most efficient in solving the 
problems that natural selection shaped them to solve.  3) In many cases, the characteristics of the 
information (especially the perceptual information) that can serve to activate a given 
psychological system are more relevant than the meaning that tends to be applied to this 
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information from a contextual standpoint.  For example, it has been shown that a human face is 
not a necessary input to trigger facial recognition processes.  Rather, various patterns of shapes 
and markings that are organized in the same basic configuration of a human face, such as the 
headlights and intake grill of an oncoming car, can trigger the same perceptual mechanisms; a 
phenomenon known as pareidolia (Hadjikhani, Kveraga, Naik, & Ahlfors, 2009).  Thus, it is 
important to consider the characteristics of the information used by evolved psychological 
mechanisms separately from the meaning that is applied to that same information in a post-hoc 
manner, outside of the operating parameters of the mechanism. 
Relative to the human lifespan, evolution is an extremely slow process.  Evolution 
requires random genetic mutations during the process of copying DNA in order for change to 
occur in biological systems which can then be used as a basis for natural selection, and such 
mutations are very rare.  Mutation rates vary depending on a range of factors, but Nachman and 
Crowell (2000) estimate that on average, DNA mutations only occur once in every 250,000,000 
copies.  Additionally, most mutations are neutral or deleterious in terms of their adaptive value, 
and thus there is not strong pressure for them to spread throughout the species.  Only a small 
subset of these mutations will provide an adaptive advantage, and such adaptive gains are likely 
to be very minor in scale.  Coupled with the fact that successful reproduction is required in order 
for an adaptive trait to spread, it is clear that many generations are required for a mutation to 
spread through the population to the point where it becomes a species-wide trait.  As an example 
of the time scale by which the evolutionary process works, one of the most recent evolved 
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biological traits in the human species is the ability to digest milk past childhood.  It is estimated 
that this trait arose approximately 30,000 years ago and is still absent in roughly 65% of the 
human population (Itan, Jones, Ingram, Swallow, & Thomas, 2010).   
Because of the relatively slow timescale of human evolution, when considering the 
selection pressures that shaped the development of human psychological mechanisms, the 
current human environment is likely to provide a misleading model.  It is only in recent decades 
that modern computing technology has begun to exert a strong influence in day-to-day human 
life; only the past few centuries that industrialization has had an influence on the human 
condition; and only the past few thousand years that humans have dealt with the adaptive 
challenges of living in large, organized societies.  By comparison, The Pleistocene Epoch, which 
was dominated by relatively small hunter-gatherer tribes which did not establish permanent 
settlements, existed for more than two million years until roughly 12,000 years BCE (Gradstein, 
Ogg, Smith, Bleeker, & Lourens, 2004; International Union of Geological Sciences, 2009), and 
is generally accepted as the era in which the biological and psychological characteristics of 
modern humans evolved.  For this reason, when considering the pressures that would have 
shaped human psychological threat detection mechanisms, the adaptive problems that were 
commonly faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (e.g., predation, competition for resources, 
outbreaks of disease) should garner the focus of scientific research, as opposed to the problems 
raised by modern, industrialized life (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).   
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Modularity in Evolved Cognitive Systems 
An important conceptual detail in psychological theories working within the framework 
of evolutionary psychology is the stance that the mind is modular in its architecture.  At a general 
level, the premise of modularity states that the human mind consists of specialized modules that 
accept specific informational inputs and promote specific behavioral outputs.  This view stands 
in stark contrast to the SSSM perspective that the mind consists of domain-general problem 
solving mechanisms and is boundlessly flexible in the types of information that it can process 
and the types of problems that can be solved.  The argument of modularity proved highly 
controversial when first put forth by Fodor (1983) and is still heavily debated.  Therefore, several 
conceptual clarifications should be made in order to precisely define the theoretical stance being 
taken in the current research. 
Fodor’s (1983) original argument for modularity of the mind was very narrow in its 
conceptualization.  His view was that modular structures are only activated based on a specific 
range of perceptual input and that modular information processing is encapsulated; meaning that 
information in one module is isolated from use by other modules.  He additionally proposed that 
modular structures are automatic in the sense that once perceptual information initiates 
processing within a module, the processing will continue to completion without interruption.  In 
the decades since its initial publication, these points have been hotly debated, and Fodor (2000) 
himself has conceded that the narrow conceptualization that he initially outlined was likely to be 
misguided. 
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The view of modularity that is most influential in evolutionary psychology today is 
guided by the premises of functional specialization and massive modularity (Barrett & Kurzban, 
2006).  Functional specialization refers to the proposition that cognitive structures evolved to 
solve particular adaptive problems.  Functionally specialized cognitive modules, therefore, 
accept a specific range of informational input and process this information in a manner 
appropriate for solving these adaptive problems.  An example of a functionally specialized 
cognitive module is the Theory of Mind Mechanism (TOMM; Baron-Cohen, 1995), a 
psychological system which is responsible for solving the problem of inferring the mental states 
of others.  The TOMM facilitates social functioning by making predictions about what others are 
likely to be thinking, feeling, or observing.  This has the effect of making the future behavior of 
others considerably more predictable.  Without the TOMM, the behavior of others - based solely 
on observable information - might make very little sense.  The modular conceptualization of the 
TOMM stems from neuroscience research demonstrating that specific brain regions are activated 
when individuals think about the mental states of others, but not when they think about their own 
mental states (Saxe & Powell, 2006).  It has been proposed that the characteristic symptoms of 
autism (impaired social development, inability to make intuitive inferences about the intentions 
of others, trouble with communication) stem from dysfunction localized in the TOMM, while 
other psychological mechanisms in individuals with autism exhibit normal functioning.  
Accordingly, a close examination of the characteristics of autism spectrum disorders reveals that 
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it is typically processes that rely on the ability to draw inferences about the mental states of 
others that are impaired (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Although early Fodorian views of functional specialization took the premise to mean that 
information was compartmentalized for problem solving, and was not integrated with any 
additional information in later-stage processing, more recent conceptualizations discard this view 
of information sorting as unlikely and instead favor a massive modularity approach.  Massive 
modularity refers to the notion that significantly greater information processing efficiency can be 
realized when a system utilizes a large number of simple, functionally specialized systems 
compared to what would be possible with a small number of complex, domain-general systems 
(Barrett & Kurzban, 2006).  The reason for this is that when a sufficiently large amount of 
information needs to be organized in a complex manner, there are infinite ways in which this 
information can be interpreted, and therefore a domain general system which is responsible for 
all aspects of this interpretation would be highly inefficient in determining which specific 
interpretation was appropriate.   
For example, in visual processing, the two-dimensional perceptual information that is 
received as it enters the eye can be interpreted in almost limitless ways in order to form a three-
dimensional representation of the world.  The task of interpreting this information becomes 
exponentially easier given functionally specialized mechanisms for detecting things like edges, 
colors, motion, and relative proximity.  Once this information is interpreted at functionally 
specialized levels, there exists a much more limited set of possibilities for how all of these 
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components can fit together in a manner consistent with known representations of the 
environment.  Additionally, the computational resources required to make these interpretations 
are significantly reduced compared to what would be necessary in a general information 
processer tasked with assembling all relevant information efficiently and effectively in order to 
inform appropriate behavioral responses.  Thus, a massively modular information processing 
architecture can act to quickly assemble individual features of perceptual information into 
summary interpretations which have historically been advantageous ways to infer meaning from 
the social environment.  Through this assembly process, the possible summary interpretations of 
this information are restricted to those that have historically been evolutionarily advantageous to 
the social functioning of the individual. 
Thus, the current conceptualization of modularity (e.g., Barrett & Kurzban, 2006) 
provides a view of the architecture of the human mind that is much more plausible from an 
information processing standpoint than alternate views proposing that the information processing 
capabilities of the mind are largely domain-general.  Considering the computational requirements 
that are necessary to efficiently solve adaptive challenges such as the ability to detect 
environmental threats, a functionally-specialized modular architecture of the human mind is 
considered the most plausible means of accomplishing these tasks in a biological organ.  
Additionally, a modular architecture is considerably more likely than a domain general 
mechanism to have evolved from natural selection as it could conceivably arise as a result of 
incremental gains in processing efficiency that were selected for over a long stretch of 
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evolutionary history.  By contrast, even if a domain general system did arise at a given point in 
evolutionary history, there would be strong pressure for the system to become increasingly 
domain specific over time particularly given any degree of environmental stability, in order to 
achieve increases in processing efficiency. 
Examples of evolved modular systems.  To date, considerable empirical evidence 
supports the existence of several evolved psychological mechanisms that operate based on 
content-specific information in order to solve problems of an adaptive nature.  The mechanisms 
that have been identified to date are considered to be too complex and functionally specialized to 
have arisen by chance alone or to be the result of domain-general processing.  Thus, these 
examples serve to illustrate the potential for complexity to arise from an evolutionary process. 
Mate preference mechanisms have perhaps received the most attention in the 
evolutionary psychology literature.  Buss and Schmitt (1993) originally proposed Sexual 
Strategies Theory to explain patterns of mating in both males and females that have been 
proposed to maximize reproductive fitness (the likelihood that genes will be passed to the next 
generation of surviving offspring).  Consistent with this theory, meta-analytic evidence suggests 
that across generations and cultures, females tend to prefer mates with characteristics such as 
financial resources and child-rearing skills that will maximize the survival likelihood of their 
children (Feingold, 1992).  Conversely, males tend to prefer characteristics such as fertility and 
youth which are indicative of reproductive capacity (Buss, 1992; 2006).  These findings tend to 
be consistent with cultural models of mate-selection preferences as well and indicate that 
 
 
17 
 
culturally specific patterns of mate preference may stem from biological factors that were 
originally shaped by evolutionary processes (Feingold, 1992). 
Evidence also indicates the existence of a collection of psychological disease avoidance 
mechanisms referred to as the behavioral immune system (BIS) which promote the avoidance of 
potential sources of disease causing pathogens (Schaller, 2006).  The BIS is specifically sensitive 
to information such as foul odors or body disfigurement which have historically indicated the 
presence of harmful contagions.  Upon encountering such stimuli, the BIS promotes a disgust 
response which motivates the avoidance of the potential source of contamination.  This system 
reduces the probability that humans will contract contagious diseases, thus increasing the 
likelihood of survival and ultimately, chances for reproductive success.  
Additionally, Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) argued that human language is highly 
likely to be comprised of several interrelated subsystems (the sensory-motor system, the 
conceptual-intentional system, and the recursion system) that each evolved to solve specific 
adaptive problems.  In support of this proposal, previous research has shown that language 
mechanisms are activated specifically in the presence of visual (hand signals or sign language) or 
auditory (spoken word) cues and function to decipher the language signals into their symbolic 
meaning in an extremely efficient manner (Pinker & Bloom, 1992).  This ability develops 
naturally in human children, even if no predominant parent language is present (Creole 
language).  Because this is a level of intricacy and specificity that is very unlikely to have arisen 
by chance and because the level of computational complexity associated with human language 
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would be next to impossible for a domain general system to ‘learn’ from scratch, it is highly 
likely that human language is modular and is the result of evolutionary processes. 
Considering the view of the human cognitive process outlined thus far, the current 
research seeks to explore the functionality associated with cognitive mechanisms which have 
been theorized to have evolved to solve the adaptive problem of detecting environmental threats.  
Such a capability is a key first step in successfully mitigating the risk of harm from 
environmental dangers (e.g., predators, disease, and competition from conspecifics); a capability 
that is essential for survival.  A host of theoretical and empirical work supports the likely 
existence of these functionally specialized cognitive threat management systems which draw 
attention to dangers in the environment and motivate appropriate protective behavioral responses 
to environmental threats.  
Cognitive Modularity and Threat Management 
Consistent with modular theories of cognition, several researchers have proposed that 
specialized cognitive structures have evolved which are specifically sensitive to threat relevant 
environmental stimuli, and which serve to motivate appropriate behavioral responses to 
environmental dangers.  LeDoux (1995) first outlined the ‘fear system’ which was described as 
“…a system that detects danger and produces responses that maximize the probability of 
surviving a dangerous situation in the most beneficial way” (p.128).  According to this view, the 
emotional experience of fear is an outgrowth of the threat detection processes of the fear system.  
These processes motivate appropriate defensive responses to threatening objects that are 
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encountered in the environment in order to reduce the likelihood that an individual experiences 
harm. 
Similarly, Öhman and Mineka (2001) proposed the existence of a fear module which is 
structured to promote rapid detection of environmental threats and to motivate fear responses in 
order to prepare an individual for appropriate action (fight, flight, or freeze).  One important 
implication outlined in the fear module theory is that individual differences are likely to exist in 
the specific sensitivity of the fear system such that some individuals may experience more 
intense fear responses than others when exposed to the same environmental stimuli.  The authors 
propose that an over-sensitivity associated with this system may underlie the disordered behavior 
associated with specific phobias. 
Yet another theoretical framework for a cognitive system which evolved to deal with 
environmental threats is the security motivation system (SMS) proposed by Szechtman and 
Woody (2004).  According to the SMS model, perceptual threat cues trigger anxiety which is 
intended to alert an organism of potential danger and which also serves as a signal to initiate 
appropriate behavioral responses intended to protect the organism from harm.  The objective 
knowledge that these protective actions have been taken is then fed back into the SMS, 
producing a subjective sense of ‘knowing’ that appropriate behavioral action has occurred 
(termed yedasentience).  This sense of knowing reduces anxiety, tempering the motivation to 
continue to engage in additional protective behaviors.  Based on this theoretical framework, the 
authors propose that the symptomology associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
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may reflect dysfunction in the feedback process following protective behavioral responses to 
threats.  More specifically, it is proposed that although sufferers of OCD tend to have objective 
knowledge that they have taken appropriate countermeasures (e.g., hand-washing) to combat a 
potential environmental threat (e.g., the presence of disease-causing pathogens), the 
yedasentience is absent.  Sufferers of OCD lack the subjective ‘feeling of knowing’ that serves to 
reduce the motivation for continued protective behaviors.  As such, anxiety remains high and the 
individual is motivated toward compulsive protective behavior (continued hand-washing) even 
though there is objective knowledge that the threat has been mitigated.     
Along similar lines, Boyer and Liénard (2006) proposed the hazard management system 
(HMS) which they theorized was a core cognitive system responsible for the prevalence of 
ritualized behavior.  The conceptualization of the HMS is similar to that of the SMS; however, 
the authors focused on ritualized behavior as the main phenomenon that can be explained as a 
consequence of HMS functionality.  More specifically, Boyer and Liénard suggested that all 
ritualized behavior including religious practices, children’s rituals, and life-stage relevant ritual 
thoughts (e.g., ritualized behavior associated with pregnancy and parenthood) are instinctive 
outgrowths of the HMS which are intended to mitigate the risk associated with environmental 
threats.   
It is theorized that the HMS was shaped by natural selection to specifically defend against 
rare but highly dangerous environmental threats such as natural disasters or attacks from large 
predators.  The characteristics of these rare threats are such that they may not be readily 
 
 
21 
 
detectible through obvious perceptual cues, but the costs associated with failing to detect them 
may be severe.  Therefore, it is economically beneficial to devote resources to protection against 
these rare threats even if there is no objective information to indicate their presence.  Evidence in 
support of the HMS, which demonstrates that humans tend to err on the side of false-positive 
identification of environmental threats, is abundant in the social psychology literature (Correll, 
Urland, & Ito, 2006; Hock, Krohne, & Kaiser, 1996; Payne, 2001; Wiens, Peira, Golkar, & 
Öhman, 2008; Windmann & Krüger, 1998). 
Cognitive threat management systems, as conceptualized above, are likely to be vastly 
complex.  There is a large range of stimuli that might signal a threat and an even larger range of 
behavioral responses which may be appropriate as protective responses in a given context.  An 
organism may encounter direct input indicating a threat (e.g., coming face to face with a 
predator, hearing a snake rattle nearby, observing a sick neighbor) or may be presented with 
more indirect information (e.g., noticing the fresh tracks of a dangerous animal, hearing a 
rustling in the bushes, being told by a neighbor about a growing flu pandemic).  In most cases 
this information must be processed contextually (the sound of explosions are likely to be 
processed very differently on July 4
th
 in the United States than they would be in an active war 
zone) and will be interpreted according to a standard set of expectations about what one is likely 
to encounter in the environment.  This level of complexity indicates that, consistent with the 
massive modularity approach of Barrett and Kurzban (2006), an evolved threat management 
system is likely to be comprised of a host of more functionally specialized subsystems.  Each of 
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these subsystems will likely play an important role in the overall process of efficiently managing 
threats and minimizing the risk of harm to the organism.   
Evidence for Modularity in Threat Management Systems.  Considerable empirical 
evidence supports the proposal that dedicated neural structures are involved in the detection and 
processing of threat-relevant information.  Blanchard and Blanchard (1988) summarized 
neurobiological evidence from human and animal research indicating that specific neural 
pathways are implicated in the detection of environmental threats.  Their review indicates that 
the amygdala is most likely the information hub for the identification and classification of threat-
relevant information.  Once a threat has been identified, signals are passed from the amygdala to 
regions in the hypothalamus and midbrain which have been shown to be essential in the 
regulation of emotion and in the initiation of defensive behavioral responses.  Davis and Whalen 
(2001) provide additional evidence from multiple studies indicating the existence of neural 
structures dedicated to fear conditioning involving connections between the basolateral amygdala 
and the central nucleus of the amygdala along with additional connections from the central 
nucleus to the brainstem.   
Research has begun to investigate the basic cognitive and behavioral correlates of 
psychological mechanisms associated with threat management systems as well.  The perception 
of threat relevant information has been shown to prioritize attention (Carlson, Fee, & Reinke, 
2009; Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, De Houwer, & Theeuwes, 2011; Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001), as well as inhibit disengagement of attention (Brosch & Sharma, 2005).  
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Additionally, increases in skin conductance rates have been shown to accompany the perception 
of threat-relevant stimuli (Flykt, Esteves, & Öhman, 2007; Michael, Blechert, Vriends, Margraf, 
& Wilhelm, 2007), and the perception of a potential contagion (a dirty diaper) has been shown to 
induce increases in heart rate and anxiety which are not reduced until appropriate protective 
action (hand washing) can be taken (Hinds, Woody, Drandic, Schmidt, Van Ameringen, 
Coroneos, et al., 2010).   
The results of these empirical studies suggest that specialized cognitive processes 
function for the purpose of managing environmental threats in an efficient manner, and that 
specific physiological and behavioral responses are initiated automatically when a threat is 
detected in order to protect the individual from harm.  Thus, it can be reasoned that threat 
management processes have a direct impact on the expected well-being of an individual.  It is 
likely that this ability to effectively manage threats depends on multiple sub-processes, and that 
each of these sub-processes has an independent impact on the overall effectiveness of the system.  
Therefore, in order to develop a more grounded empirical understanding of the process of threat 
management systems and how these processes relate to social behavior, it is important to 
investigate the sub-processes of the system separately.  In doing so, an accurate model of the 
information processing components of threat management can be constructed.  The initial - and 
arguably most important - component in the threat management process is threat detection.  If a 
threat is not accurately detected, downstream processes that serve to manage threats will be 
limited in their effectiveness.  Thus, the current proposal aims to develop a program of research 
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that will isolate the threat detection mechanism from other threat management components in 
order to understand how this particular subsystem relates to conservative social attitudes. 
Threat Detection 
The first step in an effective threat management process is accurate threat detection.  The 
ability to use perceptual cues in the environment to accurately detect danger provides a distinct 
advantage for survival and reproduction.  At the most basic level, threat detection involves the 
processing of perceptual information in order to categorize environmental objects as ‘dangerous’ 
or ‘safe’ at a sufficient level of accuracy.  Sufficient accuracy in such a system is characterized 
by the relative costs associated with deploying defense mechanisms as well as the benefits 
associated with avoiding harm.  Though perfect accuracy would be beneficial in making 
judgments about potentially threatening objects, optimization is not essential in order for a threat 
detection system to have high adaptive value.  A detection mechanism which, on average, serves 
the survival interests of the organism can be considered adaptive even if biases exist which lead 
to systematic errors in detection, provided that these errors do not reduce the overall likelihood 
of survival in the organism beyond the harm that would be expected if a less efficient system was 
in use.   
In general, it is expected that a sufficiently accurate system will minimize the number of 
threats it fails to detect (with the optimal number of misses being zero), limiting the exposure of 
the organism to harm.  Additionally, a sufficiently accurate system will limit false alarms so as 
not to waste considerable energy avoiding non-existent dangers.  More precisely, the aggregated 
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cost of the false alarms should not exceed the cost of the harm that is to be avoided in the first 
place.  This is commonly referred to as the ‘Smoke Detector Principle’ (Nesse, 2005).  Although 
detection of threats is only the initial stage of an effective threat management system, accuracy in 
detecting threats can help the organism ensure that later defense processes - which are more 
costly in terms of energy and resources - are deployed in an efficient manner.  Thus, accurate 
threat detection should ultimately increase the long term survival prospects of an organism. 
Beyond accuracy, the overall effectiveness of a threat detection mechanism is likely to 
depend on several environmental factors as well.  The level of danger that is likely to be present 
in the environment, the cost of failing to detect a threat, the cost (in energy and lost resources) 
associated with taking protective action in response to a perceived threat, and the potential 
benefits that can be extracted from non-threatening aspects of the environment are all factors that 
can influence the impact that threat-detection mechanisms can have on overall survival 
outcomes.  Thus, it is important to develop a set of grounded expectations with regard to the 
costs and benefits associated with evolved threat detection mechanisms.  
The economics of threat detection.  At its core, defensive behavior associated with 
managing threats can be modeled in terms of a basic decision tree that is executed when an 
organism encounters any object in the environment.  At the most general level, any object that is 
encountered can be classified as dangerous or safe; dangerous if the object has the potential to 
cause harm to the individual, and safe if it does not.  Additionally, the behavior of an organism 
that encounters an object in the environment can be classified as either approach or avoidance.  
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Approach behavior is any behavior in which the organism chooses to interact with the object (or 
at least remains in a proximate location so that the object is able to interact with the organism), 
and avoidance behavior is any action taken so as not to interact with the object.  As such, any 
instance of an interaction between an organism and an object in its environment can result in one 
of exactly four outcomes:  A safe object can be approached, a safe object can be avoided, a 
dangerous object can be approached, or a dangerous object can be avoided.   
It can be assumed that each of these outcomes is associated with an expected value (or 
utility), and that the behavioral response to any object that is encountered in the environment will 
be based on expectations about the probable utility of the outcome of this action.  Thus, 
assuming that negative outcomes will be associated with dangerous objects and positive 
outcomes will be associated with safe objects, it is expected that a decision maker will attempt to 
avoid all objects that are perceived to be dangerous, and will approach all objects that are 
perceived to be safe.   
If, from an evolutionary standpoint, survival is the ultimate goal that motivates behavioral 
decisions, a system that directs behavior associated with this goal is not likely to be structured so 
as to maximize the benefits that can be extracted from the environment.  Rather, it is expected 
that in the evolution of a threat detection system, natural selection would have rewarded 
characteristics that minimized the losses associated with encountering environmental danger.  
Non-optimization associated with gaining benefits would be perfectly acceptable as long as 
losses which lead to harm (and potentially the demise) of the larger system are minimized.   
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Certain parameters will impact the ability of an individual to survive in an environment in 
which potentially dangerous stimuli are present.  The overall prevalence of danger in the 
environment (the likelihood that any given object that is encountered is dangerous) as well as the 
relative ability of the organism to accurately detect dangerous objects, will have important 
implications for survival.  However, to determine the adaptive value of any threat detection 
mechanism, these two parameters must be considered concurrently.  In a sufficiently safe world 
(low likelihood of danger), the ability to accurately detect threats will not matter much because 
most objects that are encountered will be safe.  In other words, if the goal is simply to survive 
(and not to maximize resources) accuracy would not provide a considerable advantage in an 
extremely safe world because even a highly inaccurate organism will not encounter much 
danger.  Similarly, in an extremely dangerous world, accuracy will be advantageous from the 
standpoint that it will prolong the inevitable; however, this advantage will be modest at best, as 
most organisms in a highly dangerous environment will not survive for long.  In other words, if 
avoiding danger even requires a small amount of energy, and most objects in the environment are 
dangerous, then even an organism that is highly accurate at detecting danger will be constantly 
expending energy to avoid threats, and will not last much longer than an organism that is less 
accurate.  However, between these two extremes, the ability to detect threats accurately will 
allow an organism to avoid harm and allocate energy to the avoidance of danger only when 
necessary.  From an evolutionary standpoint, this ability is likely to be highly important in order 
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to increase the expected rate of survival.  As such, individual differences in the ability to detect 
threats would play a key role in influencing longevity and reproductive success.   
It is assumed that throughout human history, the world has neither been extremely safe 
(accidents, natural disasters, disease, and violence result in injury and loss of life on a daily basis 
throughout the world) nor extremely dangerous (a large proportion of the population has 
consistently survived beyond their reproductive years).  As such, it is expected that threat 
detection accuracy does indeed play an important role in promoting survival in humans.  
However, just as individual differences exist in other functionally specialized cognitive 
mechanisms such as the behavioral immune system (Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010), mate 
preference mechanisms (Buss, Shackelford, & LeBlanc, 2000), and face detection mechanisms 
(Vigil, 2010), individual differences are likely to exist in threat detection mechanisms as well.  
These differences presumably result in some people being able to detect threats in the 
environment better than others.  Because threat detection ability is likely to influence survival 
rates, individual differences in this ability may have important downstream behavioral 
consequences.  If an individual does not possess a strong ability to detect threats, alternative 
behavioral strategies such as an increased tendency to avoid situations where safety is in question 
might be necessary in order to minimize the negative effects of sub-standard threat detection 
ability.  Thus, individual differences in threat detection and their downstream impacts to social 
behavior were the focus of the present research. 
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Individual Differences in Threat Detection Ability 
Multiple studies have demonstrated variability in the accuracy with which threat-relevant 
visual stimuli can be detected across a range of presentation times.  Specifically, research has 
demonstrated the existence of individual differences in the accuracy associated with the detection 
of threatening words presented outside of conscious awareness (Windmann & Krüger, 1998), in 
the accuracy with which threat-relevant images are able to be detected when participants expect 
an associated punishment (an aversive shock) (Mermillod, Droit-Volet, Devaux, Schaefer, & 
Vermulen, 2010), and in participants’ ability to detect intentionally threatening motions of others 
under typical as well as degraded (visual noise and distortion added to video) visual conditions 
(Parasuraman, deVisser, Clarke, McGarry, Hussey, Shaw, & Thompson, 2009).  Additionally, 
multiple studies have demonstrated individual differences in the response time associated with 
detecting the presence of a threat relevant image among a matrix of distracters (Blanchette, 2006; 
Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Lipp, 2006; LoBue, 2010; Öhman et al., 2001).   
Research has also demonstrated individual differences in physiological responses to 
threatening stimuli.  Globisch, Hamm, Esteves, and Öhman (1999) demonstrated that individuals 
who reported higher levels of animal fear tended to show exaggerated startle (eye-blink) 
responses relative to non-fearful controls after being exposed to pictures of snakes and spiders.  
These startle responses were accompanied by increased skin conductance, increased heart rate, 
and increased blood pressure, indicating an association between subjectively reported fear, 
exposure to feared stimuli, and automatically activated physiological responses.  As indicated 
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previously, the emotion of fear serves to motivate the avoidance of perceived threat and 
therefore, this research provides indirect support for a link between threat detection processes 
and physiological processes that serve to motivate behavior.  Individual differences in fear were 
predictive of differences in physiological responses after exposure to (and thus detection of) a 
threat relevant stimulus object.   
Individual differences in threat detection ability may also have implications for social 
interactions and behavior.  Marsh, Kozak, and Ambaday (2007) reported evidence across three 
studies that individual differences in the ability to recognize the expression of fear in photos of 
adult faces predicted individual differences in prosocial behavior.  Specifically, participants who 
were better able to recognize the fear expression indicated higher levels of willingness to help 
another person and also judged the actions of others to be more indicative of prosocial behavior.  
The recognition of the fear expression is peripherally related to threat detection-mechanisms as 
noticing fear in another person is an important signal that danger may be near.  One possible 
interpretation of this research is that participants who are better able to discriminate fear 
expressions in others may act in a prosocial manner because they are better able to infer others’ 
motives (and are thus less likely to be taken advantage of by someone pretending to be afraid) 
whereas participants who are less able to discriminate fear expressions in others withhold 
prosocial behavior so as to decrease the chances that they unnecessarily devote time and 
resources to others when it is not needed.   
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More generally, individual differences in the ability to perceive and respond to threats 
may have implications for how an individual interprets and interacts with the social environment.  
All else being equal, an individual with less accuracy in detecting threats will experience danger 
more often (as a result of failing to detect threats) compared to an individual whose threat 
detection ability is highly accurate.  Thus, it is theoretically plausible that individual differences 
in threat detection accuracy may lead people to experience the same world in subjectively 
different ways.  Even minor differences in the ability to detect environmental threats may impact 
social attitudes and behaviors.   
An individual who is highly accurate at detecting threats should, on average, avoid more 
dangers compared to an individual who is less accurate.  This may lead the more accurate person 
to perceive the world as less dangerous, more predictable, and ultimately, more controllable.  
Conversely, an individual who is less accurate at detecting threats is likely to encounter dangers 
more frequently.  These individuals may perceive the world as a more dangerous place with 
greater uncertainty in the environment.  The perception of increased danger and uncertainty may 
promote more negative expectations about the world, and may motivate these individuals to seek 
the safety of familiar environments rather than risking the uncertainty of more novel 
environments.  In other words, an individual who is less accurate in detecting threats may be able 
to minimize the likelihood of encountering dangers by avoiding unfamiliarity and sticking to 
environments that are known to be safe.  From this perspective, an approach to social life that 
reduces the likelihood of encountering threats would serve to minimize the liability associated 
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with inaccurate threat detection.  Thus, it is plausible that individual differences in threat 
detection ability may motivate differences in general attitudes and perspectives about the social 
world in a manner that limits an individual’s overall exposure to threats. 
Conservative Attitudes 
One social approach that might reduce the likelihood of encountering danger has been 
referred to in the social sciences literature as conservatism.  Conservative political or social 
attitudes tend to reflect a favorable evaluation of tradition, established social norms, and 
conformity to the status-quo.  According to Wilson (1973), conservatism is characterized by four 
main dimensions:  resistance to change, the avoidance of risks, quantification of the ‘generation 
gap’ (the difference between older and younger generations in their typical beliefs about what 
constitutes ‘normal’ social behavior, with the views of older generations being more 
conservative), and internalization of ‘parental’ prohibitions (a quantification of the degree to 
which one holds a view that there exists an appropriate, normative pattern of social behavior).  
Similarly, Haidt, Graham, and Joseph (2009) proposed that ideologies map to moral 
underpinnings and that social conservatism reflects support of strong patriotism, authority 
associated with a traditional social role structure, concerns over sexual morality, and 
endorsement of reciprocity as a means to fairness (i.e., transgressions should be punished).  Both 
of these perspectives tend to conceptualize conservatism as a preference for social conformity 
over social diversity and for the traditional and familiar over the unfamiliar. 
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Conservatism has typically been viewed in the social sciences literature as a general 
attitude structure that is primarily influenced by social factors.  Supporting this perspective, 
Allsop and Weisberg (1988) provided evidence that shifts in party identification during the 1984 
presidential election occurred in response to campaign events.  Similarly, Niemi and Jennings 
(1991) argued that while initial political attitudes are the result of parental influence, shifts in 
political attitudes during adulthood are more likely to be related to policy preferences.  
Additionally, more recent empirical work has indicated that cues from the environment that 
reminded participants of cleanliness tended to influence a conservative shift in political attitudes 
(Helzer & Pizarro, 2011).  
Particularly relevant to the present research, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 
(2003) provided meta-analytic evidence that resistance to change and justification of social 
inequality are the two defining characteristics of a politically conservative ideology.  Based on 
this evidence, the authors developed a model of conservatism stemming from social-cognitive 
motives.  Specifically, the model predicts that environmental stimuli associated with fear, threat, 
and uncertainty promote three types of motives:  epistemic motives (dogmatism, uncertainty 
avoidance, need for structure), existential motives (self-esteem maintenance, loss prevention, 
terror management), and ideological motives (rationalization of self-interest, group-based 
dominance, system justification).  These motives, in turn, serve to motivate conservative 
attitudes and are behaviorally observable as a heightened resistance to change and an 
endorsement of social inequality.  Thus, meta-analytic evidence supports the existence of a 
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framework in which the experiences of fear, threat, and uncertainty ultimately influence the 
development of conservative attitudes.  This evidence illustrates the ability of social factors to 
influence the development of conservative attitudes; however, underlying biological factors are 
almost certain to play a role in the development of conservatism as well.  Specifically, cognitive 
threat detection processes influence the subjective experiences of fear, threat, and uncertainty by 
either motivating (or failing to motivate) the avoidance of environmental danger.  As the meta-
analysis by Jost and colleagues (2003) indicates, these subjective experiences ultimately play a 
key role in the development of conservative attitudes. 
It is likely that threat detection accuracy influences, to some extent, the probability that 
an individual will experience danger on a day-to-day basis.  Given any level of danger in the 
environment, low threat detection ability should increase the likelihood that an individual will 
fail to detect a threat and will thus encounter danger compared to an individual with relatively 
high threat detection ability.  Threat detection mechanisms, as currently defined, use perceptual 
information as an input and as such, there is not an objective standard by which people can know 
their own relative accuracy in detecting threats.  Threats are either detected at the time of 
perception or they are not, and compensation for any lack of accuracy must occur after the 
process of detection.  Therefore, it is not likely that individual differences in threat detection 
ability are typically perceived (i.e., it is unlikely that an individual with low (or high) threat 
detection ability would perceive themselves as such).  Rather, individuals with lower levels of 
threat detection ability, who tend to experience more danger in the world relative to people with 
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higher levels of threat detection ability, are likely to perceive the world itself as more dangerous 
instead of perceiving their ability to detect threats to be less accurate.  In other words, due to the 
lack of an objective standard by which to compare one’s own ability to detect threats and given 
equivalent levels of danger in the environment, an individual with low threat detection ability 
should perceive the world as a more dangerous place as a result of their experiences compared to 
an individual with high threat detection ability.  
These perceptual and experiential differences are the link between cognitive processes 
and social attitudes.  Given the increased perception of the world as dangerous, individuals with 
low threat detection ability must find a way to compensate and guard themselves against the 
relatively higher levels of danger that they perceive.  Conservative attitudes provide a means to 
accomplish this goal.  Conservatism places high value on adherence to tradition and social 
conformity, traits which promote behaviors that should steer people towards historically safe and 
predictable environments in which the overall likelihood of danger is perceived to be a known 
quantity.  Indeed, political conservatives tend to be more avoidant of novel, unfamiliar stimuli 
than political liberals (Shook & Fazio, 2009).  This is not to say that unfamiliar environments 
will always be more dangerous than known, traditional environments; rather, the argument is that 
the predictability of the known environment should be preferred over the risk of the unknown 
when the ability to detect threats is low, and that conservative social attitudes tend to motivate a 
preference for predictable, known environments.   
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In sum, though social influence and social learning mechanisms undoubtedly play a key 
role in the development of conservative social attitudes, there appears to be strong theoretical 
grounds to expect an association between trait-level cognitive threat detection accuracy and 
socially conservative attitudes as well.   
Empirical support for the proposed relation.  Though few studies have directly 
examined the relation between social conservatism and threat detection accuracy, several have 
provided initial evidence to inform the current research.  There is evidence of increased levels of 
amygdala activity (the brain area theorized to be the hub of threat-management processes) in 
Republicans, but not Democrats, when asked to make a risky decision (Schreiber, Simmons, 
Dawes, Flannigan, Fowler, & Paulus, 2009).  Additionally, Ojha and Sah (1990) found that 
conservatism was positively correlated with anxiety, intolerance of ambiguity, and insecurity, 
suggesting a relation between conservatism and safety concerns.  Along these lines, research has 
shown that participants in the United States who self-identified as Republican interpreted 
ambiguous faces as more threatening compared to participants who identified as Democrats 
(Vigil, 2010).  This may indicate that in the face of uncertainty, conservatives tend toward 
assumptions of negativity, perhaps as a strategy to avoid potential encounters with danger.   
Individual differences in physiological responses to threat have been related to 
conservative attitudes as well.  Specifically, conservatives tend to show stronger physiological 
responses (increased skin conductance, more prominent eye-blink startle responses) when 
exposed to threatening images compared to liberals (Oxley et al., 2008).  At first glance, this 
 
 
37 
 
research seems to indicate that conservatives may be more sensitive to threatening information; 
however, one key finding may indicate that this increased sensitivity stems from lower levels of 
threat detection ability.  Evidence from a review by Davis and Whalen (2001) indicates that 
when encountering a potentially threatening stimulus object, amygdala activity is highest and 
vigilance at its peak when threat information is ambiguous.  This results in the allocation of more 
attentional resources to the task of determining whether a threat is truly present in the 
environment.  For individuals with lower accuracy in threat detection, threat information is likely 
to be perceived as ambiguous more often, resulting in higher average levels of amygdala activity 
and stronger physiological responses when confronted with threat relevant information.  Thus, it 
is possible that previous findings indicating that conservatives demonstrate higher levels of 
amygdala activity and stronger physiological responses when encountering threat relevant 
information may have resulted from reduced accuracy (and therefore, increased ambiguity) in the 
threat detection process. 
In line with this perspective, perceptions of the world as a dangerous place have been 
found to be predictive of a more conservative self-reported political orientation (Jost, Napier, 
Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007).  Therefore, if the perception that the world is 
dangerous stems – at least in part – from low accuracy in threat detection, then a relation would 
be expected between threat detection accuracy and conservative attitudes. 
Additional evidence from developmental research indicates that conservative attitudes 
can be predicted from traits which are observable at a young age, supporting the notion that 
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conservative attitudes may be partially influenced by biological factors.  Following a 20-year 
longitudinal study, Block and Block (2005) reported that ideological disposition in adulthood 
was reliably predicted from pre-school traits measured 20 years prior.  Children whose teachers 
described them as being uncomfortable with uncertainty, susceptible to guilt, and rigid when 
experiencing distress tended to subscribe to a more conservative ideology in adulthood, whereas 
children who were described as resourceful, autonomous, expressive, and self-reliant reported a 
more liberal ideology later in life.   
Finally, conservative attitudes also appear to have a heritable component.  Alford, Funk, 
and Hibbing (2005) found that a common genetic factor was likely to account for between 18% 
and 41% of the variance in self-reported political attitudes across a set of 28 politically relevant 
topics.  Additionally, in a recent genome wide association study (GWAS), Hatemi and 
colleagues (2011) found evidence strongly suggesting an association between N-methyl-D-
aspartate (NMDA) receptors and self-reported political ideology assessed using a 50-item survey 
of attitudes towards contemporary ideological issues.  It should be cautioned that these findings 
are not necessarily suggestive of a direct link between genetics and ideology.  A more likely 
explanation is that genetic factors influence psychological factors which make the adoption of 
conservative attitudes more or less likely, a point originally put forward by Jost (2009) and 
echoed by Hatemi and colleagues (2011) as well.  Supporting this view, previous animal studies 
have found NMDA receptors to be functionally important in fear conditioning (Gewirtz & Davis, 
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1997), which is consistent with the proposed link between ideology and cognitive threat 
management mechanisms.   
As prior research has indicated a relation between conservative attitudes and 
psychological processes associated with threat and fear, it may be that genetic factors determine 
individual differences in cognitive threat detection mechanisms which then play a key role in 
influencing experiences with danger and threat relevant information.  Research to date that has 
examined conservative attitudes indicates that conservatism represents a very broad-based 
framework for interacting with the social world in a manner defined by a preference for tradition, 
resistance to change, and endorsement of social inequality.  These preferences have been shown 
to stem from increased perceptions of uncertainty and threat and in turn, motivate increased 
avoidance of environments or situations that deviate from social norms.  This is consistent with 
the model put forth by Jost and colleagues (2003) which proposes that environmental signals of 
threat and uncertainty motivate the development of conservative attitudes.  Additionally, 
evidence demonstrating physiological and genetic correlates of conservative attitudes indicates 
that conservatism is likely to have a biological basis as well.  One construct that might link these 
two findings is threat detection accuracy.   
Conservatism as an Adaptive Threat Management Strategy 
Differences in biological brain structures that affect threat detection accuracy may lead to 
differences in the amount of danger that is encountered in the environment.  Lower levels of 
threat detection accuracy may lead to more dangerous encounters, and a perception that the 
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world is dangerous and unpredictable.  This may motivate a more conservative attitude structure 
relative to individuals with higher levels of threat detection accuracy in order to avoid danger 
and uncertainty.  From an evolutionary standpoint, if conservative attitudes have historically led 
to higher survival rates in individuals who perceived danger and uncertainty in their 
environment, it is expected that conservatism would persist in the human species as an adaptive 
survival trait.  If conservative attitudes are evoked by perceptions of danger, they should tend to 
manifest more readily in individuals that have lower levels of threat detection accuracy, as  a 
more cautious strategy would compensate for a reduced ability to successfully detect 
environmental threats.  From this perspective, conservative social attitudes can be thought of as 
strategy for managing environmental danger which is motivated by the perception of danger in 
the surrounding environment.  This perception could be a result of actual high levels of danger, 
or it may stem from moderate levels of danger coupled with inaccuracy in the ability to detect 
threats.  In both instances, conservative attitudes are likely to promote increased survival by 
reducing the likelihood that danger is encountered, and therefore can be considered to be an 
adaptive strategy. 
This theoretical conceptualization of conservatism is consistent with previous research 
which has found evidence of a ‘conservative shift’ in individuals who are exposed to high levels 
of danger during a traumatic event (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Nail & McGregor, 2009).  These 
studies have demonstrated that exposure to highly traumatic events such as the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 result in an increase in the endorsement of conservative attitudes.  If 
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conservative attitudes are motivated by the perception of danger, it can be reasoned that the same 
psychological mechanisms responsible for conservative shifts following highly salient, traumatic 
events could promote more persistent levels of conservatism given chronic exposure to slightly 
elevated levels of danger, as would be expected in individuals with low accuracy in detecting 
environmental threats.  Thus, consistent with the motivated social cognition model of 
conservatism (Jost et al., 2003), lower levels of threat detection accuracy may predispose some 
individuals toward conservative social attitudes because they are more likely to encounter 
danger, and thus perceive the world as more dangerous. 
A conservative strategy should reduce the likelihood for mistaken encounters with 
danger.  However, for individuals with higher levels of threat detection accuracy, a conservative 
strategy might not convey the same advantages.  If threats can be detected at a fairly high rate of 
accuracy, conservative attitudes will inflate the type II error rate (mistakenly classifying a safe 
object as dangerous) much more than they will reduce the number of type I errors (failing to 
detect a dangerous object), as type I errors would already be very low to begin with.  Therefore, 
it should be less likely for conservative attitudes to manifest in individuals who are highly 
accurate at detecting threats.   
According to the Smoke Detector Principle (Nesse, 2005), as long as the cost of 
defending oneself from a threat is less than the likely cost of harm that would result from the 
threat, multiplied by the probability that this harm will actually occur, it is expected that 
defensive actions will be taken.  Because avoidance is likely to represent a low cost defense 
 
 
42 
 
mechanism across a range of potential threats, a general strategy of avoidance of unfamiliarity 
might be viewed as appropriate, if there is a perception that more than a minimal probability of 
danger exists in the environment or that the harm stemming from an encounter with danger, no 
matter how unlikely, would be particularly severe.  This tendency would be especially beneficial 
for individuals who are less accurate at detecting threats as it would reduce the chances that these 
individuals will mistakenly encounter harm.  This supports the notion that socially conservative 
attitudes may represent an adaptive strategy for managing threats. 
In our modern environment, the probability of harm associated with many historical 
threats such as predatory animals, rival individuals, disease, and natural disasters has been 
greatly reduced; however, the tendency for conservatism to persist is likely if conservative 
attitudes are motivated by the perception of threats and danger.  The advent of modern media 
allows humans to encounter signals of danger from a much broader area and on a more frequent 
basis than ever before.  As such, many individuals may perceive the world to be more dangerous 
(based on the frequency with which information indicating the prevalence of danger is 
encountered) than it truly is.  It may be that these signals of danger continue to activate threat 
detection mechanisms, motivating conservative social strategies that originally evolved to 
manage threats in the immediate environment.  In other words, though the true probability of 
danger in the modern environment is likely to be considerably lower than it was in the 
evolutionary past of humans, it may be likely that the world is perceived to be as dangerous (or 
more dangerous) than it was in the past based on the increased availability of threat-relevant 
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information.  If conservative social strategies evolved to respond to perceptions of danger, 
particularly in individuals with low threat detection ability, such strategies would be expected to 
remain prevalent in our modern environment, despite the relative decline in objective danger in 
recent decades. 
Summary 
Throughout the course of history, selection pressure is likely to have promoted the 
development of cognitive threat-management systems that increased the likelihood that 
individuals would avoid harm from environmental threats.  This pressure should have favored 
the development of sophisticated and streamlined threat detection mechanisms so that humans 
could selectively manage interactions in their social world and reduce their risk of encountering 
danger.  Considerable research supports this proposal, indicating that specialized cognitive 
mechanisms aid in the detection of potential sources of threat in the immediate environment, 
presumably reducing the likelihood that an individual will experience harm.  Additionally, there 
is evidence of variability in the ability to detect threats at the level of individual differences such 
that some individuals detect threats more accurately than others.  This would seem to indicate 
that individuals who are highly accurate at detecting threats have a distinct survival advantage 
over individuals who are less accurate.  However, it is plausible that a complementary 
mechanism may have evolved that helped improve the survival odds of early humans.  
Specifically, conservative social strategies may be an effective means of limiting exposure to 
threats when the environment is perceived to be highly dangerous.  Such a strategy would be 
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particularly beneficial for individuals with relatively lower levels of threat detection accuracy as 
it would likely limit their exposure to dangers by promoting a preference for tradition along with 
an avoidance of uncertainty and potential threats.  This approach to social life is likely to limit 
the potential liability of low threat detection accuracy. 
Present Research 
The goal of the present research was to pursue direct evidence of the association between 
threat detection ability and socially conservative attitudes.  Additionally, the present research 
explored the role that perceptions of environmental danger play in this relation.  Threat detection 
is the primary, and arguably the most important component of managing threats and avoiding 
danger.  Inaccurate threat detection processes will result in increased encounters with danger 
(because of failure to detect threats) as well as wasted energy and resources (resulting from the 
mistaken classification of safe objects as dangerous).  From this perspective, a conservative 
social strategy, which would promote avoidance of unfamiliar situations and adherence to 
traditional social practices, is likely to decrease the overall chance that a threat will be 
encountered when detection accuracy is low and would be expected to be utilized when the 
environment is perceived to be highly dangerous.   
In the present research it was predicted that individual differences in threat detection 
ability would predict differences in socially conservative attitudes.  Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that lower levels of threat detection ability would be associated with stronger 
endorsement of socially conservative attitudes.  Conservative social strategies (increased 
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avoidance of unfamiliarity and adherence to tradition) should be expected when the benefit of 
avoiding additional harm by engaging in the conservative strategy exceeds the expected cost 
associated with mistakenly encountering dangers.  This makes it particularly likely that 
conservative strategies will be beneficial when the environment is perceived to be dangerous, 
and when threat detection ability is low.  Conversely, in an environment that is perceived to be 
relatively safe (the likelihood of encountering a threat is low), there would not be a severe 
penalty for inaccuracy in threat detection, and conservative social strategies would not convey a 
significant benefit. 
Evidence in support of the predictions of the present research would have a broad range 
of applications for scientists investigating the influence of social media.  In general, evidence 
supporting that individual differences in threat detection ability are predictive of conservative 
social attitudes would indicate that attitude formation and attitude change may depend not only 
on the content of social information, but also on innate, trait-level cognitive processes as basic as 
perceptual ability.  Prior research supports this perspective, as individual differences in trait level 
characteristics such as the need for cognition have been shown to moderate the effects of 
environmental information on social attitudes (Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 
2008).   
Additionally, findings that reveal a link between basic cognitive process and social 
attitudes would highlight the need to ensure that social policies are based on objective 
information, as differences in basic cognitive processes may manifest as subjective biases at the 
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individual level.  For example, if individual differences in threat detection ability lead to 
predictable differences in socially conservative attitudes and perceptions of how safe the average 
U.S. citizen is in the modern world, policy decisions about how much federal spending should be 
devoted to a potential protective mechanism such as defense against terrorism should be based 
on objective measures of risk as opposed to subjective feelings of fear in order to avoid 
systematic biases stemming from individual cognitive differences.  This same reasoning might 
also be applied to other policy domains such as immigration reform and prison reform. 
To test the predictions of the present research, a computer model was created which 
simulated the effect of conservative social strategies (increased avoidance) on survival at various 
levels of threat detection accuracy and at varying levels of environmental danger.  Furthermore, a 
new research paradigm was developed to assess individual differences in the ability to accurately 
discriminate between dangerous and safe stimuli.  Additionally, three research studies were 
conducted to investigate the relation between threat detection accuracy and socially conservative 
attitudes in human subjects.   
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Computer Modeling 
Prior to investigating the relation between threat management processes and socially 
conservative attitudes in human subjects, a computer program was developed which modeled the 
theoretical assumptions of the current research.  The program was constructed using the C++ 
programming language and was designed to compare the expected survival rates of an organism 
based solely on threat detection ability with expected survival rates based on social behavior that 
followed a conservative strategy (increased avoidance of objects).   
The program simulates the behavior of an organism which iteratively encounters objects 
in the environment that are either safe or dangerous.  Upon encountering an object, the organism 
must choose to approach or avoid it.  Thus, four outcomes are possible:  a safe object is 
approached, a safe object is avoided, a dangerous object is approached, or a dangerous object is 
avoided.  Each of these behavioral outcomes affects the survival of the organism by increasing or 
decreasing the organism’s ‘survival resources’ (a point value that must maintain a level above 0 
for the organism to survive and continue to the next iteration of the model).   
Of main interest to the present research, the program includes a feature which allows for 
an investigation into the effect of conservative attitudes on survival rates.  This feature works by 
simulating an increase in the propensity of the organism to avoid objects above what would be 
expected based on threat detection accuracy rates alone.  Using this feature, the model allows for 
a comparison between social strategies that are based on accuracy alone and strategies that 
incorporate varying levels of conservatism. 
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Flexible Parameters of the Model 
 The program is an exploratory tool that can be used to help make informed predictions 
about the effect of conservative attitudes on survival.  As such, several key parameters that can 
influence the expected survival rate of the simulated organism are allowed to vary.  A brief 
overview of each of these parameters follows: 
 Threat detection accuracy.  The accuracy associated with correctly discriminating 
between dangerous and safe objects in the environment can be set between a lower bound of .50 
and an upper bound of .95.  An accuracy level of .50 (50%) would represent an ability to 
discriminate between dangerous and safe objects at a chance level, whereas an accuracy level of 
.95 (95%) would indicate high accuracy in the ability to discriminate between dangerous and 
safe objects. 
 Likelihood of environmental danger.  The likelihood that any object in the environment 
is dangerous can be set between a lower bound of .05 (5% likelihood of danger) and an upper 
bound of .95 (95% likelihood of danger). 
 Utility of behavioral outcomes.  The impact associated with the four possible behavioral 
outcomes (approaching a dangerous object [AD], approaching a safe object [AS], and avoiding a 
safe or dangerous object [AV]) on the survival resource value of the organism can be set by the 
experimenter.  For the purposes of the current analysis, AD ranged from -6 to -15, AS was 
always set to +5, and AV ranged between -3 and 0 (see Figure 1 for an example of the utilities  
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that were assumed in the base case of the model).  The utility of behavioral outcomes varied in 
this manner in order to examine the sensitivity of overall survival rates to the parameters that had 
the ability to reduce the resource value.
1
   
 Mortality likelihood (M).  The mortality likelihood simulates the possibility of rare but 
extremely dangerous environmental threats associated with approaching a dangerous object.  
This likelihood represents the probability that resource values are immediately reduced to 0 
(simulating death of the organism) if a dangerous object is approached.  For the purposes of the 
current analysis, the mortality likelihood varied between .01 (1%) and .15 (15%) in accordance 
with the assumption that mortality threats, while important, would be sufficiently rare. 
                                                          
1
 The following models and associated parameter values were tested in order to explore 
the effect of conservative attitudes on survival rates during computer modeling.  Initially, a base 
case model was tested which incorporated what were considered to be the most typical values for 
the utility of behavioral outcomes.  Several other models were tested in order to explore the 
sensitivity of the survival rate to changes in the utility value associated with behavioral outcomes 
as well as the mortality rate.  These alternate models yielded little deviation in the effect that 
conservative attitudes had on the average survival rate; therefore, the discussion in the present 
research is focused on the general effect of conservative social strategies across all of the models 
that were developed rather than examining the effects associated with each individual model. 
 AD AS AV M 
Base Model -10 +5 -3 10% 
Minimize AD -6 +5 -3 10% 
Strong AD -15 +5 -3 10% 
Mortality Alt 1 -10 +5 -3 1% 
Mortality Alt 2 -10 +5 -3 5% 
Mortality Alt 3 -10 +5 -3 15% 
Minimize Negativity -6 +5 0 1% 
Key:  AD = Approach Dangerous, AS = Approach Safe, AV = Avoid, M = Mortality Likelihood 
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Figure 1.  Basic decision structure for the detection of environmental threats. 
Note.  The key assumption in the payoff matrix is the proportion of the outcome values 
relative to one another.  The values themselves can be considered to be arbitrary, and should 
be assigned according to the overall utility structure to be modeled.  
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 Social strategy.  Model simulations can be run under one of four possible social 
strategies:  A neutral social strategy indicates that approach and avoidance decisions are based on 
threat detection accuracy alone.  A weak conservative strategy increases the likelihood of 
avoidance by 10% over what would be expected based on threat detection accuracy; a moderate 
conservative social strategy increases avoidance by 30%; and a strong conservative social 
strategy increases avoidance by 50%. 
 Running a simulation under one of the three conservative social strategies updates the 
probability that any object is avoided.  The updated probability of avoidance, P’(Avoid) is a 
function of the probability of avoidance based on accuracy alone, P(Avoid), coupled with the 
increase in avoidance due to conservatism, AVconservative.  The updated probability is computed 
according to the following formula: 
P’(Avoid) = P(Avoid) + AVconservative * [1 – P(Avoid)] 
For example, an organism with an accuracy rate of 75% is 75% likely to avoid any 
dangerous object in its environment and is 25% likely to avoid any safe object.  If the organism 
is also following a weak conservative social strategy that promotes a 10% increase in avoidance 
behavior, then the updated likelihood of avoiding a dangerous object, P’(Avoid | Dangerous) can 
be represented as: 
P’(Avoid | Dangerous) = .75 + .1 * (1 - .75) = 77.5% 
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Also, because a conservative social strategy reflects an overall increase in avoidance 
behavior, the updated likelihood of avoiding a safe object, P’(Avoid | Safe) can be represented 
as: 
P’(Avoid | Safe) = .25 + .1 * (1 - .25) = 32.5% 
  Likewise, the updated likelihood of approaching a dangerous or safe object decreases 
according to the following two formulas, respectively: 
P’(Approach | Dangerous) = 1 – P’(Avoid | Dangerous) = 22.5% 
and 
P’(Approach | Safe) = 1 – P’(Avoid | Safe) = 67.5% 
 Using these formulas for updating behavior based on conservative social strategies, the 
probability of any of the 4 possible behavioral outcomes will always remain between 0 and 1, 
and the behavioral probabilities associated with either type of object (dangerous or safe) will 
always sum to 1. 
 Number of simulations.  The program was designed to accept as a parameter the number 
of times to simulate a specified model at each combination of threat detection accuracy and 
likelihood of environmental danger in order to calculate the average survival likelihood.  For the 
purpose of the current analysis, the number of simulations was always set to 1000, meaning that 
the survival rates presented in the analysis represent the average number of iterations survived 
across 1000 simulations of the model.   
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Core Assumptions of the Modeling Process 
Given the flexible parameters that are incorporated into the modeling program as 
indicated above, a set of overarching assumptions guided the development of the models used in 
the current analysis: 
Assumption 1.  Threat detection processes do not change over time.  More specifically, 
approach and avoidance probabilities are not updated based on experience.  It is assumed that 
learning mechanisms influence processes in a threat management system that occur post-threat 
detection, such as the development of effective response strategies.  Threat detection processes, 
however, are assumed to exist at the entry point of perceptual information and thus because 
information must be detected before it can be acted upon, detection mechanisms as theorized 
should be isolated from learning mechanisms.  
Assumption 2.  Using a similar rationale as in assumption 1, it is assumed that organisms 
are not explicitly aware of the accuracy of their own threat detection ability.  Again, if it is 
granted that detection processes exist at the informational input level and operate in an automatic 
fashion, the true accuracy of the input signal cannot be objectively known to the organism.  An 
inaccurate categorization of a threat (categorization of a dangerous object as safe) which results 
in an encounter with the threat is assumed to result in the perception that the environment is 
more dangerous than expected (as opposed to the perception that one’s ability to detect threats is 
less accurate than had been assumed).  Similarly, an inaccurate categorization of a non-threat 
(categorization of a safe object as dangerous) which results in avoidance of the non-threat will 
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not be subject to feedback from direct experience.  Thus, it is expected that at the level of 
information processing relevant to the current study, organisms perceive their perceptions (i.e., 
threat detection mechanisms) to be accurate 100% of the time and behave according to these 
perceptions unless influenced otherwise by a social strategy. 
Assumption 3.  On average, the expected cost of encountering a dangerous object will be 
higher in magnitude than the expected benefit of encountering a safe object.  Because the value 
of an accurate threat detection system is in minimizing harm (as opposed to maximizing benefit), 
losses are more costly than gains are beneficial.  In other words, because there is a finite lower 
limit (death), but a theoretically infinite upper limit to the possible resource values that can be 
achieved by an organism interacting with the environment, encountering something dangerous is 
assumed to – on average – have a higher impact on survival than encountering something safe. 
Assumption 4.  The risk of sudden mortality should remain relatively small.  The 
likelihood of such a catastrophic event may be higher in some environments (active war zones, 
natural disaster areas, highly populated areas during a disease outbreak) than others; however in 
general, a chronically high likelihood of sudden mortality is a rare condition in human societies 
and would be a more likely subject of study as a special circumstance rather than a standard 
characteristic of the human environment.  Thus, the current models used 15% as the highest 
possible probability rate of sudden mortality. 
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Basic Model Functionality 
In any given simulation, the organism starts with a resource value of 50, and this value is 
updated following every iteration of the model’s decision sequence.  A decision sequence starts 
with the program generating an environmental object which is either dangerous or safe according 
to the likelihood of environmental danger.  In other words, if the likelihood of danger, P(D), is 
75%, then the probability that the program generates a safe object, P(S) is determined by: 
P(S) = 1 – P(D) = .25 
The program then simulates a behavioral decision (approach or avoid) by the organism 
based on the combination of threat detection accuracy and any additional likelihood of avoidance 
as indicated by the social strategy as input by the user.   
For example, if threat detection accuracy is set to 60%, the organism is following a 
moderate conservative social strategy, and a dangerous object is generated, then the probability 
that the organism avoids the dangerous object is: 
P’(Avoid | Dangerous) = .6 + .30 * (1 - .6) = 72% 
Additionally, the probability that the organism approaches the dangerous object is: 
P’(Approach | Dangerous) = 1 – P’(Avoid | Dangerous) = 28% 
Based on the utility associated with the behavioral outcome (AD, AS, AV, M), the 
resource value is updated, and the process repeats (see Figure 2 for a decision tree representing 
all possible decision paths in the model, associated probabilities, and behavioral outcomes).  This 
cycle continues until the resource value reaches zero or until 100 iterations of the decision  
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AVconservative 
1 - P(A|D) 
Object 
Generation 
P(D) 
1 - P(D) 
Dangerous 
Object 
Safe  
Object 
1 - AVconservative 
P(A|D) 
Approach 
Avoid 
Avoid 
AVconservative 
1 - AVconservative 
P(A|S) 
1 - P(A|S) 
Approach 
Avoid 
Avoid 
Figure 2.  Decision tree representing object generation and behavioral decisions in the computer modeling simulation (probabilities are noted for 
each path segment).  Key:  P(D) = Likelihood of environmental danger, AVconservative = increased rate of avoidance due to social strategy, 
P(A|D) = Probability that a dangerous object will be approached, P(A|S) = Probability that a safe object will be approached. 
Note.  1 - P(A|D) = P(A|S) = Threat Detection Accuracy 
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sequence have occurred.  Thus, the maximum length of survival in any simulation is 100 
iterations and any simulation that ends prior to 100 iterations indicates that the resource value of 
the organism has reached zero (i.e., death). 
When the simulation is complete (the organism dies or survives for 100 iterations), the 
program stores the number of iterations that the organism survived.  Then, a new simulation 
begins using the same threat detection accuracy and likelihood of environmental danger, 
provided that the user defined number of simulations (1000 for all models in the current analysis) 
has not yet been reached.  Once 1000 simulations of the model have been completed at a given 
combination of threat detection accuracy and likelihood of environmental danger, the average 
survival rate over the course of all simulations is calculated.  Running a large number of 
simulations of the model in this manner prevents a single instance of sudden mortality from 
distorting the overall expected survival rate, but also allows for the combined effect of sudden  
mortality, threat detection accuracy, and environmental danger on the rate of survival to be 
accurately assessed.   
The program begins by computing the average survival rate at a threat detection accuracy 
level of .5 and a likelihood of environmental danger of .05.  Once 1000 simulations of the model 
have concluded and the average survival rate has been calculated at this combination of values, 
the danger likelihood is increased by .05, and the process repeats.  This continues to a maximum 
danger likelihood of .95.  Then, threat detection accuracy is increased by .05 (to .55), the danger 
likelihood is reset to .05, and the entire process repeats.  This continues until the simulation has 
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been run for all combinations of threat detection accuracy (from .5 to .95) and likelihood of 
environmental danger (from .05 to .95).  Thus, during one model run, a matrix of 190 survival 
likelihood values (10 threat detection accuracy values and 19 danger likelihood values) is 
generated.  This matrix represents the range of average survival rates associated with a specific 
set of behavioral outcome utilities and a user-defined social strategy (see Figure 3 for the matrix 
of survival likelihoods generated in the base case model).    
Model Comparisons 
The average survival rate associated with each of the three conservative social strategies 
was compared to the neutral social strategy.  For example, in order to calculate the effect of a 
weak conservative social strategy on survival rates, the matrix of survival rates under the neutral 
social strategy was subtracted from the matrix of survival rates under the weak conservative 
social strategy, resulting in a matrix of values indicating the overall effect on survival rate (in  
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0.95 7.71 8.09 8.51 9.38 9.98 11.16 11.77 13.57 15.39 17.54
0.9 7.96 8.47 9.18 10.13 10.92 12.21 13.55 14.76 17.41 19.77
0.85 8.53 9.16 9.92 10.91 12.06 13.08 15.24 17.09 20.51 24.04
0.8 9.22 9.90 10.74 11.88 12.96 14.82 16.89 19.78 22.86 29.70
0.75 10.13 10.91 11.72 12.90 14.82 16.25 19.48 23.34 29.15 37.96
0.7 10.78 11.75 13.03 14.58 16.43 19.01 22.29 28.18 37.40 49.38
0.65 11.68 12.70 14.60 16.62 18.38 22.73 28.13 34.79 48.38 68.20
0.6 13.13 14.37 15.81 18.83 21.66 26.40 33.16 44.89 60.64 80.35
0.55 14.22 16.51 18.46 20.80 25.63 33.68 42.82 54.15 69.94 87.45
0.5 16.04 18.10 21.70 26.45 31.97 41.32 51.35 64.95 78.12 89.99
0.45 18.36 21.57 25.69 31.10 40.66 49.08 63.01 70.82 81.92 90.58
0.4 21.26 25.20 31.72 40.82 49.15 59.52 67.92 74.78 84.59 91.98
0.35 25.35 31.22 38.61 48.67 56.09 65.62 72.35 78.66 85.41 93.78
0.3 31.70 38.64 49.77 56.24 64.89 70.60 77.93 83.15 87.42 94.24
0.25 40.68 47.99 58.57 64.71 70.19 76.22 80.34 83.25 89.77 95.13
0.2 53.34 60.47 68.55 72.86 75.22 79.82 83.12 87.05 91.15 96.02
0.15 62.91 71.80 75.73 76.84 83.30 84.01 87.34 90.65 93.49 97.28
0.1 79.49 82.50 84.89 86.17 88.96 89.67 92.21 94.29 95.77 97.73
0.05 88.69 88.33 91.00 91.24 93.39 94.76 94.44 97.21 96.72 98.67
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Detection Accuracy
D
an
ge
r 
Li
ke
li
h
o
o
d
Figure 3.  Average number of iterations survived in the base case model (AD = -10, AS = +5, AV = -3, M = 10%) using a 
neutral social strategy 
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average number of additional trials survived) of the weak conservative social strategy.  Positive 
values indicated that conservatism benefitted survival (the organism tended to survive for a 
greater number of iterations under the conservative social strategy) whereas negative values 
indicated that conservatism reduced the average number of iterations survived compared to the 
neutral social strategy.   
Comparisons were made for each level of conservative social strategy and were averaged 
across all models, resulting in a weak (Figure 4), moderate (Figure 5), and strong (Figure 6) 
conservative strategy matrix.  Examining the comparison matrices, there was substantial 
variability as to whether a conservative social strategy was beneficial or detrimental to survival 
and this effect depended on the combination of threat detection accuracy and danger likelihood.  
Given this finding, three general patterns were apparent:    
First, a conservative social strategy was consistently beneficial when threat detection 
accuracy was low and the likelihood of danger was high.  This outcome is indicated in the top 
left quadrant of each of the matrices in Figures 4-6.   
Second, conservative social strategies could be beneficial or harmful to survival rates 
given the same level of danger in the environment, depending on detection accuracy of the 
organism.  For example, Figure 5 demonstrates that at a danger likelihood level of 75%, a 
conservative strategy benefitted survival when detection accuracy was 75% or lower, but 
reduced survival rates when detection accuracy was greater than 75%.  This indicates that in a 
relatively dangerous world, multiple social strategies can serve as a valid mechanism for  
 61 
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Figure 4.  Average survival rate effect of a weak conservative strategy (increase avoidance by 10%) on each combination of 
detection accuracy and environmental danger likelihood.  Positive numbers indicate that a weak conservative social strategy 
increased the survival rate, whereas negative numbers indicate that a weak conservative social strategy decreased the survival 
rate.  Color shading illustrates the magnitude of the effect of the weak conservative strategy according to the following key: 
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0.95 2.57 2.30 2.87 2.88 3.43 3.16 3.87 2.28 1.07 -0.12
0.9 2.74 2.70 3.13 3.11 3.38 3.14 2.86 1.38 0.33 -0.82
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Figure 5.  Average survival rate effect of a moderate conservative strategy (increase avoidance by 30%) on each combination of 
detection accuracy and environmental danger likelihood. Positive numbers indicate that a moderate conservative social strategy 
increased the survival rate, whereas negative numbers indicate that a moderate conservative social strategy decreased the survival rate.  
Color shading illustrates the magnitude of the effect of the moderate conservative strategy according to the following key: 
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0.95 5.43 5.26 6.20 6.53 7.09 6.85 7.00 3.81 1.61 0.07
0.9 5.63 5.87 6.38 6.77 6.85 5.96 4.66 2.13 0.49 -1.25
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Figure 6.  Average survival rate effect of a moderate conservative strategy (increase avoidance by 30%) on each combination of 
detection accuracy and environmental danger likelihood. Positive numbers indicate that a strong conservative social strategy 
increased the survival rate, whereas negative numbers indicate that a strong conservative social strategy decreased the survival rate.  
Color shading illustrates the magnitude of the effect of the strong conservative strategy according to the following key: 
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reducing the likelihood of mortality, and the appropriate strategy depends on the ability to detect 
threats in the environment.  
Finally, the magnitude of the conservative social strategy affected the magnitude of the 
impact on survival rates.  A relatively weak conservative strategy (increasing avoidance by 10%) 
was broadly beneficial, but had a minimal overall effect on survival rates (Figure 4).  In the 
conditions that benefitted from a weak conservative social strategy, the magnitude of the benefit 
was always less than 2 iterations.  A weak conservative strategy reduced survival likelihoods 
over a range of cases as well (yellow shaded cells), but the effect never reached a reduction of 10 
iterations, and only came close to that level of magnitude when detection accuracy was 
extremely high.  By comparison, both moderate and strong conservative social strategies 
increased the magnitude of beneficial as well as detrimental effects.  In Figure 5 (moderate 
conservative strategy), 35% of cases reflect an increased survival rate of more than 1 iteration 
(light green shading), and 20% of cases reflect a decrease in survival rates of more than 10 
iterations (red and dark red shading combined).  Likewise, in Figure 6 (strong conservative 
strategy), 17% of the cases reflect an increase in the survival rate of 5 iterations or more (dark 
green shading) and 35% of cases represent a survival rate reduction of more than 15 iterations 
over what was observed when decision making was based purely on accuracy (dark red shading).  
This illustrates that as conservative strategies get stronger, they tend to convey a higher 
magnitude of benefits, but only in increasingly specified cases.  As reflected in the model, these 
benefits tend to be localized to regions where threat detection accuracy is low and the likelihood 
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of environmental danger is high.  Conversely, as conservative strategies get stronger, they tend to 
be increasingly detrimental to a subset of cases as well.  In particular, the range of combinations 
of detection accuracy and environmental danger likelihood running from the lower left to the 
upper right portion of Figures 4-6 tend to be negatively affected by conservative social strategies.  
This may indicate that when threat detection accuracy is sufficiently high relative to the 
likelihood of danger in the environment, conservatism violates the Smoke Detector Principle, 
meaning that the cost of increased avoidance exceeds the expected cost of mistakenly 
encountering a dangerous object, given the organism’s level of accuracy in detecting threats. 
Conclusion 
In support of the current research, the computer modeling simulation demonstrated that 
conservative social strategies, which increased general avoidance tendencies, conveyed a 
relatively consistent survival benefit to organisms with low threat detection accuracy when these 
organisms were in high-danger environments.  This general pattern held up across multiple 
configurations of utility values that modeled the effects of approach and avoidance decisions on 
survival rates. 
Given these results, it is plausible to theorize that selection pressure would have favored 
the evolution of conservative social attitudes in order to promote survival, especially if it is 
assumed that at least a moderate level of danger (stemming from predators, disease, or rival 
conspecifics) existed in the ancestral environment of humans.  If individual levels of 
conservatism tend to be higher when the environment is perceived to be more dangerous, and if 
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conservatism promotes an increase in behavioral avoidance tendencies, then conservative 
attitudes may serve to minimize the likelihood that individuals mistakenly encounter harm.   
Thus, individuals with lower levels of threat detection accuracy, who are likely to 
encounter (and thus perceive) higher levels of danger in the environment, would be expected to 
develop more conservative social attitudes than those with higher rates of accuracy in detecting 
threats.  The results of the computer modeling simulation reflect this perspective, and support the 
predictions of the current research that conservative attitudes which motivate increased 
avoidance behavior can serve to reduce the liability of inaccuracy in threat detection.  This would 
decrease the likelihood that an individual will mistakenly encounter danger and would thus be 
beneficial to survival when the environment is sufficiently dangerous.    
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Development of a Threat Detection Paradigm  
Threat detection represents the initial step of the threat management process.  As such, it 
is dependent on early stage perceptual information and is likely to be highly automatic in nature.  
That is, the ability to detect threats (independent of any conscious reasoning or response 
behavior) is most likely based on unconscious processes, or processes that are unintentional and 
which act outside of conscious awareness to influence behavior (Bargh & Morsella, 2008).  
Thus, to isolate threat detection processes from later, downstream threat management processes 
to the greatest extent possible, research paradigms that investigate threat detection ability should 
investigate the ability to discriminate between threats and non-threats at an unconscious level.     
Theoretically, presenting stimuli outside of conscious awareness should minimize the 
chances that measurements of threat detection ability reflect conscious judgments or other 
cognitive processes that occur in response to the detection of a threat (or non-threat).  For 
example, it is expected that an image of a snake would be classified as threatening based on 
initial threat detection mechanisms, as snakes have historically represented a source of potential 
danger.  However, given the opportunity to consciously reason over the image of a snake in a 
laboratory setting, it is plausible that some participants may classify the snake image as non-
threatening because they feel that snakes make interesting pets, or because they may interpret the 
specific type of snake to be non-threatening to humans.  By using a threat detection paradigm 
that presents stimuli at an unconscious level, the possibility that conscious reasoning would 
influence classifications in this manner should be considerably reduced.    
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Along these lines, Windmann and Krüger (1998) assessed automatic threat detection 
mechanisms by asking participants to distinguish words from non-words that were presented for 
a very brief time (28ms).  Accuracy in this discrimination task served as the main measure of 
interest in the study, and the authors found that participants responded with a higher bias toward 
a ‘word’ response for non-words that resembled threatening words compared to non-words that 
resembled neutral words.  Although this finding provides some insight into the automatic nature 
of cognitive categorization processes, the use of words to represent environmental threats 
presents issues for the study of individual differences in threat detection ability.  Words are 
symbolic in their representation of threats, and therefore, assessment of the ability to detect 
threats using words as target stimuli incorporates the functionality of cognitive language 
mechanisms which must act to correctly interpret the symbolic meaning of the words that are 
presented.  Words do not represent actual threats that need to be avoided or defended against; 
therefore, it is possible that a paradigm which uses words as target stimuli might not directly 
assess the processes that would have been shaped by evolutionary forces to detect environmental 
threats in order to promote survival.  Instead, such a paradigm must assess mechanisms which 
extract meaning through language to determine whether a threat is being represented. 
In a separate study, Wiens and colleagues (2008) assessed automatic threat detection 
ability by presenting participants with standardized grayscale images one at a time followed by a 
backward masking image.  Backward masking involves presenting a second image (in this case, 
an image composed of randomly re-shuffled 10 pixel x 10 pixel sections from the original target 
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images) immediately after the first image, limiting the extent to which the target image can be 
held in short term memory and consciously perceived.  The authors presented each image for 12 
ms and varied the onset of the presentation of the backward masking image between 12 ms and 
200 ms to investigate the extent of the exposure required to show differences in threat detection 
ability.  Participants were told that each image belonged to one of four possible categories 
(snakes, spiders, mushrooms, or flowers), and were given as much time as they wanted in order 
to categorize the images once they were displayed.  The main measure of threat detection ability 
was a signal detection index (d’) which is a standardized measure of accuracy in categorizing 
images which controls for response bias.  The d’ statistic represents the difference between the 
hit rate (correct categorization of threats) and the false alarm rate (categorization of a non-
threatening image as threatening) after both of these rates have been standardized using the 
inverse of the normal distribution transformation.
  
Wiens and colleagues (2008) found that 
individual variation in threat detection ability was best assessed when the backwards masking 
stimuli was presented between 24ms and 36ms after the onset of the target stimulus (floor effects 
for detection were found at faster presentation times, and ceiling effects were found at slower 
presentation times).  Using this paradigm, the authors determined that individual differences in 
disgust sensitivity were positively correlated with participants’ ability to accurately detect snake 
and spider images (and was not related to the ability to detect flower and mushroom images), but 
that self-reported snake fear and spider fear were unrelated to the ability to detect threatening 
images. 
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Although this threat detection paradigm is likely to have separated the process of 
perceptually-based threat detection from later stage response processes, and does not rely on 
symbolic interpretation, a few aspects of the paradigm may limit the external validity of the 
findings as they relate to cognitive threat detection mechanisms.  First, by presenting the images 
in grayscale, the authors excluded information that may be relevant to threat detection.  Color 
may be an important feature that triggers threat detection mechanisms, and therefore, presenting 
images in grayscale may not fully assess evolved threat detection mechanisms.  As such, the 
increased experimental control provided by presenting images in grayscale may sacrifice 
external validity more than would be desired when assessing individual differences in threat 
detection ability.   
Second, participants were made aware of the image categories ahead of the threat 
detection procedure.  By providing this information ahead of time, the procedure may have 
primed the target categories and activated cognitive mechanisms that compared the target images 
to exemplar categories, making detection of threats (or non-threats) more likely.  Along these 
lines, the presentation of target images for 12 ms may be inadequate for assessing individual 
differences in threat detection ability if participants are not aware of the potential image 
categories ahead of time.  Indeed, Wiens and colleagues (2008) found that the ability to 
distinguish threats from non-threats at this presentation rate only differed from chance when the 
onset of the masking stimulus was delayed by 24 ms or greater.  A recent set of studies by de la 
Rosa, Choudhery, and Chatziastros (2011) further supports this proposition, demonstrating a 
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considerable increase in signal detection (d’) beyond chance levels when the presentation time of 
a backward masked target image was increased from 7 ms to 28 ms. 
Based on this review, it was determined that prior procedures for assessing threat 
detection ability were insufficient for the assessment of individual differences in threat detection 
in the present research.  Therefore, adaptations were made to the Wiens and colleagues (2008) 
procedure for assessing threat detection ability and the updated procedure was pilot tested.  The 
goal of this adapted procedure was to assess threat detection ability in a manner that was 
independent from later stage threat management processes (e.g., threat response and threat 
learning mechanisms) as well as independent from mechanisms that rely on symbolic 
interpretation.  An additional goal in developing the current paradigm was to retain as much 
external validity as possible by using color images.   
In the current paradigm, participants were not told ahead of time what categories of images they 
would be exposed to, only that images would represent objects that were either dangerous or 
safe.  This was done to eliminate the possibility that participants would be primed to notice 
specific characteristics of the images they were presented with based on a priori knowledge of 
the stimulus categories.  Thus, the current threat detection paradigm assessed individual 
differences in the ability to distinguish between dangerous and safe images that were presented 
outside of conscious awareness.   
Stimuli  
 72 
 
Stimuli were 40 color images categorized as dangerous (n = 20) or safe (n = 20).  Within 
the category of dangerous stimuli, there were 4 different sub-categories (dangerous mammals, 
guns, snakes, and spiders).  Similarly, within the category of safe stimuli, there were also 4 
different sub-categories (butterflies, books, flowers, and leaves).  Five images were selected to 
represent each of these lower-level categories.  All images were selected from an online search 
of Google™ images.  Adobe Photoshop™ was used to isolate the main figure from each image 
on a dark grey background and to adjust all images to a standard size (400 pixels by 280 pixels).  
Prior to incorporating these images into the threat detection paradigm, the images were evaluated 
by 10 participants (undergraduate students volunteering prior to class) who rated each image on a 
scale from 1 (safe) to 9 (dangerous).  The 20 images intended to represent threats were 
categorized as being significantly more dangerous (M = 7.89, SD = .70) than the 20 images 
intended to represent non-threats (M = 1.41, SD = .58), t(9) = 22.41, p < .001.  The range of the 
average individual image scores within the categories of dangerous images (7.40 – 8.80) and safe 
images (1.10 – 2.30) indicated that no individual images were viewed as unrepresentative of their 
intended category. 
In addition to the 40 images, a backward mask of colored dots was created and 
standardized to the same image size.  Examples of stimuli from each category as well as the 
masking stimuli can be found in Figure 7.  All stimuli were presented to participants on a 17” 
Dell M781p CRV monitor using Medialab ™ software running on a desktop PC with an Intel ™ 
dual core, 2.39 GHz processor with 1 GB of RAM.   
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Figure 7.  Example images from each stimulus category and the backwards mask image as used 
in the pilot study 
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Participants   
Forty-three participants (66% female) participated in the pilot study in exchange for 
course credit.  Participants’ average age was 22.77 years (SD = 4.02).  All participants 
volunteered for the study titled “Identifying Threats” after reading a short description on the 
psychology department’s research participation Website.  The description of the study read as 
follows: 
In this study, you will be presented with a series of pictures. Some of these 
pictures will represent things that could be dangerous to you, and some of these 
pictures will represent things that are safe. Each picture will be presented one at 
a time and for each picture, your job is to determine whether the picture 
represents something dangerous or not. 
Procedure   
Upon arrival, participants were asked to sign a consent form acknowledging their 
voluntary participation in the study.  Participants were then seated at individual workstations and 
were given a brief overview of the purpose of the study.  Each workstation was located in a 
separate cubicle and a maximum of 5 workstations could be occupied by participants during a 
single research session.  A piece of twine was affixed across the front of the cubicle at a height of 
117 cm above the floor and at a distance of 43 cm from the workstation monitor.  Prior to 
beginning the pilot session, all participants were instructed to adjust their seats so that the twine 
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lightly touched their forehead just above eyebrow level.  This was intended to standardize the 
viewing experience across all participants to the maximum extent possible.   
First, participants completed the threat detection paradigm.  Participants were told that 
they would be presented with a series of trials on the computer screen.  At the start of each trial, 
an ‘X’ was displayed in the center of the computer screen for 2 seconds as a focal image.  The 
‘X’ was immediately followed by the target image which was presented for 30ms.  Previous 
research has indicated that a backward masked stimulus presentation time of roughly 30ms is 
sufficient for eliciting greater-than-chance signal detection while stimulus awareness remains 
largely outside of conscious awareness (de la Rosa et al., 2011; Wiens et al., 2008).  Participants 
were instructed that this target image was the image that they were to try and identify, but that it 
was likely that they would not be able to consciously perceive it.  Following the target image, the 
backward mask was presented for 60ms.  After this series of images, participants were asked to 
indicate whether they thought the target image was something dangerous (something that could 
potentially harm them) or something safe (something that would not be likely to cause them any 
harm).   
In order to assess conscious awareness of the stimuli, participants were then asked to 
indicate their level of confidence in their classification on a scale from 1 (not sure at all) to 7 
(completely sure).  After indicating their confidence, participants were asked to write down (in a 
free response format) what they thought the target image had been on a separate sheet of paper.  
After writing down what they thought the target image was, participants pressed the space bar to 
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begin the next trial.  This process was repeated for all 40 stimulus images, which were presented 
in random order.  Prior to beginning the procedure, it was stressed to all participants that they 
would very likely not be able to see the target image, but that they should trust their instinct in 
attempting to make an accurate classification of the target, even if they were not consciously 
aware of its valence. 
At the conclusion of the procedure, participants completed several demographic 
questions (gender, age, and whether or not they had a prescription for and were wearing 
corrective lenses) and were also asked to report their impressions of the threat detection 
procedures in an open-ended format.  Finally, when all participants had finished, the 
experimenter gave everyone a final opportunity to ask questions and provide feedback about the 
procedure.  At this point, the most common question asked by participants was whether or not 
they had actually been presented with images during the procedure, as most of them had not been 
consciously aware of the target stimuli. 
Statistical analysis  
Signal detection analysis (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) was used to assess the ability of 
participants to discriminate a dangerous object from a safe object in the threat detection 
procedure while accounting for response bias using the same data reduction method as Wiens 
and colleagues (2008).  Using this procedure, four raw statistics were tabulated for each 
participant: hits (# of trials in which a threatening image was correctly categorized as 
‘dangerous’), misses (# of trials in which a threatening image was incorrectly categorized as 
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‘safe’), false alarms (# of trials in which a safe image was incorrectly categorized as 
‘dangerous’), and correct rejects (# of trials in which a safe image was correctly categorized as 
‘safe’).  Using these raw counts, a hit rate (number of hits divided by the total number of 
threatening images) and a false alarm rate (number of false alarms divided by the total number of 
safe images) was calculated for each participant after dropping trials in which the participant 
reported conscious detection of the target image.  In calculating these rates, half a trial was added 
to the numerator (hits and false alarms) and a whole trial was added to the denominator (total 
number of dangerous or safe images) so that these rates would never be 0 or 1 (undefined in the  
standard distribution used for signal detection analysis).   
After calculating the hit rate and false alarm rate for each participant, these values were 
standardized according to the inverse of the normal distribution function (by using the 
NORMSINVERSE function in Microsoft™ Excel).  This function converts hit rates and false 
alarm rates of .5 to a standardized score of 0.  Hit rates or false alarm rates that are higher than .5 
will result in a positive standardized score, whereas hit rates and false alarm rates that are lower 
than .5 will result in a negative standardized score (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).   
Using these standardized scores, the d’ (signal detection) index and the C (response bias) 
index were calculated.  As stated previously, the d’ index is a score representing the difference 
between the standardized value of the hit rate and the standardized value of the false alarm rate.  
Thus, d’ = zhit rate – zfasle alarm rate.  A d’ value of zero represents chance ability to discriminate 
dangerous images from safe images, whereas more positive values of d’ indicate a greater ability 
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to correctly identify dangerous images after accounting for response bias.  For example, a hit rate 
of .75 paired with a false alarm rate of .75 would indicate that the participant is no better than 
chance at distinguishing a dangerous image from a safe image, and in this case, the d’ score 
would be 0.  Even though the participant was correct on 75% of the trials, the participant mistook 
safe pictures for dangerous 75% of the time as well, indicating that the accuracy associated with 
the hit rate was due to response bias, and did not reflect a true ability to distinguish dangerous 
images from safe images.  Conversely, a participant with a hit rate of .25 and a false alarm rate of 
.05 would have a d’ score of .97, indicating a good ability to distinguish dangerous stimuli from 
safe stimuli, even though the overall hit rate of 25% was fairly low.  In this latter case, it is likely 
that the participant was less willing to make a false positive response, and thus had a bias toward 
answering ‘safe’ unless there was a high certainty that the stimulus was dangerous.  This type of 
response pattern would be viewed as more accurate than the participant with both a hit rate and 
false alarm rate of 75%. 
The C index is a standardized score which represents a participant’s overall tendency to 
respond to images as either ‘dangerous’ or ‘safe’.  C is defined as -0.5 * (zhit rate + zfalse alarm rate).  
Thus, a positive C index indicates a bias toward a ‘safe’ response, and a negative C index 
indicates a bias toward a ‘dangerous’ response.  
The reason for using standardized scores (as opposed to raw hit rates and false alarm 
rates) in the calculation of the d’ and C indices is that the standardized scores provide sensitivity 
to the extent to which hit rates and false alarm rates deviate from neutral (.5).  For example, if 
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two individuals are compared, one of whom demonstrates the ability to differentiate between two 
stimuli at a hit rate of .8 and false alarm rate of .4, and the second of whom demonstrates a hit 
rate of .5 and a false alarm rate of .1, simply subtracting the hit rate from the false alarm rate will 
indicate that the detection ability of the two participants are equivalent (both would have a 
detection ability score of .4).  However, using the standardized scores in the d’ calculation 
indicates that the detection ability of the second participant is superior to the first given their 
respective d’ scores of 1.095 and 1.282.  Though the second participant had a lower hit rate, their 
false alarm rate (which exhibits the most extreme deviation from a neutral rate of .5) is weighted 
more heavily in the calculation of the d’ score when the standardized score is used, and indicates 
that the second individual has a superior ability to discriminate between the two stimulus 
categories compared to the first individual. 
Results and discussion  
An initial investigation indicated that the results of the pilot study did not differ based on 
participant sex or as a consequence of participants not wearing corrective lenses for which they 
had a prescription (all ps > .73).  Thus, these variables were not included in the reported 
analyses.   
First, conscious awareness of the target stimuli was analyzed to confirm that participants’ 
classifications were not based on overt conscious awareness of the stimuli.  This was assessed by 
investigating participants’ confidence in their classifications as well as their conscious reports of 
the images that they saw.  A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that confidence differed with 
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respect to stimulus category, F(7, 1712) = 7.68, p < .01.  A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that 
participants reported higher confidence in their classification of butterfly images (M = 3.23, SD = 
2.27) compared to all other stimulus categories (all ps < .02).  Indeed, investigation of 
participants’ written reports of the images revealed that butterflies were consciously identified at 
a much higher rate (18%) than all other images (range: 1% to 9%; M = 4%).  For butterfly 
images, confidence level was significantly correlated with classification of the image as safe, 
r(213) = .42, p < .01.  Thus, conscious perception of butterfly images was significantly greater 
than all other image categories, and therefore it was determined that the category of butterfly 
images would be dropped from future studies.  In order to maintain a balanced set of stimuli 
(equal numbers of dangerous and safe images), the category of dangerous stimuli with the 
highest mean confidence score (dangerous animals; M = 2.60, SD = 1.85) and conscious 
perception rate (9%) was also dropped.  Thus, the remainder of the analyses are based on the 
results that were obtained for the remaining categories of dangerous (guns, snakes, and spiders) 
and safe (books, flowers, and leaves) stimuli.   
Using this revised set of stimuli, participants were able to consciously detect very few of 
the target stimuli on average (M = 1.02, SD = 2.11).  However, conscious detection of the target 
stimuli was not normally distributed throughout the sample.  Most participants (65%) did not 
consciously detect any of the target stimuli and roughly ninety percent of participants 
consciously detected two or fewer of the target images.  However, the remaining ten percent of 
participants detected three or more images, with one participant detecting six (20%) and another 
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detecting eleven (37%) of the target images that were presented during the procedure.  Thus, 
conscious detection of the target stimuli was positively skewed.  As the theoretical premise of the 
research was dependent on threat detection occurring at unconscious levels, all trials in which 
participants were able to consciously detect the target stimuli were dropped from further 
analyses. 
Analyses performed on the remaining trials indicated that variability in the d’ statistic 
was relatively normally distributed across the sample (see Figure 8) despite being mildly kurtotic 
(kurtosis = 2.90) and the skewness value of the distribution fell well within the acceptable range 
(skewness = -.13).  Though the average d’ score of the sample (M = .08, SD = .48) was not 
significantly greater than zero after dropping the trials in which conscious detection occurred, 
t(42) = 1.07, p = .29, the sample size in the pilot study was relatively small and the trend in the 
data indicated that the average participant may have been able to discriminate between safe and 
dangerous target images at levels that exceeded chance.  This phenomenon was investigated 
further in later studies.  Additionally, analysis revealed that the C index (M = .51, SD = .75) 
differed significantly from zero, t(42) = 4.45, p < .001, indicating that participants reported a 
strong bias toward a ‘safe’ response during the procedure.   
Taken together, the results of the pilot study suggested that the paradigm should be an 
appropriate measurement instrument for the assessment of individual differences in the ability to 
accurately distinguish between dangerous and safe images.  Assessment of unconscious threat 
detection ability using this paradigm retained the six image categories (books, flowers, leaves,  
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Figure 8.  Distribution of d’ scores in the pilot study 
guns, snakes, and spiders) from the preceding analysis and was used to investigate the relation 
between threat detection ability and social conservatism in subsequent studies. 
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Study 1: Threat detection and conservatism 
 The first study was intended to establish the existence of the basic relation between threat 
detection ability and socially conservative attitudes.  If individual differences in the ability to 
discriminate dangerous objects from safe objects in the initial stages of visual perception affect 
relative perceptions of danger in the social world as well as the endorsement of socially 
conservative attitudes, then a simple correlational study should reveal this effect.  As such, the 
purpose of the first study was to explore initial evidence of these relations.   
Individual differences in the ability to detect threats was assessed using the procedure 
outlined in the pilot study and was compared to a series of social conservatism measures as well 
as a measure assessing participants’ belief that the world is a dangerous place.  It was expected 
that threat detection ability, as indicated by d’ scores, would be negatively correlated with 
measures of socially conservative attitudes such that participants with lower levels of threat 
detection ability would tend to report more conservative social attitudes compared to participants 
with higher levels of threat detection ability.  Additionally, it was expected that threat detection 
ability would be negatively correlated with belief that the world is dangerous such that 
participants with lower levels of threat detection ability would tend to perceive the world as more 
dangerous than participants with higher levels of threat detection ability.  Finally, it was 
predicted that threat detection ability would moderate the predicted positive correlations between 
belief that the world is dangerous and measures of social conservatism.  Participants who 
demonstrated low threat detection ability and also reported perceptions of the world as highly 
 84 
 
dangerous were predicted to report significantly stronger conservative attitudes than all other 
participants. 
Participants   
One-hundred ninety-three undergraduate students participated in exchange for one hour 
of course credit.  Data from three participants were lost due to computer malfunction, and thus 
the following analyses are based on the remaining sample (N =190).  The sample was 63% 
female and primarily White/Caucasian (51%) with 24% of participants identifying their 
race/ethnicity as African-American, 13% as Asian, 8% as Latino, and 5% identifying as ‘other’.  
The average age of the sample was 19.70 years (SD = 4.08).  A post-hoc sensitivity analysis 
conducted using the G*Power software (version 3.1.3; Faul, 2010) determined that a sample of 
this size provided 80% power to detect a significant correlation coefficient (ρ) of +/-.20 or 
greater using a two-tailed test of significance.  This sample size also provided 80% power to 
detect a significant effect at an R
2
 value of .07 or larger in a random effects multiple linear 
regression model with four predictors (one control variable, two main effects, and an interaction 
term) using a two-tailed test of significance.   
Participants self-selected into a study titled Detecting Threats after reading the following 
description on the SONA research page: 
In this study, you will be presented with a series of pictures one at a time. The 
pictures will be presented rapidly so that you might not actually be able to tell 
what they are. Your task will be to decide whether the picture you saw 
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represented something dangerous or something safe. Since it may be hard for you 
to tell what each picture actually is, we are primarily interested in your 'gut' 
reaction as to whether the picture represents something dangerous. After the 
picture task, you will be asked to fill out several related surveys. 
The study description did not explicitly mention the measurement of conservative 
attitudes in order to minimize the likelihood of response bias during the survey portion of the 
study.  After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were told that they could withdraw 
from the study at any time without penalty.   
Measures   
Measures of threat detection ability and social conservatism were assessed along with 
control variables and demographic characteristics in the following order (the full version of each 
measure can be found in Appendix A): 
Threat detection ability.  Threat detection ability was assessed using the procedure 
outlined in the pilot study.  Three categories of safe (books, flowers, leaves) and three categories 
of dangerous (guns, snakes, spiders) stimuli were used in the threat detection procedure.  The 
same five images were used in each category as were used in the pilot study.  Thus, 30 total 
stimulus images were used along with a backward mask of randomly-colored dots and each 
image was displayed twice resulting in a 60-trial paradigm to assess threat detection ability.  All 
images were presented at the same size (400 pixels wide by 280 pixels high) as in the pilot study.   
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After removing trials in which participants reported conscious awareness of the target 
image, signal detection analysis was used to determine each participant’s d’ score, which was the 
primary measure of interest in assessing threat detection ability.  This analysis also produced 
measures of response bias (labeled as ‘C’) for each participant such that positive C scores 
indicated a bias toward a ‘safe’ response and negative C scores indicated a bias toward a 
‘dangerous’ response.  The measure of response bias was used for additional exploratory 
analyses. 
Conscious awareness.  Conscious awareness of the target images was assessed during 
the threat detection procedure by asking participants to write down what they thought the target 
image was after each threat detection trial.  Participants were not told ahead of time what 
categories would be represented by the target images.  Participants were given the option of 
circling ‘not sure’ if they truly had no idea what the target image was, but were asked to write 
down any idea that they had about the target image, even if they were very uncertain.  These 
free-response reports were compared to the actual target image that was presented in each trial to 
determine whether the target image had been consciously perceived. 
Categorization confidence.  Participants were asked to report their confidence in their 
classification (‘safe’ versus ‘dangerous’) of target stimuli during the threat detection procedure 
on a seven point scale anchored at 1 (not sure at all) to 7 (very sure) as a secondary measure for 
assessing conscious awareness of the target stimuli. 
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Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS).  The PANAS was used to control 
for mood.  Previous research has indicated that individuals tend to show an attentional bias 
toward mood congruent objects (Becker & Leinenger, 2011).  Thus, it was important to control 
for the possibility that a negative mood state might bias participants toward detection of 
dangerous images, and a positive mood state might bias participants toward detection of safe 
images.  The PANAS scale measures state levels of positive and negative affect (mood) by 
asking participants to indicate the extent to which they are experiencing each of 20 emotional 
feelings at the present moment using a 5 point scale anchored at 1 (Very slightly or not at all) 
and 5 (Extremely).  Ten items in the scale represent positive mood states (e.g., interested) and ten 
items from the scale represent negative mood states (e.g., distressed).   
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale.  The RWA is a 20 item scale that was 
used to measure participants’ level of endorsement of conservative, authoritarian views 
(Altemeyer, 1998).  Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement on 
a nine point scale anchored at 1 (Strongly disagree) and 9 (Strongly agree).  Ten of the scale 
items are phrased such that agreement indicates stronger authoritarian views (e.g., The "old-
fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way of life) and ten items are 
phrased such that agreement indicates weaker authoritarian views (e.g., There is no "ONE right 
way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way) which were reverse scored so that 
higher scores on all items indicated higher levels of RWA. 
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Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale.  The SDO is a 14-item scale that measures 
participants’ tendency to view statements about societal equality or inequality as positive or 
negative.  Each item represents a belief statement and participants are asked to report the extent 
to which they view each statement to be positive or negative on a seven point scale anchored at 
1(Very negative) and 7(Very positive).  Seven items are phrased so that more positive responses 
indicate higher endorsement of social dominance (e.g., Some groups of people are simply not the 
equals of others) and seven items are phrased so that more positive responses indicate lower 
endorsement of social dominance (e.g., In an ideal world, all nations would be equal).  The latter 
seven items were reverse-scored so that higher average scores across the 14 items indicate higher 
levels of SDO (Pratto et al., 1994).   
Political ideology.  To assess political ideology, participants were asked to report their 
level of agreement with each of 12 belief statements which reflect common partisan issues.  
Agreement was assessed on a 5-point scale anchored at -2 (disagree strongly) and 2 (agree 
strongly).  The statements were phrased to reflect either a conservative (e.g., Gun control 
violates people’s constitutional right to bear arms) or liberal (e.g., Gay people are entitled to the 
same constitutional rights as heterosexuals) stance on each item.  During data analysis, all 
liberally phrased items were reverse-scored so that higher scores reflected a more conservative 
attitude.  In addition to the 12 belief statements, participants completed a single-item self-
identification measure of political ideology, in which they classified themselves along a 7-point 
continuum ranging from 1 (liberal) to 7 (conservative).   
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Belief that the World is Dangerous.  The 12-item dangerous world scale (Altemeyer, 
1988) was used to assess participants’ belief that the world is dangerous and is deteriorating 
toward a state of anarchy.  Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Six of the items are phrased so 
that agreement indicates a belief that the world is a dangerous place (e.g., Any day now, chaos 
and anarchy could erupt around us.  All the signs are pointing to it), and six items are phrased so 
that agreement indicates a belief that the world is a safe place (e.g., Despite what one hears 
about 'crime in the street', there probably isn't any more now than there ever has been).  These 
latter items were reverse-scored so that higher scores on the scale indicated a stronger belief that 
the world is dangerous. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI).  The STAI was used to control for both state (in 
the moment) and trait (chronic) levels of anxiety in participants.  The inclusion of anxiety as a 
control measure was considered necessary as previous research has shown anxiety to be 
associated with a bias toward classifying ambiguous images as threatening (Britton, Lissek, 
Grillon, Norcross, & Pine, 2010).  The separate subscales of the STAI are each 20-item self-
report questionnaires which ask participants to rate how anxious they feel at present moment 
(state measure; ‘I feel calm’) or in general (trait measure; ‘I lack self-confidence’), using a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so).  Items that were phrased positively were reverse-
scored so that higher scores on each scale indicated higher levels of anxiety (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs 1983). 
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Demographics.  To obtain demographic characteristics of the sample, participants 
reported biological sex, age, and race/ethnicity.  As additional control measures for threat 
detection ability, participants were asked whether they had a prescription for corrective lenses, 
and if so, if they were wearing their corrective lenses at the time of the study.  Participants were 
also asked to indicate whether they were colorblind.
2
   
Procedure   
Upon arriving at the lab and completing the consent form, participants were seated at 
individual workstations and adjusted the height of their seats so that their forehead lightly 
touched the piece of twine that had been appended to the cubicle according to the same 
procedure as in the threat detection pilot study.  Participants were told that the purpose of the 
study was to assess their ability to correctly categorize dangerous and safe images that are 
displayed very rapidly.  They were also told that there would be a related survey following the 
threat detection procedure that would assess their opinions about various social issues.  After 
giving participants the opportunity to ask any questions, the threat-detection procedure was 
administered.   
In each trial of the threat detection procedure, participants were asked to categorize the 
target image as either ‘safe’ or ‘dangerous’.  Participants then indicated their level of confidence 
in this categorization and were asked to write down, on a separate sheet of paper, any ideas they 
                                                          
2
 Controlling for colorblindness and uncorrected vision (participants who reported having a 
prescription for corrective lenses but who also reported that they were not wearing the corrective 
lenses at the time of the study) did not influence the results of the analysis and thus these 
participants were retained in the sample. 
 91 
 
had about what the target image had been in order to assess conscious awareness of the target 
stimuli. 
Following the threat detection paradigm, participants completed the survey measures in 
the order listed in the Measures section.  A short debriefing statement was presented to 
participants on the computer screen after they completed all survey measures, explaining that the 
true purpose of the study was to assess the relation between the ability to detect threats and social 
attitudes.  Participants had the opportunity to ask questions of the experimenter before being 
dismissed, and were provided with the email address of the experimenter for any additional 
questions that arose after leaving. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Threat Detection Ability.  As expected, participants’ ability to consciously detect the 
target images was extremely low.  On average, participants were able to consciously detect 2.07 
(SD = 3.74) of the 60 images to which they were exposed (roughly 3%).  However, the conscious 
detection of images did not follow a normal distribution across participants (skewness = 2.87, 
kurtosis = 9.27) and thus this description is likely to be an overestimate of the relative ability of 
the average participant to detect the target images.  Over fifty percent of participants did not 
consciously detect any of the target images, and over seventy-five percent of participants 
detected two or fewer images.  However, ten percent of the sample consciously identified seven 
or more of the target images, with two participants correctly identifying twenty of the images 
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during the procedure.  Consistent with the pilot study, all trials in which the participant 
consciously identified the target image were dropped from further analyses in line with the 
theoretical proposal of the study, that threat detection ability – assessed at the unconscious level 
– would be predictive of social conservatism.  
Threat detection ability (d’) and response bias (C) were calculated for each participant 
following the procedure outlined by MacMillan and Creelman (2005).  One-sample t-tests 
comparing each index to zero indicated that across participants, there was a strong bias toward a 
‘safe’ response (M = .34, SD = .75), t(189) = 6.24, p < .001, and that the average threat detection 
ability (M = .04, SD = .41) did not differ significantly from chance levels, t(189) = 1.21, p = .23.  
However, threat detection ability was normally distributed across participants, indicating that as 
anticipated, some participants were more adept at differentiating between safe and dangerous 
objects than others (min = -1.44, max = 1.05).  Threat detection ability was not associated with 
participants’ average reported confidence in their classification of the target images during the 
threat detection procedure, r(189) = -.02, p = .79.  Thus, the results indicated that participants’ d’ 
scores represented a true measure of their ability to successfully discriminate between safe and 
dangerous images at an unconscious level. 
Questionnaires.  Items from all questionnaire measures were assessed for reliability 
before creating composite scores.  This analysis revealed that the 12-item political ideology scale 
demonstrated poor initial reliability (α = .41).  To address this, the scale was reduced to 7-items 
that demonstrated adequate reliability (α = .64) and which was significantly correlated with the 
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self-report political ideology scale item (r = .39, p < .001).  All other scale measures 
demonstrated acceptable reliability and were converted into their respective indices.  All of these 
indices were normally distributed with the exception of the negative mood subscale of the 
PANAS measure which was positively skewed (skewness = 1.14).  A square-root transformation 
was performed which corrected for this deviation from normality.  Means, standard deviations, 
skewness, kurtosis, and reliability statistics for all Study 1 variables can be found in Table 1. 
An initial examination revealed the expected pattern of correlations between all survey 
measures (see Table 2).  All four measures of social conservatism (RWA, SDO, Political 
Ideology composite and scale) were significantly positively correlated with one another.
3
  
Additionally, the belief in a dangerous world measure was significantly positively correlated 
with all social conservatism measures with the exception of social dominance orientation, which 
exhibited a marginally significant positive relation, r(189) = .14, p = .06.  This pattern of 
correlations indicated that, as expected, participants who believed the world to be more 
dangerous tended to hold more socially conservative attitudes whereas those who believed the 
world to be more safe tended to endorse less social conservatism.   
Examination of the control variables indicated a marginally significant correlation 
between threat detection ability and state anxiety, r(189) = .12, p = .10, such that higher levels of 
anxiety were associated with more accurate discrimination between safe and dangerous images at 
                                                          
3 A priori, it had been planned to combine these measures into a single index of social 
conservatism; however, the reliability of these measures did not reach an acceptable threshold to 
justify the creation of this index (Cronbach’s α = .66).   
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an unconscious level.  However, state anxiety did not exhibit a significant relation with any of 
the measures of social conservatism, and it was therefore unnecessary to control for any of the 
mood or anxiety measures in any of the analyses investigating the main hypotheses of the study.  
Analyses also revealed sex differences in participants’ belief in a dangerous world such that  
Table 1 
 
Study 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Statistics 
 
N=190 M SD skewness kurtosis α 
Belief in a Dangerous World 4.01 .88 .01 -.13 .79 
Right Wing Authoritarianism 3.64 1.26 .14 -.29 .88 
Social Dominance Orientation 2.28 .84 .65 .22 .80 
Political Ideology Composite
†
 2.49 .69 .34 .07 .64 
Political Ideology Scale
†
 3.49 1.58 .21 -.25 - 
PANAS – Negative 1.32 .26 .82 -.15 .86 
PANAS – Positive 2.67 .75 .32 -.48 .84 
State Anxiety  2.07 .57 .67 .23 .91 
Trait Anxiety  2.13 .48 .38 -.50 .89 
Threat Detection Ability (d’)†† .04 .41 -.41 .65 - 
Response Bias (C)
†††
 .34 .75 .47 .84 - 
Note. †Higher numbers indicate a more conservative political ideology 
††
Threat detection ability was calculated after removing trials in which conscious detection of the 
target image occurred 
†††Higher numbers indicate a bias toward a ‘safe’ response 
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Table 2 
Bivariate Correlations between Study 1 Measures 
N = 190 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Threat Detection Ability (d’) - -.18* .09 .07 -.14+ .07 .04 .04 -.04 .12+ .07  
2. Response Bias (C) - -.13+ -.02 -.02 .05 .01 -.14+ -.22** -.13+ -.12   
3. BDW - .53*** .14+ .39*** .22** .11 .00 .09 .07   
4. RWA - .27*** .72*** .42*** .10 .09 .04 -.12   
5. SDO - .15* .24*** .05 .18* -.09 .02   
6. PI-Comp - .39*** .08 .02 .01 -.11   
7. PI-Scale - -.01 .13+ -.04 -.15*   
8. PANAS Neg - .13+ .69*** .40*** 
9. PANAS-Pos - -.12+ -.15*   
10. SAI - .54*** 
11. TAI -   
Note.  BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, PI-Comp = 
Political Ideology Composite, PI-Scale = Political Ideology Scale, PANAS-Neg = Negative Mood (Root Transformed), PANAS-Pos = 
Positive Mood, SAI = State Anxiety, TAI = Trait Anxiety 
+ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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women reported significantly higher levels of belief that the world is dangerous (M = 4.13, SD = 
.86) compared to men (M = 3.80, SD = .89), t(188) = -2.56, p = .01.  Thus, all analyses involving 
belief in a dangerous world controlled for participants’ biological sex. 
Main Analyses   
There were three primary hypotheses for Study 1.  First, negative correlations were 
predicted between threat detection ability and all measures of social conservatism.  Analysis 
revealed a marginally significant association in the predicted direction between threat detection 
ability and social dominance orientation, r(189) = -.14, p = .06, such that lower levels of threat 
detection ability were associated with higher endorsement of SDO.  No significant associations 
were found between any of the other measures of social conservatism and threat detection ability 
(all ps > .32).  An ancillary investigation of the relation between response bias and the social 
conservatism measures indicated no significant relations between response bias and any of the 
measures of social conservatism (all ps > .53). 
The second prediction of the study was that threat detection ability would be negatively 
correlated with belief in a dangerous world which would indicate that participants who were less 
able to discriminate between safe and dangerous images at an unconscious level would perceive 
the world to be more dangerous.  As mentioned previously, belief in a dangerous world was a 
significant predictor of all social conservatism measures; however, belief in a dangerous world 
was not significantly related to threat detection ability after controlling for sex differences, 
r(189) = .09, p = .22.  Supplementary analysis revealed a significant relation between response 
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bias and belief in a dangerous world after controlling for sex differences, r(189) = -.14, p = .05, 
such that increased bias toward a ‘safe’ response was associated with less belief that the world is 
dangerous. 
 Finally, hierarchical linear regression modeling was used to test the prediction that threat 
detection ability would moderate the significant relations that were observed between belief in a 
dangerous world and socially conservative attitudes after controlling for participant sex.  
Separate models were run using each measure of social conservatism as the dependent variable 
and all models controlled for sex differences.  Participant sex (coded 0 = male, 1 = female) was 
entered in the first step of each model as a control variable.  Threat detection ability and belief in 
a dangerous world were entered into the second step of each model to investigate main effects, 
and the interaction term was entered into the third step of each model.  The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 3.  The analyses did not indicate any evidence that threat 
detection ability moderated the relation between belief in a dangerous world and social 
conservatism.  In each of the models, belief in a dangerous world was a strong predictor of social 
conservatism after controlling for sex differences, but this relation did not depend on individual 
differences in threat detection ability.  The model predicting social dominance orientation was 
unique in that it revealed the predicted main effects for both threat detection ability and belief in 
a dangerous world.  However, the lack of any significant interaction effects in this model 
indicated that the effects of each construct were independent from one another and each 
accounted for unique portions of variance in the SDO measure. 
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Table 3 
Regression Coefficients for Threat Detection Ability, Belief in a Dangerous World, and their 
Interaction as Predictors of Social Conservatism in Study 1 
 Threat Detection Ability BDW TD x BDW 
DV β t β t β t 
SDO -.15* -2.14 .17* 2.31 -.07 -.98 
RWA .03 .40 .52*** 8.27 -.03 -.45  
PI Composite .03 .46 .39*** 5.72 .09 1.40 
PI Scale .02 .29 .21** 2.89 .08 1.04 
Note.  Participant sex was entered into the first step of the regression model as a control variable.  
Threat detection ability (TD) and belief in a dangerous world (BDW) were entered into the 
second step of the regression model to investigate main effects.  The interaction term was entered 
in the third step of the regression.  SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism, PI = Political Ideology, BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World, TD = Threat 
Detection Ability 
* p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Discussion 
The findings from Study 1 were mixed with respect to the hypotheses.  The predicted 
effect of threat detection ability on social conservatism was only found with one out of the four 
social conservatism indices (social dominance orientation), and this effect only reached a 
marginal level of significance.  As such, it was unclear whether this was a spurious correlation or 
whether the predicted effect of threat detection ability holds specifically for social dominance 
orientation (but not right-wing authoritarianism or political ideology).  It is also worth noting that 
the political ideology measure demonstrated low reliability in the current study and as such, 
interpretations of the findings (or lack thereof) with regard to political ideology should be viewed 
with caution.  The low reliability in the initial political ideology measure and the subsequent 
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reduction in the total number of items that were used in creating the political ideology composite 
item limit the extent to which it can be concluded that this measure truly reflects participants’ 
ideological worldviews.  In Study 2, the political ideology measure was revised to address these 
issues. 
 Belief in a dangerous world (BDW) was consistently related to the measures of social 
conservatism as expected, even after controlling for observed sex differences in BDW.  
Participants who believed the world to be more dangerous reported higher levels of right wing 
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and political ideology (measured as the 
composite of several belief statements as well as with a single-item self-report measure).  
Contrary to the predictions of the study, however, no relation was observed between belief in a 
dangerous world and threat detection ability.  It was expected that participants who demonstrated 
higher levels of threat detection ability would endorse less belief that the world is a dangerous 
place.  The results of the present study did not support this prediction, as no significant relation 
was found between the two constructs. 
The predicted role of threat detection ability as a moderator of the relation between belief 
in a dangerous world and social conservatism was also not observed in Study 1.  This may 
indicate that the effect does not exist as predicted.  Alternatively, this first study was simply a 
cross-sectional investigation of participants’ attitudes which intentionally did not place a great 
deal of emphasis on extant levels of danger.  Thus, because environmental danger was not a 
highly salient aspect of the study, any moderating effects of threat detection ability may have 
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been somewhat weak and the study may not have had the power to detect them.  Another 
possibility for the lack of effects supporting the hypotheses of Study 1 is that individual 
differences in threat detection ability may not moderate the relation between more chronic, trait-
level beliefs that the world is dangerous and socially conservative attitudes, but may have a more 
significant impact on how new information regarding the presence of danger in the environment 
is processed.  Study 2 was designed to investigate this possibility further by providing 
participants with new information pertaining to the relative level of danger in the world and by 
making the level of environmental danger a highly salient aspect of the study. 
It is worth noting the finding stemming from supplemental analysis with regard to the 
relation between response bias and belief that the world is dangerous.  Participants who indicated 
stronger beliefs that the world is dangerous tended to be biased toward a ’dangerous’ response 
during the threat detection procedure.  Though somewhat intuitive, future research should take 
into consideration the direct evidence that extant beliefs about the level of danger that exists in 
the social world may influence assumptions about ambiguous aspects of the environment.  In 
other words, the results of Study 1 suggest that existing beliefs about the level of danger that 
exists in the world may serve to bias judgments toward objects in the environment when it is not 
clear whether these objects represent a danger or a threat.  Though this specific prediction was 
not an aspect of the main hypotheses of the present research, this potential relation was 
investigated further in subsequent studies. 
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Study 2: Threat Detection, Danger, and Conservatism 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to address the limitations of Study 1 as well as to replicate 
the findings of the first study.  In Study 1, the political ideology measure of social conservatism 
demonstrated poor initial inter-item reliability and several items had to be dropped from the 
measure in order to achieve adequate reliability for the construct.  In dropping these items, it is 
quite possible that the resulting construct did not provide as robust a measure of political 
ideology as was initially intended, and the revised construct that was used in the analyses of 
Study 1 may not have assessed social conservatism as originally conceptualized.  To address this, 
an updated measure of political ideology was used in Study 2 which included all items that were 
used in Study 1 as well as thirteen additional items from prior research which investigated 
relations between socially conservative political attitudes and sensitivity to disgust (Terrizzi, 
Shook & Ventis, 2010) and twelve other items that had been used in prior unpublished 
exploratory work. 
A second potential limitation from Study 1 was that only relations between trait-level 
unconscious threat detection ability and existing socially conservative attitudes were 
investigated.  It may be the case that threat detection ability does not moderate the relation 
between existing perceptions of danger and socially conservative attitudes, but may moderate the 
extent to which new information about social danger leads to changes in conservative social 
attitudes (i.e., individuals with low threat detection ability may be more likely to adopt stronger 
conservative attitudes upon being presented with new information regarding danger as part of a 
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cautious social strategy, in line with the theoretical framework of the present research).  
Additionally, danger was not a highly salient aspect of Study 1, and as such, any moderating 
effects of threat detection ability on the relation between dangerous world beliefs and social 
conservatism may have been difficult to detect.   
To address these potential limitations, Study 2 sought to investigate whether individual 
differences in threat detection ability moderated the effect of new information about potential 
danger in the environment on socially conservative attitudes.  In Study 2, the perceived level of 
environmental danger was experimentally manipulated in participants prior to investigating the 
relation between perceptions of danger, trait level differences in the ability to detect threats, and 
conservative social attitudes.  Experimentally manipulating participants’ perceptions of danger 
made danger a highly salient aspect of the study, and allowed for a more controlled investigation 
of the relation between threat detection ability, belief in a dangerous world, and socially 
conservative attitudes. 
Three hypotheses were made for Study 2.  First, it was once again predicted that weaker 
threat detection ability would be associated with higher levels of social conservatism at the level 
of individual differences.  Although initial evidence to support this hypothesis was limited in 
Study 1, the hypothesis was retained and re-tested in Study 2 in order to seek replication of the 
relation between threat detection ability and social dominance orientation.  Also, an updated 
version of the political ideology questionnaire, which demonstrated better reliability than the 
measure that was used in Study 1, was incorporated to test the hypothesis.   
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A second hypothesis of Study 2 was that participants in the high danger condition were 
expected to endorse significantly stronger conservative social attitudes than participants in the 
low danger condition.  This hypothesis was specifically aimed at investigating the ability of 
social information to influence state-level changes in socially conservative attitudes. 
Finally, an interaction between threat detection accuracy and experimental condition was 
predicted such that participants in the high danger condition who were also low in threat 
detection ability were expected to report stronger conservative social attitudes than all other 
participants.  This hypothesis was specifically aimed at investigating threat detection ability as a 
moderator of the effect of dangerous world beliefs on socially conservative attitudes in a context 
that made danger a much more salient aspect of the research design than it had been in Study 1. 
Participants   
One-hundred seventy-three undergraduate students were recruited for participation 
according to the same procedure outlined in Study 1.  Data from seven participants were lost due 
to computer malfunction (data loss was comparable across experimental conditions); thus, all 
analyses are based on the remaining 166 participants.  The sample was 51% female and racially 
diverse (44% White, 30% African-American, 12% Asian, 6% Latino, and 8% reporting their race 
as ‘other’).  The average age of participants was 19.96 years (SD = 3.85).  Participants were 
randomly assigned to a high danger (n = 76) or low danger (n = 90) condition.
4
  A post-hoc 
                                                          
4
 Differences in the number of participants across experimental groups resulted from random 
assignment of participants to experimental conditions as they entered the study.  Assignment was 
randomized using the RANDBETWEEN function in Microsoft Excel™ to assign an 
 104 
 
sensitivity analysis conducted using the G*Power software (version 3.1.3; Faul, 2010) indicated 
that a sample of this size provided 80% power to detect a significant coefficient of determination, 
R
2
, of .08 or larger in a random effects multiple linear regression model with four predictors 
using a two-tailed test of significance (assumes α = .05).   
Danger Manipulation  
In the high danger condition, participants read a fictitious news article which indicated 
that the threat of crime in the United States had increased drastically in recent years.  The 
manipulation was intended to prime participants with the perception of a high likelihood of 
danger in their social world.  For the low danger condition, the news article was altered so that 
instead of indicating that violent crime has risen dramatically in recent years, the article indicated 
that it has dropped considerably.  The essays were exactly the same with the exception that in the 
low danger condition, any words indicating a rise in crime (e.g., rise, higher, increase) were 
changed to indicate a decrease (e.g., drop, lower, decrease), and all statistics presented in the 
article were changed to be consistent with this language (see Appendix B for the full text of the 
fictitious news articles used for the manipulation).  Previous research has indicated that similar 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
experimental condition (1 or 2) a priori to each participant ID number.  As participants arrived 
for the study, participant ID numbers were assigned in sequential order and thus participants 
were assigned to the experimental condition associated with the participant ID number to which 
they had been given.  Because participants were able to sign-up for the study as little as 2 hours 
before a scheduled session, and sessions were scheduled at least 1 week in advance, the exact 
number of participants that would constitute the final sample was unknown, and it was not 
possible to adjust condition assignments as the study proceeded to avoid the differences in 
sample sizes across experimental groups that resulted. 
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mortality salience manipulations have an effect on measures of political conservatism 
(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pysczynski, & Lyon, 1989). 
Pilot test. Twenty-five undergraduate students from an introductory statistics course 
were randomly assigned to either the high danger or low danger condition as part of a lesson on 
independent-samples t-tests (participants were not told that this was the purpose of the activity 
nor that they had been assigned different articles to read until after the pilot test had been 
completed).  After reading the fictitious news article, they were asked to respond to a series of 
semantic differential items that were each scored on a seven-point scale.  These scales were 
distributed across several categories in order to evaluate specific dimensions of participants’ 
reactions to the article.  Specifically, the students were asked to rate the article itself on 15 
separate dimensions; were asked to indicate how they felt that the article portrayed life in the 
United States across six dimensions; were asked to rate their perception of life in Richmond, 
Virginia across seven dimensions; and were asked to respond to two items examining their belief 
that the facts presented in the article were accurate and consistent with their previous beliefs.  A 
full overview of each of these dimensions along with means, standard deviations, and the results 
of independent samples t-tests are presented in Table 4.  In general, participants evaluated the 
high danger article as more dangerous and threatening compared to the low danger article.  
Additionally, participants perceived the high danger article to depict life in the United States as 
more dangerous and threatening compared to the low danger article.  As expected, participants 
did not differ across conditions in terms of how accurate or truthful they found the articles to be.   
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Table 4 
Results of the Pilot Test for the Manipulation Used in Study 2 
 Low Danger (n = 14) High Danger (n = 12) 
 M SD M SD t 
Article ratings 
 Dangerous 3.36 1.34 4.27 1.10 -1.83+ 
 Non-Threatening 4.79 1.37 3.33 1.50 2.58** 
 Harmless 4.85 1.07 3.17 1.11 3.85*** 
 Alarming 3.43 1.09 5.00 1.60 -2.97** 
 Worrying 3.07 1.33 4.58 1.68 -2.57* 
 Positive 4.29 .73 2.25 1.42 4.70*** 
 Happy 4.14 1.10 2.50 1.00 3.96*** 
 Bad 3.36 1.15 4.47 1.50 -2.52* 
 Inaccurate 4.14 1.23 4.08 1.44 .11 
 True 3.86 1.46 4.08 1.38 -.40 
 Unconvincing 4.00 1.24 3.33 1.72 1.14 
 Interesting 3.64 1.86 4.75 2.09 -1.43 
 Weak 3.77 1.67 3.67 1.72 .18 
 Uninteresting 4.00 1.52 2.92 1.38 1.89+ 
 Uninformative 2.36 1.22 2.42 1.24 -.12 
Evaluations of the article’s portrayal of life in the United States 
 Dangerous 3.17 1.03 4.83 1.27 -3.54** 
 Non-Threatening 4.42 1.38 3.25 1.22 2.20* 
 Harmless 4.08 1.44 3.08 1.24 1.82+ 
 Alarming 3.92 1.38 4.83 1.34 -1.65 
 Worrisome 3.58 1.31 5.17 1.59 2.67* 
 Inaccurate 3.50 1.08 3.75 1.22 .53 
Perceptions of life in Richmond, VA 
 Dangerous 4.92 1.24 4.17 .94 1.67 
 Non-Threatening 3.25 1.06 3.50 1.00 -.60 
 Harmless 3.92 .29 3.83 1.03 .27 
 Positive 3.83 1.11 4.08 1.88 -.40 
 Bad 3.50 1.38 4.00 1.71 -.79 
 Alarming 4.00 1.13 3.67 .98 .77 
 Interesting 4.08 2.23 4.50 1.68 .52 
Agreement with the conclusions of the article 
  4.00 1.60 4.17 1.53 -.26 
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In reality, there is more crime in the U.S. than the article described 
  4.83 1.19 4.92 1.51 -.15 
Note.  All items were evaluated on a 7-point scale. 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Based on these results, it was determined that the manipulation was effective and was 
appropriate for use in Study 2.   
Measures  
Threat detection ability.  Threat detection ability was measured using the same procedure as in 
Study 1 in which participants categorized each of 60 target images as either ‘safe’ or 
‘dangerous’, provided their level of confidence in this categorization, and were asked to write 
down, in free response format, what they believed the target image to be.  Threat detection 
ability was determined by calculating participants’ d’ scores after dropping all trials in which 
conscious perception of the target image was reported.  A measure of response bias (C) was also 
calculated according to the same procedure as in Study 1.  The only difference in the threat 
detection procedure in Study 2 was with regard to the response keys.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two response conditions; one in which the ‘danger’ response key was located 
under the participant’s left hand (with the ‘safe’ response key under the right hand) or an 
alternate condition in which the positioning of the keys was reversed.  These conditions were 
added to the procedure as a means to test whether the strong bias toward a ‘safe’ response that 
was observed in the Pilot Study and in Study 1 was due to the ‘safe’ response key being located 
under participants’ right hand (the dominant hand for most participants in the study). 
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Social conservatism. Participants completed the same RWA and SDO measures that 
were used in Study 1 as assessments of social conservatism.   
Political ideology.  In order to address the reliability issues that were found in Study 1, 
twenty-five additional items were added to the previous political ideology measure.  Thirteen of 
these items were taken from research by Terrizzi, Shook, and Ventis (2010) and an additional 
twelve items were added that had been used in prior exploratory research.   Thus, the updated 
scale contained 37 ideological statements to which participants responded with their level of 
agreement on a -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree) scale, as well as a single-item self-
report measure of political ideology anchored at 1 (Liberal) and 7 (Conservative).  The list of 
additional items is presented in Appendix A and is distinguished from the items that were only 
used in Study 1.   
Control measures.  The PANAS and STAI measures that were used in Study 1 were 
incorporated to control for the effects of mood and anxiety in the assessment of the relation 
between threat detection ability and social conservatism.   
Manipulation checks.  Participants completed several measures as checks of the 
effectiveness of the danger manipulation during the study.  Immediately after reading the 
fictitious news article associated with their experimental condition, participants completed the 
same belief in a dangerous world measure that was used in Study 1.  Additionally, after all other 
survey measures were completed and prior to completing the demographics questions, 
participants were asked to report how big of a problem they felt that violent crime was in the 
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United States; how big of a problem they felt that violent crime is where they live, specifically; 
how safe from violent crime the felt in the city of Richmond; how safe from violent crime they 
felt on campus; how surprised they felt about the information they had read in the article; 
whether the article was consistent with what they already knew about violent crime in the 
Richmond; and how accurate they felt that the information in the article was, based on what they 
had already known about the crime rate in the United States. 
Procedure  
Upon arriving for the study, all participants completed a consent form, were randomly 
assigned to an experimental condition, and were seated at individual workstations.  After 
receiving instructions for the study and having the opportunity to ask questions, participants 
began the experiment by completing the threat detection procedure.  Following this procedure, 
participants were asked to read the news story associated with their experimental condition and 
then completed the survey measures in the following order: BDW (as a manipulation check), 
PANAS, RWA, SDO, Political Ideology, STAI, the additional manipulation check items, and 
demographics.  At the completion of the surveys, participants read a short debriefing statement 
and were dismissed. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks  
An independent-samples t-test indicated that participants in the high danger condition 
reported significantly higher levels of belief in a dangerous world (M = 4.33, SD = 1.00) 
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compared to participants in the low danger condition (M = 3.81, SD = .84), t(164) = 3.69, p < 
.001, immediately following the manipulation.  Additional independent-samples t-tests revealed 
that participants in the high danger condition saw violent crime as a significantly bigger concern 
in the United States, t(164) = 5.66, p < .001, a significantly greater problem where they lived, 
t(164) = 4.11, p < .001, and reported feeling marginally less safe on campus, t(164) = -1.82, p = 
.07, compared to participants in the low danger condition when asked at the end of the study.  
Participants did not differ between experimental conditions when asked to report how safe from 
violent crime they perceived themselves to be in the city of Richmond, t(164) = -.53, p = .60.  It 
should be noted that participants in the low danger condition reported being significantly more 
surprised about the information that was presented in the news article, t(164) = 2.98, p = .003, 
and perceived the statistical information presented in the article to be significantly less accurate, 
t(164) = -2.15, p = .03, compared to participants in the high danger manipulation condition.  
However, there were no significant differences between the two groups when asked whether they 
felt that the article presented information that was consistent with what they already knew about 
the crime rate in Richmond, t(164) = .45, p = .65.  Although significant differences were 
observed in the perceived accuracy of the information presented in the articles and the extent to 
which participants reported being surprised by the information in the articles, the manipulation 
appeared to have the intended effect, particularly with regard to the observed differences 
between experimental conditions in the BDW measure. 
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Descriptive Statistics   
Threat detection.  In Study 2, there was a replication of the basic pattern of results that 
was found in Study 1 with regard to threat detection ability.  Participants, on average, were able 
to consciously detect very few target images during the threat detection procedure (M = 2.03, SD 
= 3.95), and as in Study 1 conscious detection was not normally distributed in the sample 
(skewness = 3.71, kurtosis = 17.67).  Again, over fifty percent of the sample did not consciously 
detect any images during the procedure and more than seventy-five percent of the sample 
detected two items or less.  However, slightly fewer than ten percent of participants were able to 
consciously detect six or more images, with one participant consciously detecting twenty-seven 
images (45%) and another participant consciously detecting twenty-six images (43%).  As in 
Study 1, all trials in which conscious detection of the target image occurred were dropped from 
further analysis.  
A one-sample t-test comparing the response bias statistic to zero (representing no 
response bias) indicated that there was a significant bias toward a ‘safe’ categorization across all 
participants (M = .57, SD = .77), t(165) = 9.50, p < .001.  Independent samples t-tests indicated 
that key placement did not have an effect on response bias, as participants who completed the 
threat detection procedure with the dangerous key assigned to their left hand (M = .53, SD = .75) 
did not differ in response bias from participants who completed the procedure with the 
‘dangerous’ key assigned to their right hand (M = .61, SD = .80), t(164) = -.71, p = .48.   
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Additionally, a one-sample t-test indicated that in Study 2, the average threat detection 
ability in the sample significantly exceeded chance (M = .07, SD = .42), t(165) = 2.25, p = .03.  
After removing trials in which conscious detection of the target image occurred, threat detection 
ability was not associated with participants’ reported confidence in their classifications, r(165) = 
.05, p = .49, providing additional evidence that the threat detection measures were not influenced 
by conscious awareness of the target images. 
Questionnaires.  Factor analysis using the updated set of items which comprised the 
political ideology composite measure suggested the presence of a single dominant factor 
indicated by a large first eigenvalue (13.59) coupled with a much smaller second eigenvalue 
(4.39).  Investigation of the associated scree plot (see Figure 9) indicated that a 2 or 3 factor 
solution was plausible; however, examination of the rotated factor loadings associated with these 
solutions did not reveal theoretically relevant loading patterns across the individual items.  As 
such, all items were combined into a single factor indicating participants’ political views for the 
analyses in Study 2. 
Reliability statistics indicated that all questionnaires had acceptable reliability and were 
also normally distributed with the exception of the PANAS-negative mood measure which was 
positively skewed (skewness = 1.43) and positively kurtotic (kurtosis = 1.83).  As in Study 1, a 
square root transformation addressed both of these issues.  Basic statistics for all Study 2 
measures including means and standard deviations, split by experimental condition, can be found 
in Table 5.  
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Figure 9.  Scree plot of eigenvalues in Study 2 
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Table 5 
Study 2 Reliability Statistics, Skewness, Kurtosis for All Variables with Means and Standard Deviations by Danger Condition 
    Low Danger (n = 90) High Danger (n = 76) 
 α skewness kurtosis M SD M SD t 
Belief in a Dangerous World .81 .45 .41 3.81 .84 4.33 1.00 -3.69*** 
Right Wing Authoritarianism .90 .05 -.57 3.92 1.32 4.17 1.32 -1.25 
Social Dominance Orientation .86 .65 .29 2.61 .92 2.32 .97 1.95+ 
Political Ideology Composite
†
 .81 -.20 -.38 -.41 .42 -.31 .47 -1.38 
Political Ideology Scale
†
 - .17 -.45 3.53 1.45 3.91 1.67 -1.55 
PANAS – Negative .83 1.08 .59 1.21 .20 1.28 .23 -2.03*  
PANAS – Positive .88 .38 -.14 2.68 .88 2.65 .75 .24 
State Anxiety  .89 .59 -.15 1.88 .46 1.98 .54 -1.29 
Trait Anxiety  .87 .04 -.51 2.00 .43 2.08 .43 -1.13 
Threat Detection Ability (d’) - .36 1.09 .10 .42 .04 .42 .97 
Response Bias (C)
††  .67 -.08 .54  .77 .61 .78 -.61 
Note.  †Higher numbers indicate a more conservative political ideology. ††Positive numbers indicate a bias toward a ‘safe’ response 
and negative numbers indicate a bias toward a ‘dangerous’ response. 
+p < .10, *p < .05, ***p < .001 
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Prior to testing the main hypotheses of the study, bivariate correlations were run between 
all of the main study measures and the control variables to assess whether mood or anxiety may 
have had any effect on the subsequent results.  A summary of these correlations can be found in 
Table 6.  This analysis revealed a significant positive correlation between negative mood and 
RWA (r = .15, p = .05) such that participants who reported more negative mood states also 
reported higher levels of right wing authoritarianism.  Additionally, participants differed 
significantly by experimental condition in their reports of negative mood, t(164) = 2.03, p = .04, 
with participants in the high danger condition reporting significantly more negative mood  
compared to participants in the low danger condition.  Thus, in order to account for the 
possibility that the experimental manipulation may have had an effect on RWA because of a 
manipulation of mood state, negative mood was controlled for in all analysis in which 
differences in RWA were investigated across experimental conditions.  Significant sex 
differences were also found with respect to the SDO measure, with males reporting significantly 
higher levels of social dominance orientation (M = 2.66, SD = 1.04) compared to females (M = 
2.31, SD = .83), t(164) = 2.40, p = .02.  Thus, all analyses involving SDO controlled for 
participant sex. 
Main Analyses 
 There were three main hypotheses of Study 2.  The first was that threat detection ability 
would predict social conservatism such that lower levels of threat detection ability would be 
associated with higher levels of social conservatism.  The second hypothesis of the study was  
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Table 6 
Initial Bivariate Correlations between All Study 2 Measures 
N = 166 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1. Threat Detection Ability (d’) - -.06 -.03 -.10 -.08 -.17* -.14+ -.06 .00 .01 .03 
2. Response Bias (C) - -.09 .00 -.08 -.01 -.11 .01 -.07 -.03 .01  
3. BDW - .37*** -.01 .28*** .28*** .16* -.03 .17* .19*  
4. RWA - .34*** .77*** .39*** .15* .13+ -.02 -.04  
5. SDO - .35*** .22** .06 .09 .06 .08  
6. PI-Comp - .46*** .13 .10 .00 -.03  
7. PI-Scale - .05 .01 -.05 -.02  
8. PANAS-Neg - .16* .59*** .42***  
9. PANAS-Pos - -.26*** -.22**  
10. SAI - .60***  
11. TAI -  
Note.  BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, PI-Comp = 
Political Ideology Composite, PI-Scale = Political Ideology Scale, PANAS-Neg = Negative Mood (Root Transformed), PANAS-Pos = 
Positive Mood, SAI = State Anxiety, TAI = Trait Anxiety 
+ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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that the danger manipulation would influence levels of social conservatism such that participants 
in the high danger manipulation would endorse higher levels of social conservatism compared to 
participants in the low danger condition.  Finally, an interaction between threat detection ability 
and danger manipulation was predicted such that participants in the high danger condition who 
also were assessed as having low threat detection ability were expected to report higher levels of 
social conservatism compared to all other participants.  These hypotheses were tested 
simultaneously in four separate hierarchical regression models, with each model testing the 
effects of threat detection ability and the experimental manipulation on a separate indicator of 
social conservatism.  The model predicting RWA included negative mood as a covariate, and the 
model predicting SDO included participant sex as a covariate.  Table 7 summarizes the findings 
of these analyses. 
 In regards to the first hypothesis, a significant main effect of threat detection ability in the 
predicted direction was found in the model predicting the political ideology composite (β = -.16, 
t = -2.06, p = .04), and a marginally significant effect of threat detection ability in the predicted 
direction was found in the model predicting the self-report political ideology scale item (β = -.13, 
t = -1.69, p = .10), such that participants with lower levels of threat detection ability reported 
more conservative political ideologies as assessed by both the composite and single-item self-
report measures.  A significant main effect of threat detection ability was not found in the model 
predicting RWA (β = -.09, t = -1.14, p = .25) after controlling for negative mood, nor was it 
found in the model predicting SDO (β = -.10, t = -1.36, p = .17), though the effects were in the  
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Table 7 
Regression Coefficients for Threat Detection Ability, Danger Manipulation Condition, and their 
Interaction as Predictors of Social Conservatism in Study 2 
 Threat Detection Ability MANIP TD x MANIP 
DV β t β t β t 
RWA
†
 -.09 -1.14 .07 .88 .06 .58 
SDO
††
 -.10 -1.36 -.15* -2.01 .12 .52 
PI Composite -.16* -2.06 .10 1.24 .32 1.34 
PI Scale -.13+ -1.65 .11 1.43 .30 1.24  
Note.  MANIP = Danger manipulation, TD x MANIP = Threat Detection Ability X Danger 
Manipulation Interaction, RWA = right wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance 
orientation, PI = political ideology. 
†
 Negative mood was entered as a control variable in the first step of the regression 
†† 
Participant sex was entered as a control variable in the second step of the regression 
+p < .10, *p < .05 
 
predicted direction (lower levels of threat detection ability were associated with higher levels of 
RWA and SDO). 
 In regards to the second hypothesis, a main effect of the manipulation was found in the 
model predicting SDO (β = -.15, t = -2.01, p = .05) after controlling for participant sex; however, 
the effect was not in the predicted direction.  Participants in the high danger condition reported 
significantly lower levels of social dominance orientation compared to participants in the low 
danger condition.  No other main effects of the experimental condition were observed (all ps > 
.16). 
 Finally, no significant interaction effects were found in any of the models (all ps > .18), 
indicating no support for the hypothesis that threat detection ability moderates the effect of 
newly-presented danger-relevant information on conservative attitudes.  Additionally, the 
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exploratory findings with respect to response bias from Study 1 were not replicated in Study 2.  
Response bias was not associated with belief in a dangerous world or any of the measures of 
social conservatism (all ps > .17).  
Discussion 
The findings of Study 2 provide limited support for the hypothesized relations between 
threat detection ability, perceptions of danger in the environment, and social conservatism.  First, 
the results indicated a more robust relation between threat detection ability and social 
conservatism than was found in Study 1.  The relation between these two constructs was 
observed in the predicted direction across all measures of social conservatism, though only 
reached the standard level of significance for the political ideology composite measure, and was 
marginally significant for the self-report political ideology scale item.  This may indicate that the 
improvement in the reliability of the political ideology construct over what was observed in 
Study 1 allowed for the detection of this relation.  There was not a replication of the significant 
relation between threat detection ability and SDO that was observed in Study 1; however, this 
relation did follow the same directional trend.  Thus, across two studies, there is mixed support 
for the hypothesis that lower levels of threat detection ability are associated with stronger 
endorsement of conservative social attitudes.  
The results of Study 2 did not indicate that manipulating perceptions of danger serves to 
influence social conservatism.  Though it did appear that the manipulation was effective in 
influencing participants’ perceptions of danger (as indicated by differences across experimental 
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conditions in the belief in a dangerous world measure), and though higher levels of belief in a 
dangerous world were predictive of higher social conservatism scores across the participant 
sample, participants in the high danger condition did not report significantly higher levels of 
social conservatism compared to participants in the low danger condition.  Finally, there was no 
evidence that threat detection ability moderated the effect of the experimental condition as no 
significant interaction effects were found between threat detection ability and experimental 
condition when predicting any of the measures of social conservatism.   
Overall, the results of the study offer multiple possibilities about the nature of socially 
conservative attitudes and their relation with the ability to detect threats.  First, threat detection 
ability seemed to be a small but consistent predictor of social conservatism which supports the 
possibility that this trait level ability influences the likelihood that socially conservative attitudes 
will develop.  In other words, it may be that subtle differences in experience that are related to 
the ability distinguish dangerous from safe objects at an unconscious level may lead to 
systematic differences in social attitudes.  However, it is essential for future research to seek 
additional evidence of this relation prior to drawing any strong conclusions, as the magnitude of 
the effect found in Study 2 was small, and the effect was only found for a single construct (social 
dominance orientation) in Study 1.   
The results obtained in Study 2 may also indicate that socially conservative attitudes tend 
to be more chronic and persistent aspects of an individual’s worldview as opposed to a state-
level characteristic that is sensitive to the influence of situational factors.  Across the first two 
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studies, belief in a dangerous world was a consistent predictor of social conservatism; however, 
manipulating participants’ beliefs about the relative level of danger in their environment did not 
convey any significant effect on their endorsement of socially conservative attitudes.  Thus, 
social conservatism may represent an attitude structure that develops over a long period of social 
experience and thus requires considerable social influence in order to produce change.  If this is 
the case, it would not be surprising that the information in a single news article, although 
effective in influencing participants’ immediate beliefs about the level of danger in their 
environment, was not powerful enough to produce change in more established social attitudes. 
Across the first two studies, limited evidence was found indicating that individual 
differences in the ability to detect threats, as well as a belief that the world is dangerous, are both 
predictive of socially conservative attitudes.  Study 3 sought to expand on these findings by first 
examining the importance of perceptions of threat detection ability (as opposed to actual ability) 
in predicting social conservatism.  Additionally, the findings from Study 2 indicated that 
although the danger manipulation was effective in creating systematic differences between the 
experimental conditions in participants’ dangerous world beliefs, these differences did not 
influence subsequent differences across the measures of social conservatism.  This may indicate 
that socially conservative attitudes are relatively stable characteristics which are not subject to 
changes associated with short-term variability in perceptions of danger.  However, the results of 
Study 2 would only support this conclusion in the context of perceptions of the threat of violent 
crime.  It is plausible that different types of dangers might differentially influence socially 
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conservative attitudes.  As such, a different fictitious news article was used to prime participants’ 
belief that the world is dangerous in Study 3 to determine whether the nature of the perceived 
threat has any bearing on the ability of the information to influence socially conservative 
attitudes.  
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Study 3: Manipulating Perceptions of Threat Detection Accuracy 
The primary focus of Studies 1 and 2 was to investigate the effect of trait-level individual 
differences in threat detection ability on socially conservative attitudes.  In Study 3, participants’ 
perception of their own accuracy in detecting threats was manipulated in order to determine 
whether this perception influences social conservatism.  This investigation was undertaken in an 
effort to distinguish the effects of trait-level cognitive threat detection ability from more 
subjective perceptions of one’s own ability.   
The manipulation of threat detection accuracy was accomplished by providing false 
feedback to participants in regards to their performance on the threat detection procedure.  Threat 
detection ability is assumed to be an automatic, unconscious process from the standpoint that 
individuals tend to make judgments about the valence of stimulus objects based on the 
assumption that their perception of the world is accurate.  However, feedback that indicates that 
these judgments are inaccurate may promote changes in threat management processes such as the 
adoption of socially conservative attitudes as a means to compensate for this perceived 
shortcoming.  Thus, it is important to note that the third study was intended to manipulate 
perceptions of threat detection accuracy, and not threat detection accuracy itself. 
The manipulation of the perception of threat detection accuracy was intended to simulate, 
in a lab setting, the subjective feeling that one is vulnerable to threats based on an inability to 
accurately detect them.  Although Studies 1 and 2 assessed the trait level ability to detect threats 
and the propensity to harbor conservative attitudes, participants were not provided with feedback 
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regarding their accuracy during the threat detection procedure in either of these studies.  
Conversely, Study 3 was intended to assess the tendency to adjust conservative attitudes in 
response to perceptions of one’s own ability to detect threats.  Perceptions of danger were also 
manipulated, as in Study 2, in order to examine the combined effects of perceptions of threat 
detection ability and the perceived likelihood of danger on the endorsement of socially 
conservative attitudes using a full experimental design.  In Study 2, perceptions of danger 
associated with violent crime were manipulated by asking participants to read a fictitious news 
article.  Though this paradigm was successful in manipulating perceptions of danger, the 
manipulation did not lead to systematic differences in participants’ socially conservative 
attitudes.  To determine whether this pattern of results was specific to perceptions of danger 
associated with violent crime or whether these findings are likely across multiple contexts of 
danger, Study 3 manipulated perceptions of danger associated with disease threat.  Specifically, 
participants were led to perceive differential levels of threat associated with the possibility of a 
global Swine Flu pandemic. 
Three specific hypotheses were tested in Study 3.  First, a main effect of the danger 
manipulation was predicted.  Participants in the high danger condition were expected to report 
higher levels of social conservatism than participants in the low danger condition.  Though this 
prediction was tested and not supported in Study 2, Study 3 re-tested the prediction by 
manipulating perceptions of danger in a different context (danger stemming from disease as 
opposed to danger stemming from violent crime).  Second, a main effect of the threat detection 
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accuracy manipulation was predicted such that participants who received feedback indicating 
that they were inaccurate at detecting threats were expected to report higher levels of social 
conservatism than participants who received feedback that they were highly accurate at detecting 
threats.  Finally, an interaction between the threat detection accuracy and danger manipulations 
was predicted such that participants in the low accuracy / high danger condition were expected to 
report higher levels of social conservatism than participants in all other conditions. 
Participants  
Two-hundred fourteen undergraduate students participated in Study 3 in exchange for 
one hour of course credit.  Data from five participants was lost due to experimenter error.  The 
research assistant who was running the study accidentally ran these 5 participants through a draft 
version of the Study 2 procedure instead of the Study 3 procedure.
5
  The remaining 209 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: low accuracy / low 
danger (n = 53), low accuracy / high danger (n = 41), high accuracy / low danger (n = 58), or 
high accuracy / high danger (n = 57).
6
  The participant sample was 55% female and 
predominantly White/Caucasian (56%) with 21% of participants reporting their race/ethnicity as 
                                                          
5
 An additional five participants experienced a computer malfunction during the threat detection 
procedure; however, as the data from this procedure was not necessary for testing the main 
hypotheses of the study, these participants were retained after investigation of their responses to 
the open-ended manipulation checks and additional notes that were taken from the session 
indicated that the malfunctions were unlikely to have influenced the effectiveness of the 
manipulation.  These five participants were not included in ancillary analyses that investigated 
relations with actual threat detection ability stemming from this procedure. 
6
 Differences in the number of participants across experimental groups resulted from the same 
random assignment process that was outlined in Study 2.  Additionally, data loss due to 
experimenter error was comparable across all conditions. 
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African-American, 11% Asian, and 8% Latino (4% categorized their race/ethnicity as ‘other’).  
The average age of the sample was 20.15 years (SD = 2.81). 
A post-hoc sensitivity analysis using G*Power (version 3.1.3; Faul, 2010) indicated that 
this sample size provided 80% power to detect an effect size of .05 (Cohen’s f 2) in a fixed 
effects 2 x 2 ANCOVA examining main effects and interactions with the inclusion of one 
covariate, which represents the most complex analysis conducted in the present study.   
Threat detection accuracy manipulation 
Threat detection accuracy was manipulated by providing false feedback to participants at 
the conclusion of the threat detection paradigm.  Participants completed the same threat detection 
procedure as in Studies 1 and 2; however, at the conclusion of the procedure, participants were 
presented with feedback about the accuracy of their performance.  Participants in the high 
accuracy condition (n = 115) were told that they were 79.3% accurate at detecting threats during 
the procedure, whereas participants in the low accuracy condition (n = 94) were told that they 
were 19.7% accurate at detecting threats.   
Likelihood of danger manipulation 
Participants’ perceptions of the likelihood of danger were manipulated in the same 
manner as in Study 2, but instead of manipulating the threat of violent crime, the fictitious news 
articles portrayed the threat of infectious disease.  Participants in the high danger condition (n = 
98) read a fictitious news article discussing the high likelihood of a Swine Flu pandemic 
affecting the United States, whereas participants in the low danger condition (n = 111) read a 
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similar article indicating that the threat of Swine Flu has been all but eliminated in the U.S. (see 
Appendix B for the manipulation essays).   
Pilot test of manipulations 
Fifty-eight undergraduate students (52% male; Mage = 20.16 years, SD = 2.08) 
participated in a pilot test of the accuracy and danger manipulations to be used in Study 3 in 
exchange for course credit.  Participants were randomly assigned to either the low accuracy (n = 
29) or high accuracy (n = 29) condition, and either the low danger (n = 26) or high danger (n = 
32) condition.  All participants completed the same threat detection procedure that was used in 
Studies 1 and 2 which was followed by the accuracy manipulation.  After the accuracy 
manipulation, participants read the fictitious news article associated with their danger 
manipulation condition and then responded to the same series of 28 semantic differential items 
(scored on a seven point scale) that were used in the pilot test of the danger manipulation in 
Study 2.  Following the semantic differential items, participants were asked to rate their own 
performance on the threat detection task, were asked to recall the accuracy score they had been 
presented with at the conclusion of the task, and were then asked to rate their opinion of this 
score and their perception of how well they felt they had done on the threat detection task 
relative to other participants.  All of the accuracy manipulation checks were scored on a five-
point scale. 
To investigate the effectiveness of the danger manipulation, independent-samples t-tests 
were used to compare participants’ responses to the semantic differential items after reading the 
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fictitious news article specific to their experimental condition.  An overview of responses to the 
semantic differential items is presented in Table 8.  When asked to rate the article itself, 
participants in the high danger condition consistently rated their article as conveying more threat 
relevant information compared to participants in the low danger condition across several 
semantic differential items, whereas there were no significant differences in participants’ ratings 
of how accurate, true, convincing, or interesting they found the article to be.  This pattern held 
when participants were asked to rate how the article portrayed life in the United States, and when 
participants were asked to indicate their perception of life in Richmond.  Additionally, there were 
no significant differences between participants in the low danger condition (M = 3.04, SD = 
1.28) and participants in the high danger condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.67) when asked the extent 
to which they agreed with the conclusions of the article, t(56) = .69, p = .49.  The responses to 
the semantic differential scale items represented a consistent general pattern indicating that 
participants viewed the high danger article as representative of a more negative and threatening 
view of the world compared to the low danger article, though no significant differences emerged 
in regards to participants’ perceived legitimacy of the articles.  Thus, the danger manipulation 
appeared to be effective. 
Investigation of participants’ responses to the checks of the accuracy manipulation 
indicated that participants in the high accuracy condition rated their performance on the threat 
detection task (M = 3.17, SD = .89) as significantly better compared to participants in the low 
accuracy condition (M = 1.34, SD = .48), t(56) = -9.72, p < .001.  When asked to recall their  
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Table 8 
Responses to the Semantic Differential Items from the Pilot Test of the Danger Manipulation in 
Study 3  
 Low Danger High Danger  
N = 58 M SD M SD t 
Ratings of the article 
 Safe – Dangerous 2.54 1.42 5.19 1.35 -7.25*** 
 Non-Threatening – Threatening 2.31 1.52 5.13 1.77 -6.41*** 
 Harmless – Scary 2.92 1.52 5.50 1.34 -6.85*** 
 Calming – Alarming 2.62 1.60 5.50 1.02 -8.34*** 
 Relieving – Worrying 2.23 1.42 5.56 .84 -11.09*** 
 Inaccurate – Accurate 3.00 1.26 3.34 1.49 -.93 
 True – False 3.15 1.46 3.50 1.72 -.81 
 Convincing – Unconvincing 2.58 1.42 3.06 1.37 -1.32 
 Interesting – Boring 3.27 1.69 2.72 1.49 1.32 
 Strong – Weak 3.81 1.58 2.88 1.54 2.27* 
 Engaging – Uninteresting 3.31 1.41 2.53 1.14 2.33* 
 Positive – Negative 2.15 1.05 5.75 1.30 -11.44*** 
 Happy – Sad 2.65 1.23 5.97 .93 -11.67*** 
 Good – Bad 2.31 1.09 5.38 1.70 -7.97*** 
 Informative – Uninformative 2.31 1.26 2.22 1.24 .27 
Ratings of the article’s portrayal of life in the U.S. 
 Safe – Dangerous 2.27 1.15 4.28 1.85 -4.83*** 
 Non-Threatening – Threatening 2.54 1.45 4.78 1.70 -5.34*** 
 Harmless – Frightening 2.58 1.24 4.66 1.56 -5.53*** 
 Calming – Alarming 2.35 1.02 4.94 1.46 -7.67*** 
 Relieving – Worrisome 2.58 1.27 5.00 1.34 -7.00*** 
 Accurate – Inaccurate 3.12 1.28 3.66 1.58 -1.41 
Perception of life in Richmond, VA 
 Non-Threatening – Threatening 3.23 1.34 3.97 1.38 -2.06* 
 Safe – Dangerous 3.35 1.32 3.88 1.50 -1.41 
 Harmless – Frightening 3.31 1.38 3.59 1.29 -.81 
 Positive – Negative 2.88 1.24 3.44 1.61 -1.44 
 Good – Bad 2.54 1.14 3.03 1.36 -1.48 
 Calming – Alarming 3.35 1.23 3.88 1.31 -1.57 
 Interesting – Boring 3.31 1.87 2.66 1.70 1.39  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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accuracy score, participants in both the high (M = 78.69, SD = 1.79) and low accuracy (M = 
19.39, SD = .56) conditions accurately recalled the false feedback they had been given following 
the threat detection task.  High accuracy participants expressed a significantly more positive 
opinion of this score (M = 3.69, SD = .71) compared to participants in the low accuracy 
condition (M = 2.24, SD = .83), t(56) = -7.13, p < .001, and also reported a significantly greater 
likelihood that they had done well on the task relative to other participants (M = 3.10, SD = .41) 
compared to participants in the low accuracy condition (M = 2.41, SD = .78), t(56) = -4.22, p < 
.001.  Based on these results, it was concluded that the accuracy manipulation was an effective 
mechanism for influencing participants’ perceptions of their own threat detection ability. 
Measures  
Belief in a dangerous world, social conservatism, mood, and anxiety were assessed using 
the same measures as in Study 2. 
Procedure   
The procedure for Study 3 was identical to Study 2 with the exception of the threat 
detection accuracy manipulation which occurred at the conclusion of the threat detection 
procedure.  During the instructions that were provided at the beginning of the study, participants 
were told that they would receive feedback regarding their performance at the conclusion of the 
threat detection task. 
Following the threat detection accuracy manipulation, participants received either the 
high danger or low danger manipulation and then completed all of the study measures according 
 131 
 
to the same procedure outlined in Study 2.  After all of the survey measures were completed, but 
before participants completed the demographics questions, participants were asked to complete 
three questions as a check of the threat detection accuracy manipulation and seven questions as a 
check of the danger manipulation.  These questions can be found in Appendices B and C, 
respectively. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
 An independent samples t-test indicated that participants in the high accuracy condition 
rated their performance on the threat detection task (M = 2.82, SD = 1.11) as significantly better 
compared to participants in the low accuracy condition (M = 1.39, SD = .68), t(207) = -10.87, p < 
.001.  Participants in the high accuracy condition also reported being significantly more satisfied 
with their score (M = 3.61, SD = .70) compared to participants in the low accuracy condition (M 
= 2.37, SD = .87), t(207) = -11.43, p < .001, and reported significantly higher levels of 
confidence that they had performed better than other participants in the study (M = 3.10, SD = 
.56) compared to participants in the low accuracy condition (M = 2.39, SD = .69), t(207) = -8.20, 
p < .001.  Based on these responses, it was determined that, consistent with the results of the 
pilot test, the accuracy manipulation had the desired effect of influencing participants’ 
perceptions of their own threat detection abilities.   
Independent samples t-tests were also used to assess the efficacy of the danger 
manipulation.  Participants in the high danger condition reported that they felt that a potential 
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Swine Flu pandemic was a significantly greater problem facing the United States (M = 3.01, SD 
= 1.62) compared to participants in the low danger condition (M = 2.26, SD = 1.18), t(207) = -
3.85, p < .001.  Additionally, participants in the high danger condition reported feeling 
marginally less safe from Swine Flu in the city of Richmond (M = 5.21, SD = 1.85) compared to 
participants in the low danger condition (M = 5.67, SD = 1.55), t(207) = 1.92, p = .06, and also 
reported feeling marginally less safe from Swine Flu on campus (M = 5.16, SD = 1.79) compared 
to participants in the low danger condition (M = 5.56, SD = 1.66), t(207) = 1.66, p = .10.  
However, participants in the low danger condition reported significantly higher levels of belief 
that the world is dangerous (M = 4.06, SD = .78) compared to participants in the high danger 
condition (M = 3.72, SD = .71), t(207) = -3.26, p = .001.  Significant differences were not 
observed between participants in the high danger and low danger conditions when asked how big 
of a problem they thought Swine Flu was where they live, t(207) = .54, p = .58.   
Thus, it seems as though the manipulation had an effect (albeit arguably a weak effect) in 
the expected direction when participants were specifically asked about their perceptions of 
danger related to the Swine Flu.  However, perceptions of the world as a dangerous place 
differed between the experimental conditions in the opposite direction than was expected 
(participants in the low danger condition reported viewing the world as significantly more 
dangerous compared to participants in the high danger condition).  Because of this unanticipated 
finding, all further analyses associated with the danger manipulation were interpreted in an 
exploratory manner. 
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Descriptive statistics 
As in Study 2, reliability statistics indicated that all questionnaire items demonstrated 
acceptable reliability and were normally distributed with the exception of the negative mood 
subscale of the PANAS measure, which was positively skewed (skewness = 1.38) and kurtotic 
(kurtosis = 2.08).  As in Studies 1 and 2, a square root transformation addressed both of these 
issues.  Basic statistics for all Study 3 measures including reliability measures, skewness, 
kurtosis, and means and standard deviations split by experimental condition can be found in 
Table 9. 
In order to determine whether control variables would be necessary when testing the 
main hypotheses of the study, independent-samples t-tests were used to assess whether mood or 
anxiety differed across experimental conditions.  These analyses did not indicate any significant 
differences between experimental conditions in the accuracy manipulation in reports of negative 
mood, positive mood, or state or trait level anxiety (all ps > .30).  An independent-samples t-test 
did reveal a significant difference in reports of positive mood between participants in the high 
danger (M = 2.46, SD = .78) and low danger (M = 2.71, SD = .72) conditions, t(207) = 2.38, p = 
.02, such that participants in the high danger condition reported less positive mood compared to 
participants in the low danger condition.  There were no other significant differences in any of 
the other potential control variables across danger conditions (all ps > .20).   
Bivariate correlations were examined between all study variables.  These correlations can 
be found in Table 10.  As expected, all measures of social conservatism were significantly  
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Table 9 
Study 3 Reliability Statistics, Skewness, Kurtosis for All Variables with Means and Standard Deviations by Experimental Condition 
 Experimental Condition (Accuracy / Danger) 
 Low / Low Low / High High / Low High / High 
 α skewness kurtosis M SD M SD M SD M SD 
BDW  .75 .12 -.06 4.07 .82 3.62 .69 4.05 .75 3.80 .72 
RWA  .92 .12 -.64 3.77 1.32 3.43 1.18 3.76 1.53 3.52 1.21  
SDO  .89 .66 -.18 2.37 .95 2.36 .94 2.22 1.04 2.48 .92 
PI Composite
†
  .81 -.04 .12 -.45 .38 -.50 .42 -.45 .50 -.51 .41 
PI Scale
†
  - .37 -.38 3.66 1.57 3.44 1.58 3.28 1.64 3.63 1.55 
PANAS – Neg .83 1.00 .66 1.28 .23 1.19 .16 1.22 .19 1.23 .19 
PANAS – Pos  .87 .40 -.05 2.70 .74 2.32 .67 2.72 .72 2.56 .84 
SAI  .91 .37 -.24 2.00 .53 1.94 .48 1.92 .52 2.00 .55 
TAI  .92 .22 -.53 2.08 .51 1.97 .40 2.10 .55 2.11 .54 
Note.  †Higher numbers indicate a more conservative political ideology 
BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World, RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, PI = Political 
Ideology, PANAS – Neg = Negative Mood (Root Transformed), PANAS – Pos = Positive Mood, SAI = State Anxiety Inventory, TAI 
= Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
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Table 10 
Initial Bivariate Correlations Between All Study 3 Measures 
N = 209 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
1. BDW - .34*** -.06 .24*** .02 .14* .06 .08 .07   
2. RWA   - .30*** .74*** .49*** .16* .15* -.03 -.13+ 
3. SDO  - .38*** .36*** .07 .00 .10 .04 
4. PI-Comp  - .55*** .09 .10 .02 -.16* 
5. PI-Scale  - .02 .08 -.05 -.15* 
6. PANAS-Neg  - .10 .61*** .47*** 
7. PANAS-Pos  - -.32*** -.31*** 
8. SAI   - .70*** 
9. TAI   - 
Note.  BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World, RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, PI = 
Political Ideology, PANAS-Neg = Negative Mood (Root Transformed), PANAS-Pos = Positive Mood, SAI = State Anxiety 
Inventory, TAI = Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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positively correlated with one another.
7
  Additionally, the RWA construct was significantly 
correlated with positive mood (r = .15, p = .03) indicating that elevations in positive mood were 
associated with stronger authoritarian views.  Based on these findings, the main analyses 
examining the effect of the experimental conditions on RWA controlled for positive mood as this 
construct differed significantly across the levels of the danger manipulation and was also 
significantly related to RWA, thus representing a potential confound. 
Main analyses 
A series of 2 (low accuracy vs. high accuracy) x 2 (low danger vs. high danger) between-
subjects ANOVAs (ANCOVA in the case of the RWA analysis) were used to test the main 
hypotheses of the study.  The analyses examined the main effects of the accuracy and danger 
manipulations as well as the interaction between the experimental conditions on each measure of 
social conservatism (RWA, SDO, and the political ideology composite and self report items).  
None of the analyses revealed a significant main effect of either the accuracy or the danger 
manipulation on social conservatism indices, nor were there any interaction effects (all ps > .19). 
                                                          
7
 The reliability between the four measures of social conservatism was examined and was found 
to reach the accepted threshold for combination into a single index of social conservatism 
(Cronbach’s α = .78).  As such, an additional test of the main hypothesis of the study was 
conducted using the social conservatism index as the dependent variable.  Analysis of covariance 
using the accuracy and danger manipulations as independent variables did not reveal a 
significant main effect of the accuracy manipulation, F(1, 205) = .02, p = .89, the danger 
manipulation, F(1, 205) = .13, p = .72, or the interaction between the two experimental 
conditions, F(1, 205) = .64, p = .42. 
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Secondary analyses 
 Though the main hypotheses of Study 3 were not supported, additional analyses were 
conducted in order to determine whether the patterns of findings from Studies 1 and 2 with 
respect to threat detection ability were replicated.  Specifically, the secondary analyses examined 
participants’ threat detection ability as well as their belief in a dangerous world and the relation 
between these constructs and the social conservatism indices. 
Threat detection ability.  In Study 3, there was a replication of the basic pattern of 
results that were found in Studies 1 and 2 with regard to threat detection ability.  Again, 
participants were able to consciously detect very few target images during the threat detection 
procedure (M = 3.42, SD = 5.83), and conscious detection was not normally distributed in the 
sample (skewness = 2.74, kurtosis = 8.81).  In Study 3, forty percent of the sample did not 
consciously detect any images, and seventy-eight percent of the sample consciously detected 
four images or fewer.  In this sample, however, eleven percent of participants consciously 
detected ten images or more, with one participant consciously detecting 36 of the target images 
(60%) and another participant consciously detecting 31 of the target images (52%).  As in the 
previous studies, all trials in which conscious detection occurred were dropped from further 
analysis.  
A one-sample t-test comparing the response bias statistic to zero indicated that there was 
once again a significant bias toward a ‘safe’ categorization across all participants (M = .37, SD = 
.78), t(203) = 6.83, p < .001.  Additionally, a one-sample t-test indicated that in Study 2, the 
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average threat detection ability in the sample significantly exceeded chance (M = .10, SD = .45), 
t(203) = 3.10, p = .002.  Threat detection ability was not associated with participants’ reported 
confidence in their classifications, r(203) = .02, p = .76, providing additional evidence that the 
threat detection measures were not influenced by conscious awareness of the target images. 
Social conservatism.  Initial analysis indicated that threat detection ability was not 
significantly correlated with belief in a dangerous world, any of the social conservatism 
measures, or any of the control variables (all ps > .37).  Belief in a dangerous world was 
positively correlated with RWA, r(208) = .34, p < .001, and the political ideology composite 
measure, r(208) = .24, p < .001, such that higher levels of belief in a dangerous world were 
associated with higher levels of RWA and more conservative political attitudes as indicated by 
the composite measure.  Significant correlations were not observed between belief in a 
dangerous world and the SDO, r(208) = -.06, p = .40, or the single-item self-report ideology 
measure, r(208) = .02, p = .74.   
Hierarchical linear regression models were used to assess whether threat detection ability 
served to moderate the relation between belief in a dangerous world and social conservatism.  As 
in Studies 1 and 2, four separate models (one for each social conservatism measure) were tested.  
The first model, predicting RWA, controlled for negative mood in the first step of the regression 
as negative mood was significantly correlated with RWA and was marginally correlated with 
BDW.  This model indicated a main effect of BDW (β = .33, t = 4.99, p < .001) after controlling 
for negative mood such that participants who believed that the world was more dangerous tended 
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to also endorse higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism.  However, investigation of the 
interaction term indicated that this relation was not moderated by threat detection ability (β = -
.05, t = -.75, p = .45).   
The model predicting the political ideology composite item also indicated a main effect 
of belief in a dangerous world (β = .23, t = 3.36, p = .001) such that participants who believed 
that the world was more dangerous tended to endorse a more conservative political viewpoint.  
Once again, however, this relation was not moderated by threat detection ability (β = -.07, t = -
1.00, p = .32).  Additionally, no main effects or interaction effects were found in the models 
predicting social dominance orientation or the single-item political ideology self-report measure 
(all ps > .39). 
Discussion 
 The results from Study 3 did not indicate support for any of the hypotheses.  Participants’ 
reports of socially conservative attitudes did not differ across the conditions of the accuracy 
manipulation or the danger manipulation, nor was evidence of an interaction effect found 
between the two experimental conditions. 
The manipulation checks conducted in Study 3 suggest that the accuracy manipulation 
had the desired effect (i.e., participants’ perceptions of their ability to detect threats in the threat 
detection paradigm were consistent with their manipulation condition); however, this perception 
did not appear to have an effect on participants’ level of social conservatism.  This may indicate 
that explicit perceptions of threat detection ability do not directly influence socially conservative 
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attitudes.  Put another way, the results of Study 3 may suggest that the perception that one’s 
ability to detect threats is below average does not necessarily prompt a compensatory response 
for this perceived deficit via an increase in socially conservative attitudes.   
The danger manipulation in Study 3 presented a slightly more puzzling story.  
Participants’ responses to the manipulation check questions indicated that the manipulation had 
the desired (albeit weak) effect on perceptions of danger in the context of the article (i.e., 
participants in the high danger condition appeared to perceive a greater threat from Swine Flu 
compared to participants in the low danger condition).  However, the measure of participants’ 
belief that the world is dangerous stood in contrast with the findings from the manipulation 
checks such that participants in the low danger condition reported a significantly higher belief 
that the world is dangerous compared to participants in the high danger condition; a result that 
was unexpected.  If it were the case that participants did not view the threat of disease as 
representative of a ‘danger’ in their environment (i.e., it could be argued that participants might 
conceptualize ‘dangers’ as violent physical threats, more closely related to the manipulation in 
Study 2), then no significant differences would be expected between the two experimental 
conditions.  However, the finding that participants’ dangerous world beliefs differed 
systematically across the experimental conditions suggests that the content of the fictitious article 
influenced perceptions of danger, but that the high danger article led to participants viewing their 
world as less dangerous compared to participants that read the low danger article.  One possible 
explanation for such a finding would be that this difference between experimental conditions 
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represented a compensatory response to the information that they had been given (i.e., 
participants in the high danger condition responded to the perceived threat of swine flu by 
conceptualizing their world as significantly safer compared to participants who had not been 
faced with this same threat).  However, such a response would seem to make little sense from the 
standpoint that it contradicts the ostensibly objective information presented in the news article. 
Consistent with the findings from Study 2, these differences between experimental 
conditions with regard to belief in a dangerous world did not translate into differences in the 
social conservatism measures.  Differences across experimental conditions failed to manifest 
despite the significant positive correlations that existed between belief in a dangerous world and 
both the RWA and political ideology composite measures.  These findings further support the 
interpretation that socially conservative attitudes are pervasive, trait-level constructs that are not 
prone to short-term fluctuations stemming from variability in the surrounding social context. 
Additional exploratory analyses indicated that participants were once again able to 
differentiate between safe and dangerous images presented outside of conscious awareness in the 
threat detection task at rates that significantly exceeded chance; however, threat detection ability 
was neither associated with any of the political conservatism indices, nor did it serve to moderate 
the relation between dangerous world beliefs and social conservatism. 
In sum, the findings from Study 3 failed to support the hypotheses that self-perceptions of 
accuracy in detecting threats as well as perceptions of the level of danger in one’s social 
environment serve to influence socially conservative attitudes.  These findings may suggest that 
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social conservatism is not a contextually bound attitude structure, and thus is not likely to be 
susceptible to short term fluctuations and manipulation through situational factors.  Rather, these 
findings may be interpreted to suggest that social conservatism represents a more pervasive, trait-
level attitude construct that remains stable (or at least changes relatively slowly) over time and 
across social experiences. 
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Summary Analyses 
 Considering that the threat detection paradigm used in the present research was new and 
provided unique insight into participants’ ability to discriminate between safe and dangerous 
images, summary analyses were performed combining the data across all studies to investigate 
the threat detection measure and the relations between threat detection ability and social 
conservatism.  These analyses combined data from the threat detection pilot study, the threat 
detection accuracy manipulation pilot study, and Studies 1-3 for summary data on the threat 
detection procedure, and combined data from Studies 1-3 only for summary data on the relations 
between threat detection ability and social conservatism. 
Threat detection procedure   
Data from five separate studies were combined to investigate overall performance on the 
threat detection procedure.  In the initial pilot study, participants’ threat detection ability (d’ 
index) was based on a procedure which used 30 total trials, with each image presented once.  In 
all other studies, threat detection ability scores were based on a procedure which used 60 total 
trials (each image presented twice).  The same set of images were used in all procedures and all 
other aspects of the procedure (display timing of the images, participants’ distance from the 
computer screen, the structure of participants’ response tasks) were exactly the same, suggesting 
that it is acceptable to combine data from participants across all trials.  This resulted in a 
summary data set containing observations from 668 unique participants (participants were not 
permitted to sign up for more than one of the five studies that were conducted).   
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Consistent with what was reported in previous studies, conscious detection of the target 
images was not normally distributed in the summary sample (skewness = 3.58, kurtosis = 16.43).  
In order to provide valuable descriptive information from the summary data, the number of trials 
in which the target image was consciously detected was retained for all participants, but a data 
transformation was applied in order to correct for the non-normality so that its relation to other 
variables could be explored.  The transformation was conducted by first adding 1 to all conscious 
detection scores so that the transformation would not involve division by zero.  Next, the inverse 
of each conscious detection score was calculated which corrected for the issues of non-normality.  
Taking the inverse of the conscious detection scores resulted in participants with the highest 
number of consciously detected items having the lowest scores, so the sign of all correlations 
associated with conscious detection was reversed (e.g., positive correlations were changed to 
negative correlations and vice-versa), so that the relations could be interpreted properly.   
All trials in which conscious detection of the target image was reported were dropped 
when calculating threat detection ability, response bias, and average confidence scores; thus, the 
analyses summarize threat detection ability that occurred outside of conscious awareness.  
Summary statistics regarding the threat detection procedures are presented in Table 11.   
Analysis indicated that across all studies, participants’ ability to discriminate between 
safe and dangerous images that were presented outside of conscious awareness (M = .07, SD = 
.43) significantly differed from chance levels, t(667) = 4.21, p < .001.  This is an important 
finding, because had the average threat detection ability in the sample not exceeded chance  
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Table 11 
Signal Detection across All Studies 
 d’ 95% Confidence C 95% Confidence Conscious Detection 
 N M SD LCL UCL M SD LCL UCL M  Median Max 
TD Procedure Pilot
†
 43 .08 .48 -.07 .23 .51 .75 .28 .74 1.02 0 11 
Study 1 190 .04 .41 -.02 .10 .34 .75 .23 .45 2.07 0 20 
Study 2 166 .07 .42 .01 .14 .57 .77 .45 .69 2.03 0 27 
Study 3 Pilot 65 .07 .43 -.04 .18 .42 .64 .26 .58 4.46 1 44 
Study 3 204 .10 .45 .04 .16 .37 .78 .26 .48 3.42 1 36  
 
All Trials 668 .07 .43 .04 .10 .43 .76 .37 .48 2.64 1 44 
Note.  d’ = Threat Detection Ability , C = Response Bias (positive numbers indicate a bias toward a ‘safe’ response, and negative 
numbers indicate a bias toward a ‘dangerous’ response).  Both statistics represent only trials in which the target stimulus was not 
consciously detected. 
†
Pilot study based on 30 total trials with each image viewed once.  All other studies based on 60 total trials with each image viewed 
twice. 
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levels, it could be argued that the individual differences that had been found within each sample 
only represented random fluctuations in a normally distributed construct akin to statistical noise.  
Had this been the case, any associations that were found between threat detection ability and 
social conservatism would likely have represented spurious associations.  
Threat detection ability was not associated with reported confidence in classifications of 
the target stimuli, r(667) = .03, p = .48, further suggesting that the classifications were not based 
on conscious awareness.  However, threat detection ability was related to the number of target 
images that were consciously detected, r(667) = .20, p < .001, indicating that participants who 
were more accurate at distinguishing between safe and dangerous images which were presented 
outside of conscious awareness tended to detect more images consciously as well.  Detection 
ability did exhibit a weak negative correlation with response bias, r(667) = -.10, p = .01, such 
that participants with better threat detection ability demonstrated less of a bias toward a ‘safe’ 
response.   
There was a strong bias across all participants toward a safe response (M = .43, SD = 
.76), t(667) = 14.51, p < .001, and response bias was positively correlated with participants’ 
reported confidence in their responses, r(667) = .18, p < .001.  Thus, participants who were more 
biased toward a ‘safe’ response tended to be more confident (on average) in their classification 
of the target stimuli, whereas participants who demonstrated less of a bias toward classifying the 
target image as ‘safe’ (or more of a bias toward a classification of ‘dangerous’) tended to report 
less confidence in their classifications on average.  Response bias was also associated with the 
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number of target images that were consciously detected, r(667) = -.11, p = .004, such that 
participants who consciously detected more of the target images tended to be less biased toward 
a ‘safe’ response.  Finally, the number of images that were consciously detected was not 
associated with participants’ average confidence in their classifications, r(667) = -.03, p = .51.  It 
should be noted that as the average confidence rating was calculated using only trials in which 
conscious detection did not take place, the significant relation between the two constructs 
indicates that though some participants were able to consciously detect more target images than 
others, participants who consciously detected more of the target images were no more or less 
confident in their classifications on trials in which they were not able to consciously detect the 
target compared to participants who consciously detected fewer (or none) of the target images. 
Threat detection ability and social conservatism   
Data from Studies 1-3 were combined into a single dataset in order to investigate overall 
relations between threat detection ability and social conservatism measures.  The summary data 
set contained observations from 560 unique participants across the three studies.  For all analyses 
involving the political ideology composite measure, only data from Studies 2 and 3 (N = 375) 
were used because of the poor reliability of the political ideology composite measure that was 
observed in Study 1. 
 Initial bivariate correlations were conducted between threat detection, response bias, 
belief in a dangerous world, all measures of social conservatism, and all control variables.  These 
correlations are summarized in Table 12.  The results indicated that across all three studies,  
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Table 12 
Bivariate Correlations across Studies 1-3 
N = 560 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
†
 8 9 10 11 12  
1. Threat Detection Ability (d’) - -.08* .20*** .03 .00 -.08+ -.05 -.05 .01 -.02 .06 .06  
2. Response Bias (C)  - -.10* -.07+ .06 -.03 .05 -.04 -.06 -.10* -.08* -.03  
3. Conscious Detection   - -.05 -.11* .03 -.12* -.03 .08* .03 .04 .06 
4. BDW    - .42*** .02 .26*** .17*** .14** .02 .11* .10*  
5. RWA     - .31*** .76*** .44*** .13** .13** -.01 -.10*  
6. SDO      - .38*** .28*** .05 .09* .01 .04  
7. PI-Comp
†
       - .52*** .11* .11* .01 -.11* 
8. PI-Scale        - .01 .08+ -.05 -.11**  
9. PANAS-Neg         - .13** .64*** .43*** 
10. PANAS-Pos          - -.23*** -.23*** 
11. SAI           - .62*** 
12. TAI            - 
Note.  BDW = Belief in a Dangerous World, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, PI-Comp = 
Political Ideology Composite, PI-Scale = Political Ideology Scale, PANAS-Neg = Negative Mood (Root Transformed), PANAS-Pos = 
Positive Mood, SAI = State Anxiety, TAI = Trait Anxiety 
+ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
†
Correlations involving the political ideology composite variable only used data from Studies 2 and 3 (N = 375). 
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threat detection ability demonstrated a weak but marginally significant relation with social 
dominance orientation, r(559) = -.07, p = .08, such that lower levels of threat detection ability 
were associated with higher levels of social dominance orientation.  However, no relation was 
observed across the three studies between threat detection ability and the composite measure of 
political ideology, r(374) = -.05, p = .36, the self-report single-item measure of political 
ideology, r(559) = -.04, p = .30, or RWA, r(559) = .00, p = .92. 
 Response bias demonstrated a marginally significant relation to belief in a dangerous 
world, r(559) = -.07, p = .08, such that higher levels of belief that the world is dangerous were 
associated with a bias toward a ‘dangerous’ response.  Response bias was also significantly 
associated with positive mood, r(559) = -.10, p = .02, such that more positive mood was 
associated with higher bias toward a ‘dangerous’ response, and with state anxiety, r(559) = -.08, 
p = .05, such that increased anxiety was associated with a higher bias toward a ‘dangerous’ 
response. 
 Across the three studies, belief in a dangerous world demonstrated a moderate association 
with right-wing authoritarianism, r(559) = .42, p < .001, as well as a somewhat weaker  
association with the single-item political ideology measure, r(559) = .17, p < .001.  Additionally, 
across Studies 2 and 3, belief in a dangerous world demonstrated a moderate association with the 
political ideology composite measure, r(374) = .26, p < .001.  However, BDW was unrelated to 
social dominance orientation, r(559) = .02, p = .58, indicating that SDO is unlikely to stem from 
beliefs about the relative level of danger in the social world. 
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 Interestingly, conscious detection of the target images was significantly correlated with 
right-wing authoritarianism, r(559) = -.11, p = .01, as well as the political ideology composite 
measure, r(369) = -.12, p = .02.  Both of these relations indicated that participants who 
consciously detected fewer of the target images tended to endorse more conservative social 
attitudes.
8
    
                                                          
8 As belief in a dangerous world was significantly correlated with both of these indices as well, 
follow up analyses using hierarchical regression models indicated that although conscious 
detection of the target images and belief in a dangerous world were both unique, significant 
predictors of RWA and the political ideology composite, conscious detection of the target images 
did not moderate the relation between dangerous world beliefs and either of the two measures of 
social conservatism (both ps > .29).   
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General Discussion 
The present research sought to test the hypothesis that individual differences in the ability 
to detect threats are related to socially conservative attitudes such that low levels of threat 
detection ability were expected to predict high levels of social conservatism.  It was argued that 
the ability to accurately detect threats in the environment is likely to have historically been a 
crucial mechanism in a modular cognitive architecture that would have been subject to 
evolutionary selection pressures.  As socially conservative attitudes are characterized by an 
adherence to traditional social practices and the status-quo as well as avoidance of uncertainty 
(Wilson, 1973; Jost et. al., 2003), conservative attitudes may have evolved to function as an 
adaptive social strategy for reducing the likelihood of encountering danger for individuals who 
are not highly adept at detecting and managing threats in their environment.  Supporting this 
hypothesis, prior research has indicated that subjective experiences of fear, threat, and 
uncertainty are important factors that motivate the development of conservative attitudes (Jost et 
al., 2003).  Additionally, research has shown higher levels of conservatism to be related to higher 
levels of anxiety, intolerance of ambiguity, and insecurity (Ojha & Sah, 1990), which is 
consistent with the perspective that conservative attitudes are associated with concerns about 
personal safety.   
Overall, the present set of studies found mixed support for the stated hypothesis, 
indicating the plausibility that conservative social attitudes stem from trait level cognitive 
processes associated with the ability to detect threats.  However, the limited nature of these 
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findings suggest that further research is necessary in order to determine, with a higher level of 
certainty, the true nature of the relation.  Should the association between threat detection ability 
and social conservatism become more clearly established, additional studies are also necessary in 
order to develop a better understanding of the specific cognitive processes that function to 
influence socially conservative attitudes. 
Prior to conducting studies with human participants, computer simulations were 
developed and run which indicated that a conservative social strategy (conceptualized as 
increased avoidance of objects in the social environment) is likely to increase the survival rate of 
an organism with low threat detection ability living in a relatively dangerous social environment.  
These computer simulations also indicated that a conservative social strategy was detrimental to 
the survival rate of an organism that was more adept at detecting threats or which was less likely 
to encounter danger.  These results provided support for two important theoretical underpinnings 
of the present research.  First, they indicated that socially conservative attitudes which promote 
the avoidance of unfamiliar objects in the environment can function as an adaptive social 
strategy for individuals with low threat detection ability functioning in an environment 
characterized by a sufficiently high level of danger.  As such, this finding supports the theory 
that such attitudes could have evolved as an adaptive component of human psychology.  
Secondly, the results from the computer modeling simulations indicated that given a wide range 
of levels of environmental danger, different social strategies would be advantageous depending 
on individual levels of threat detection ability.  More specifically, at any given time and place in 
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the social world, conservatism might be advantageous to individuals who possess a limited 
ability to manage threats, but might also present a disadvantage to individuals with a strong 
ability to manage threats, and thus it is not surprising to find varying levels of conservative social 
attitudes scattered throughout the population.   
The hypothesis of the present research was tested further after developing a paradigm for 
the investigation of individual differences in threat detection ability.  The threat detection 
paradigm evaluated participants’ ability to accurately discriminate between safe and dangerous 
images presented outside of conscious awareness.  This methodological design was intended to 
isolate and measure cognitive threat detection processes operating at the initial stages of visual 
perception, consistent with the theoretical framework of Massive Modularity (Barrett & 
Kurzban, 2006).   
Over the course of five studies (two pilot studies and three full research studies), the 
average participant in this paradigm demonstrated a better than chance ability to differentiate 
between safe and dangerous target images presented outside of conscious awareness.  This 
finding lends support to the theoretical proposal that cognitive processes associated with the 
differentiation between safe and dangerous visual stimuli can be activated in the initial stages of 
cognitive processing, prior to visual information being accessible in consciousness.  Across all 
studies, individual differences in the measure of unconscious threat detection ability 
demonstrated a marginally significant relation in the predicted direction with social dominance 
orientation such that participants who were less able to distinguish between safe and dangerous 
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images tended to endorse marginally higher levels of SDO.  Additionally, the findings from 
Study 2 indicated a significant relation between unconscious threat detection ability and political 
ideology such that participants who were less able to distinguish between safe and dangerous 
images tended to endorse more conservative political attitudes.  No relations were found between 
threat detection ability and right-wing authoritarianism. 
The observed relation between threat detection ability and SDO may indicate that 
individuals with lower levels of threat detection ability advocate for a hierarchical social 
structure as a mechanism to compensate for an increased risk of encountering threats.  At the 
very least, a hierarchical social structure would tend to make social interactions somewhat more 
predictable, as social roles and acceptable practices would be more clearly defined within social 
strata.  Additionally, for members of social groups perceived to be near the top of the social 
hierarchy, adhering to a hierarchical social structure would likely convey additional benefits such 
as increased access to resources and institutional protection that might reduce the overall 
likelihood of encountering threats. 
The observed relations between threat detection ability and political ideology that were 
found in Study 2 may indicate that participants with lower levels of threat detection ability tend 
to favor the status-quo in terms public policy, suggesting a link between cognitive threat 
detection characteristics and resistance to social change.  However, as there was only evidence of 
these relations in Study 2, additional research is necessary in order to conclude that the findings 
do not simply represent spurious associations. 
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 Finally, the lack of any observed relation between threat detection ability and right-wing 
authoritarianism was surprising considering that the RWA measure specifically targets adherence 
to traditional social norms and practices which were predicted to be the primary avenue by which 
conservatism would provide compensation for any deficiencies in the ability to detect threats.  
As there is a common perception that college students tend to be more liberal than the population 
average, it might be suggested that the lack of an observed relation may stem from restricted 
range in the RWA measure.  However, inspection of the variable characteristics indicated no 
evidence of such a restricted range.  It may be that threat detection ability, as measured, 
represents a cognitive trait that influences attitudes that are unrelated to adherence to traditional 
beliefs and practices.  Along these lines, the results also indicated the absence of any relation 
between threat detection ability and belief in a dangerous world.  This provides a strong 
indication that threat detection ability, as measured, does not influence the extent to which 
individuals experience their social worlds as dangerous, as was theorized.  Had a relation been 
observed between threat detection ability and belief in a dangerous world, the predicted relation 
between threat detection ability and RWA may have manifested as well, as RWA is much more 
likely to represent a social strategy that would compensate for perceived environmental danger.  
Supporting this perspective, higher levels of belief in a dangerous world were consistently 
predictive of higher endorsement of right-wing authoritarianism across all studies. 
It is important to consider, however, that the lack of consistent relations between threat 
detection ability and social conservatism may indicate that the current theory is wrong, and that 
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the hypothesized relation does not exist.  At the very least, it seems likely that any relation 
between the two constructs is weak and separated by several layers of cognitive and social 
factors (e.g. conscious reasoning, levels of exposure to extant danger, exposure to social media 
advocating or disavowing a conservative perspective) that may moderate the degree to which 
threat detection ability serves to influence social attitudes.  In the current set of studies, twelve 
separate tests of this proposed relation were carried out (four in each of the main studies), and 
three of these tests indicated a relation between threat detection ability and social conservatism 
that was significant at the p < .10 level.  This is a higher percentage of significant results than 
would be expected to stem from chance findings if a true relation did not exist (roughly one out 
of the twelve tests would be expected to indicate a significant relation based on chance alone at 
an alpha-level of .10), and as such it does not seem appropriate to draw any definitive 
conclusions with regard to the proposed relation as a result of the current work.   
Threat Detection Paradigm 
It is important to carefully consider several aspects of the threat detection paradigm that 
have implications for the interpretation of the findings across the first two studies.  Threat 
detection ability was operationalized as the ability to distinguish between safe and dangerous 
images presented outside of conscious awareness.  The research paradigm was intentionally 
structured in this manner in order to isolate detection ability from downstream processes 
involving conscious reasoning in regards to the target images.  In short, the goal was to approach 
the research assuming a functionally modular organization of the human mind, and to eliminate 
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the potential for contextual interpretations to influence categorizations of the target stimuli.  
However, in order to achieve this level of isolation, the paradigm was designed as a 
discrimination task in which two categories of stimuli were presented (safe and dangerous) and 
participants were forced to choose between these two classifications when categorizing the 
stimuli.  Signal detection analysis allowed for the threat detection measure to account for 
response bias so that a true measure of participants’ ability to distinguish between the image 
categories could be assessed; however, this statistic only provided a measure of participants’ 
ability to differentiate between the stimulus classifications.  Though this statistic was 
conceptualized throughout the research as ‘threat’ detection ability, it would be equally valid to 
conceptualize the statistic as ‘safe’ detection ability, as it only assessed the ability to discriminate 
between safe and dangerous images.  In other words, it would be misleading to imply that the 
statistic represented participants’ sensitivity to dangerous stimuli in particular, though it is 
plausible that the ability to distinguish between safe and dangerous objects in the environment is 
conceptually equivalent to being sensitive to the presence of dangerous objects.  When the ability 
to distinguish between two categories of a stimulus serves as a measure of sensitivity, as was the 
case in the present research, any measure of sensitivity to a single stimulus category is a relative 
construct, by definition.  . 
Following from this point, it is possible that the current threat detection paradigm 
assessed a more general cognitive ability related to (but not uniquely associated with) threat 
detection ability.  One possibility is that the paradigm assessed individual differences in visual 
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processing ability such that the visual information presented during the threat detection paradigm 
was more influential to some participants’ responses than others.  If this ability only serves to 
influence the categorization of stimuli but does not also influence functional mechanisms for 
avoiding threats and danger, the lack of strong relations with the belief in a dangerous world 
construct would make sense.  This conceptualization would still be consistent with the 
perspective of Massive Modularity that underlies the current theoretical framework, but it would 
leave open the possibility that the module being assessed in the threat detection paradigm may 
not be functionally specialized for the detection of threats.   
A second possibility for the lack of a relation between threat detection ability and belief 
in a dangerous world is that the variability in participants’ prior experiences with danger was too 
great.  If the ability to detect threats does indeed influence perceptions of danger, but the actual 
levels of danger in the environments of the participants studied were highly variable, this 
variability may have washed out the ability to detect the influence of cognitive threat detection 
ability on perceptions of danger (note that using the examples provided in the computer 
modeling paradigm, it would be considerably more difficult to determine the relative advantage 
of a conservative social strategy on survival across individuals of varying threat detection 
abilities if the level of environmental danger is not held constant or is unknown). 
Trait-Level Ability versus Perceptions of Ability 
Beyond trait-level differences in threat detection ability, the current research also 
investigated the relation between perceptions of one’s own ability to detect threats and socially 
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conservative attitudes.  The manipulation that was used in Study 3 to influence participants’ 
perceptions of their ability to detect threats was effective, but demonstrated no relation to 
socially conservative attitudes.  This seems to indicate that perceptions of one’s own threat 
detection ability, at least in the context of a laboratory study, have little bearing on socially 
conservative attitudes.  It could be argued that individuals who suddenly perceived their ability 
to detect highly dangerous threats (e.g., enemy military personnel in plain clothes or a highly 
contagious disease that manifests no obvious symptoms before becoming deadly) to be 
inadequate may be much more apt to develop conservative social attitudes in order to 
compensate for their lack of accuracy.  However, given the findings of the present research, trait-
level differences in threat detection ability appear more likely to be related to conservative 
attitudes than perceptions of threat detection ability and as such, warrant more research attention 
in the near term. 
Another prediction of the current research was that perceptions of danger would also 
influence socially conservative attitudes.  As expected, there was a robust association across all 
studies between belief that the world is dangerous, RWA, and political ideology such that 
participants who believed the world to be more dangerous tended to report higher levels of RWA 
as well as more conservative political views (no consistent association was found between belief 
in a dangerous world and SDO).  This result is consistent with previous research which has 
indicated a relation between fear and conservatism and further establishes that conservative 
social attitudes are linked to perceptions of the level of danger in the social environment.  
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However, manipulations of participants’ perceptions of danger did not significantly affect 
socially conservative attitudes.  This result was consistent across two separate danger 
manipulations in Studies 2 and 3 (though the manipulation in Study 3 produced an effect on 
participants’ perceptions of danger in the opposite direction from what was intended, these 
differences still did not translate to differences in socially conservative attitudes).  Combined, 
these findings suggest that conservative social attitudes represent trait-level characteristics which 
tend to be fairly stable across time, and which are not readily influenced by short-term 
fluctuations in environmental characteristics.  As such, manipulations in future research that are 
intended to influence conservative attitudes would most likely need to be considerably stronger 
than the manipulations used in the present research in order to be effective.   
The finding that conservative social attitudes are likely to be pervasive, trait-level 
constructs also favors the continued investigation of trait-level cognitive characteristics that 
function to detect and manage threats in the environment.  If socially conservative attitudes are 
developed and maintained over long periods of time, then trait-level differences in cognitive 
characteristics which can shape perceptions of the world in ways that make the development of 
these attitudes more or less likely are an important focus of research.  It may be that the current 
set of studies did not isolate the appropriate cognitive mechanism that would shape perceptions 
of the world in this manner; however, the pervasive nature of conservative social attitudes 
justifies the continued exploration of trait-level cognitive characteristics as a factor that 
potentially influences their development. 
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One additional limitation of the present research was the specific demographic niche that 
comprised the participant sample.  Undergraduate college students were recruited primarily for 
reasons of convenience in the present sample; however, it must be recognized that such a sample 
is likely not to be representative of the larger populations of adults, U.S. residents, or humans in 
general.  More specifically, undergraduate college students tend to be better educated, and 
wealthier than the general population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  Though the 
participant samples in the present research tended to be more racially diverse than would be 
found in many other U.S. institutions, the sample was still predominantly White and consisted 
almost entirely of first and second year students currently listed as Psychology majors.  As 
mentioned previously, it is quite possible that many of these participants had not formed concrete 
conceptualizations of their ideological identities at the time of their participation and that their 
prior life experiences (particularly with respect to encounters with danger) may have been 
uncharacteristic of the U.S. population.  These characteristics of the sample may have inhibited 
the ability of the research to detect the hypothesized effects. 
It is also important to note that the current research placed a strong emphasis on the 
investigation of the relation between trait-level cognitive factors and socially conservative 
attitudes and largely ignored social learning factors that may contribute to the development of 
these same social attitudes.  This was not because social learning factors are considered 
irrelevant in the development of social conservatism.  On the contrary, the current theoretical 
framework views trait-level characteristics and social learning factors as two integrated 
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components which continuously work in tandem to influence human behavior and the 
development of social attitudes.  Trait-level cognitive mechanisms are essential in interpreting 
the vast amount of social information that one encounters (and learns from) on a daily basis, and 
individual differences in these mechanisms must result in varied interpretations of social 
information.  Similarly, regional and cultural differences in the prevalence of certain types of 
social information and the norms by which this information is interpreted will also result in 
variability across individuals in the information that is available to be interpreted by cognitive 
mechanisms.  Thus, both factors (social learning and trait-level cognitive characteristics) must 
work concurrently to interpret social information in a manner that leads to the formation of 
attitudes and the production of social behavior.  The present research investigated this complex 
set of processes from the perspective of cognitive characteristics in an effort to develop a better 
understanding of the effect that trait-level processes have in influencing interpretations of the 
social world and as a result, shaping social attitudes in a predictable manner. 
Future Directions 
 The current research investigated the link between threat detection ability and socially 
conservative attitudes across multiple dimensions.  A considerable focus of the research was on 
the relation between participants’ ability to discriminate between safe and dangerous images 
presented outside of conscious awareness and conservative social attitudes.  Mixed evidence 
indicated a possible relation between the two constructs, but the current set of studies only 
scratched the surface of what should be covered by a more comprehensive program of research 
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investigating the link between threat management processes and conservatism.  Future research 
in this area should proceed along two concurrent paths:  1) a deeper investigation of the cognitive 
processes associated with threat detection ability, and 2) a more thorough investigation of social 
factors that influence the development and maintenance of socially conservative attitudes.  
Concurrent lines of research which isolate these two phenomena and work to develop a deeper 
understanding of both would contribute to the development of a more refined theoretical 
framework which postulates the route by which cognitive threat detection processes may relate 
to socially conservative attitudes.  In other words, if a relation exists between threat detection 
ability and social conservatism, the two constructs are likely to represent opposite ends of a 
complex process, with many potential sources of variability existing between them.  As such, 
working concurrently from both ends of the process may help to illuminate any paths that join 
them.  
In regards to the investigation of cognitive threat detection mechanisms, the current 
research paradigm should continue to be used in future investigations of participants’ ability to 
discriminate between safe and dangerous images presented outside of conscious awareness.  In 
the current set of studies, this paradigm was able to assess a normally distributed range of threat 
detection abilities throughout the population, with the average ability significantly exceeding 
chance levels.  This finding is intriguing in and of itself as it indicated that even though the 
information contained in the target stimuli did not reach conscious awareness, it was still 
influential in participants’ categorization decisions.  Future longitudinal studies investigating this 
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ability would be able to further assess whether these detection measures represent static, trait-
level cognitive abilities or whether the ability to discriminate between safe and dangerous images 
is also subject to contextual influences. 
 In regards to the study of social factors which influence conservative social attitudes, 
additional work should examine the role that perceptions of danger play and the process by 
which these perceptions relate to social conservatism.  In the present set of studies, participants 
who perceived the world to be more dangerous tended to endorse higher levels of RWA as well 
as a more conservative political perspective.  However, manipulating perceptions of danger did 
not result in systematic differences in these same indices of social conservatism.  This leaves 
open questions regarding the mechanism by which perceptions of danger and social conservatism 
are related.   
As this relation is investigated further, it is important to consider that the current set of 
studies operationalized social conservatism using only a few specific measures (RWA, SDO, 
Political Ideology) which were predicted to be key indicators of socially conservative attitudes.  
However, there are many other measures that could be used to assess social conservatism.  Jost 
and colleagues (2003) reviewed a host of measures that have been used in previous research to 
assess conservative political and social attitudes which are potentially relevant to the current 
work.  Examples of such measures include the F-Scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Bruswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950) which assesses the extent to which the marginalization and derogation of low 
status minority groups is endorsed; the C-Scale (Wilson & Patterson, 1968) which assesses 
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resistance to change by measuring endorsement of traditional social and religious practices; or 
more specific assessments of attitudes toward current social issues (e.g., gay rights, immigration 
reform, health care reform).  In order to more thoroughly investigate the specific nature of the 
relation between cognitive threat detection and threat management mechanisms and socially 
conservative attitudes, future research should be conducted using a broad range of indicators of 
social conservatism.  This will assist in highlighting specific characteristics of attitudes or 
behaviors that tend to be the most closely related to the ability to detect and manage threats. 
It should also be noted that the computer simulation that was developed in the present 
research provided a sound logical basis for the argument that threat management processes 
should be related to socially conservative attitudes.  However, these simulations were extremely 
simplified in their conceptualization and the conclusions drawn from them should not be 
interpreted in a more specific manner than is warranted.  In short, the paradigm demonstrated the 
advantage of a conservative strategy (increased avoidance) for organisms that experienced harm 
upon encountering threats.  ‘Encountering threats’, in this instance, is a sufficiently loaded term.  
The computer simulation assumed that the organism would experience harm if a dangerous 
object was encountered.  In the real world, dangerous objects may be encountered because they 
cannot be detected, but they may also be encountered because they cannot be otherwise avoided.  
As such, the computer simulation would provide an equivalent justification for research 
investigating individual differences in the ability to effectively respond to threats, and the 
relation between this ability and conservative social attitudes.  The current research project 
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sought to investigate threat detection ability because it is the first step in the threat management 
process and a logical place to begin a program of research.  However, threat detection ability is 
not necessarily the only place where a relation between threat management and conservative 
attitudes might be found.  Future research should be as diligent in investigating relations between 
social conservatism and the ability to respond to threats as the present research has attempted to 
be in investigating threat detection ability. 
 Additionally, the computer model did not incorporate any measure of learning into the 
simulation.  It is anticipated that the ability to learn about threats and adjust behavior accordingly 
might also influence the likelihood of encountering threats and the subsequent value of socially 
conservative attitudes in reducing this likelihood.  Prior research has indicated a relation between 
individual differences in the learning of novel stimuli and political ideology (Shook & Fazio, 
2009) such that political conservatives tended to show a bias toward learning about negatively 
valenced stimuli better than positively valenced stimuli.  Additional differences exist in terms of 
how social information can influence learning, as conservatives tend to be less susceptible to 
evaluative conditioning with positive stimuli compared to liberals (Shook & Clay, 2011).  Thus, 
it is plausible that a more specific relation might exist between the ability to learn about threat 
relevant stimuli and subsequent conservative attitudes.  Future research should examine these 
associations as another potential trait-level cognitive difference that might influence the 
likelihood that danger will be encountered and as a result, how valuable conservative attitudes 
would be in reducing this likelihood. 
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Conclusion 
The present research investigated the relation between cognitive differences in the ability 
to detect threats at an unconscious level, perceptions of extant levels of danger in the 
environment, and conservative social attitudes.  Across three studies, the findings of the research 
indicated that threat detection ability was weakly but significantly related to multiple indices of 
social conservatism as predicted.  More specifically, participants who demonstrated lower levels 
of threat detection ability tended to endorse higher levels of social dominance orientation as well 
as a more conservative political ideology.  These findings indicate that trait-level cognitive 
characteristics related to the ability to detect threats during the initial stages of perception may 
play a role in the development of socially conservative attitudes; however, the findings did not 
emerge consistently across all studies, nor were they found across all indices of social 
conservatism and as such, further research is warranted. 
Additionally, belief that the world is dangerous was reliably associated with social 
conservatism such that higher levels of belief that the world is dangerous were associated with 
more conservative social attitudes.  However, manipulating participants’ belief that the world is 
dangerous did not produce systematic differences in the endorsement of conservative attitudes.  
This indicates that conservative social attitudes tend to be pervasive attitude structures which are 
not subject to contextual fluctuation, at least in the absence of a sufficiently powerful 
manipulation.   
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Given these findings, it is recommended that future research focus on the investigation of 
trait-level cognitive characteristics that might serve to influence the development of socially 
conservative attitudes over time.  Though the findings in the present set of studies regarding such 
an association were limited, there remains a considerable theoretical justification for the 
investigation of the relation between threat management processes (threat detection, threat 
response, and threat learning) and conservative social attitudes. 
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Appendix A: Study Measures 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale 
 
 
 
Instructions:  Please read each of the following statements carefully.  Indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with each statement using the scale shown below.  Please fill in the number that best 
corresponds to your feelings about each issue.  Please think carefully before answering.  
 
1  Strongly disagree 
2 
3  Disagree somewhat 
4 
5  Neither agree nor disagree, or no opinion 
6 
7  Agree somewhat 
8 
9  Strongly agree 
 
1.  Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the 
radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.  _____ 
 
2.  Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.  _____ 
 
3.  It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion 
than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s 
minds.  _____ 
 
4.  Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit 
as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.  _____ 
 
5.  The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence troublemakers spreading bad ideas.  _____ 
 
6.  There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.  _____ 
 
7.  Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
this upsets many people.  _____ 
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8.  Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our 
moral fiber and traditional beliefs.  _____ 
 
9.  Everyone should have their own life-style, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else.  _____ 
 
10.  The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way of life.  _____ 
 
11.  You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting for 
abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.  _____ 
 
12.  What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us 
back to our true path.  _____ 
 
13.  Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.”  _____ 
 
14.  God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is 
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.  _____ 
 
15.  There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.  _____ 
 
16.  A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be.  The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.  _____ 
 
17.  Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell 
us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.  _____ 
 
18.  There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.  _____ 
 
19.  Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional 
family values.”  _____ 
 
20.  This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up 
and accept their group’s traditional place in society.  _____   
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Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
 
Please read each of the following statements carefully.  Indicate how positive or negative you find each 
statement using the scale shown below.  Please fill in the number that best corresponds to your feelings 
about each issue.  Please think carefully before answering.  
 
1  Very Negative 
2 
3   
4  Neither Negative or Positive 
5 
6 
7  Very Positive 
 
1.  Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others.  _____ 
 
2.  Some people are just more worthy than others.  _____ 
 
3.  This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people were.  _____ 
 
4.  Some people are just more deserving than others.  _____ 
 
5.  It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.  _____ 
 
6.  Some people are just inferior to others.  _____ 
 
7.  To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others.  _____ 
 
8.  Increased economic equality.  _____ 
 
9.  Increased social equality.  _____ 
 
10.  Equality.  _____ 
 
11.  If people were treated more equally, we would have fewer problems in this country.  _____ 
 
12.  In an ideal world, all nations would be equal.  _____ 
 
13.  We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible.  _____ 
 
14.  It is important that we treat other countries as equals.  _____ 
 183 
 
 
 
Political Ideology Scale 
 
Please read each of the following statements carefully.  Indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each statement using the scale shown below.  Please fill in the number that best 
corresponds to your feelings about each issue.  Please think carefully before answering.  
 
+2 Agree strongly  
+1 Agree somewhat 
0   Neither agree nor disagree, or no opinion 
-1  Disagree somewhat 
-2  Disagree strongly 
 
*Note.  Only the following thirteen items were used in Study 1. 
1.  Abortion is wrong, because everyone, even unborn babies, has the right to life.     _____ 
 
2.  The benefits of nuclear power plants outweigh its potential hazards.     _____ 
 
3.  If drugs were decriminalized, society would degenerate.     _____ 
 
4.  Some crimes are so despicable, they should be punishable by death.     _____ 
 
5.  Gay people are entitled to the same constitutional rights as heterosexuals.     _____ 
 
6.  It is women’s constitutional right to choose whether or not to have an abortion.     _____ 
 
7.  For safety reasons, all existing nuclear power plants should be shut down.     _____ 
 
8.  Censorship of music and art violates people’s constitutional rights.     _____ 
 
9.  Gun control violates people’s constitutional right to bear arms.     _____ 
 
10.  Student-led prayer should be allowed in public schools.     _____ 
 
11.  Quotas should be set so that more women are hired for traditionally male-dominated jobs.     
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_____ 
 
12.  Censorship of art is justified when the artwork is deemed pornographic or obscene.     _____ 
 
13.  How would you rate yourself on the following scale? 
 
Conservative                    Neither one                    Liberal            
           or the other       
      O  O  O  O  O  O  O  
**Note.  The following items were used along with the previous items in Studies 2 and 3 
 
14.  Congress should not increase taxes, rather they should decrease spending.     _____ 
 
15.   More support for AIDS research is needed.     _____ 
 
16.  Sex education should be taught at home by the parents, not in public schools.     _____ 
 
17.  The government should spend less on defense and focus more on domestic needs.     _____ 
 
18.  Homelessness has become an issue that requires immediate attention by the federal 
government.     _____ 
 
19.  Because the U.S. is a world leader, it cannot cut its defense spending position without losing 
its world position.     _____ 
 
20.  Environmentalists should worry less about the welfare of animals and more about people’s 
jobs.     _____ 
 
21.  An increase in taxes is needed.     _____ 
 
22.  Capital punishment is not an effective deterrent.     _____ 
 
23.  Too much money is being spent on AIDS research and not enough is being spent on research 
for other serious diseases.     _____ 
 
24.  Sex education in schools is vital, especially with the increasing concern of AIDS.     _____ 
 
25.  The government should adopt a stricter immigration policy 
 
26.  Homosexuals should not legally be allowed to marry. 
 185 
 
 
27.  Evolutionary theory should not be taught in public schools. 
 
28.  Abortion should be illegal. 
 
29.  The government should not adopt a stricter policy to protect the environment. 
 
30.  Terminally ill patients should not have the right to die. 
 
31.  There should not be a complete separation between church and state. 
 
32.  Marijuana should not be legalized for medicinal use. 
 
33.  The government should restrict stem cell research. 
 
34.  United States did the right thing by attacking Iraq. 
 
35.  The death penalty should not be abolished. 
 
36.  The government should not adopt a policy to guarantee health care to all workers and their 
families. 
 
37.  The minimum wage should not be raised. 
 
38.  The current pre-emptive (strike them before they strike you) foreign policy, is the most 
effective foreign policy. 
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Belief that the World is Dangerous 
 
Instructions:  Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement 
below using the following scale.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Please think about each 
statement carefully before answering. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 
5 – Slightly Agree 
6 – Agree 
7 – Strongly Agree 
 
1.  It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and 
more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else. 
 
2.  Although it may APPEAR that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it 
really isn't so.  Every era has its problems, and a person's chances of living a safe, untroubled life 
are better today than ever before. 
 
3.  If our society keeps degenerating the way it has been lately, it's liable to collapse like a rotten 
log and everything will be chaos. 
 
4.  Our society is NOT full of immoral and degenerate people who prey on decent people.  News 
reports of such cases are grossly exaggerating and misleading. 
 
5.  The 'end' is NOT near.  People who think that earthquakes, wars and famines mean God 
might be about to destroy the world are being foolish. 
 
6.  There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all. 
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7.  Despite what one hears about 'crime in the street', there probably isn't any more now than 
there ever has been. 
 
8.  Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us.  All the signs are pointing to it. 
 
9.  If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad will happen to him / her.  We do 
NOT live in a dangerous world. 
 
10.  Every day, as our society becomes more lawless, a person's chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up. 
 
11.  Things are getting so bad, even a decent law-abiding person who takes sensible precautions 
can still become a victim of violence and crime. 
 
12.  Our country is NOT falling apart or rotting from within. 
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The Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) 
 
Instructions:  This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.  
Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW, that is, at this very moment. Use the  
following scale to record your answers: 
 
very slightly 
or not at all 
a little moderately 
 
quite a bit extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
interested irritable 
distressed alert 
excited  ashamed 
upset  inspired 
strong nervous 
guilty determined 
scared attentive 
hostile jittery 
enthusiastic active 
proud afraid 
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State and Trait Anxiety Inventory 
 
 
The following is a list of statements which people have used to describe themselves. We want 
you to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment using the rating scale provided.  
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement, just 
give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
 
 
 Not at all Somewhat Moderately 
so 
Very 
much so 
1. I feel calm 1 2 3 4 
2. I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
3. I am tense 1 2 3 4 
4. I feel strained 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel at ease 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel upset 1 2 3 4 
7. I am presently working over possible misfortunes 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4 
9. I feel heighten 1 2 3 4 
10. I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
11. I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 
12. I feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
13. I am jittery 1 2 3 4 
14. I feel indecisive 1 2 3 4 
15. I am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16. I feel content 1 2 3 4 
17. I am worried 1 2 3 4 
18. I feel confused 1 2 3 4 
19. I feel steady 1 2 3 4 
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20. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
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Now please indicate how you generally feel using the rating scale provided. Again, there are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement just give the answer 
which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
 
 Not at all Somewhat Moderately 
so 
Very 
much so 
21. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
22. I feel nervous and restless 1 2 3 4 
23. I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be 1 2 3 4 
25. I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4 
26. I feel rested 1 2 3 4 
27. I am “calm, cool, and connected” 1 2 3 4 
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot 
overcome them 
1 2 3 4 
29. I worry too much over something that really 
doesn’t matter 
1 2 3 4 
30. I am happy 1 2 3 4 
31. I have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4 
32. I lack self-confidence 1 2 3 4 
33. I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
34. I make decisions easily 1 2 3 4 
35. I feel inadequate 1 2 3 4 
36. I am content 1 2 3 4 
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind 
and bothers me 
1 2 3 4 
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t pull 
them out of my mind 
1 2 3 4 
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39. I am a steady person 1 2 3 4 
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over 
my recent concerns and interests 
1 2 3 4 
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Appendix B: Danger Manipulations with Accompanying Manipulation Checks 
 
High Danger Manipulation #1 – Violent Crime 
 
 
 
New Data Shows Increase in Crime Rate 
 
The number of violent crimes rose by a surprisingly large 12 percent in the United States last 
year, a far bigger increase than the nation has been averaging since 2001, the Justice Department 
said.  
 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported there were 4.3 million violent crimes last year, up from 
3.8 million in 2009. 
 
The reality is that "we're surprised to find how much it increases," Professor Alfred Wilson of 
Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz School said Friday. 
 
More than 80 percent of the increase in violent crime was attributed to a spike in simple assaults, 
by 15 percent. Those assaults accounted for nearly two-thirds of all violent crimes in 2010. 
 
The numbers come from the National Crime Victimization Survey, which gathers information on 
nonfatal crimes against people aged 12 or older by questioning a nationally representative 
sample of U.S. households. 
 
Turning to rates of crime per thousand residents, which takes into account population growth 
over time, it's clear that the rise in violent crime is part of a long-term trend that began in 1993. 
 
From 1993 through 2010, the rate of violent crime has increased by a whopping 70 percent and 
the rate of property crime rose by 28 percent. 
 
Wilson added that "the victimization survey is basically confirming" the FBI's preliminary 
figures from last May on crimes reported to police during 2010. That early, incomplete FBI data 
showed reported crime rose across the board last year, extending a multi-year upward trend with 
an increase in both violent crime and property crime.  
 
The victimization survey figures are considered the government's most reliable crime statistics, 
because they count crimes that are reported to the police as well as those which go unreported. 
Over the last decade, the government has found that only about half of all violent crimes and 
only 40 percent of property crimes are reported to police. 
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Because the survey is based on interviews with victims, it gathers no data on murder. But the 
FBI's crime figures, based solely on what is reported to police, do provide murder figures, and 
they are considered quite reliable because murder has always been the least likely crime to go 
unreported.  
 
Wilson asserts that the message to be taken away from these statistics is one of caution:  “These 
findings indicate that the average U.S. citizen faces much more danger today than they did at this 
time a year ago.” 
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Low Danger Manipulation #1 – Violent Crime 
 
 
 
New Data Shows Drop in Crime Rate 
 
The number of violent crimes fell by a surprisingly large 12 percent in the United States last 
year, a far bigger drop than the nation has been averaging since 2001, the Justice Department 
said.  
 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported there were 3.8 million violent crimes last year, down 
from 4.3 million in 2009. 
 
The reality is that "we're surprised to find how much it declines," Professor Alfred Wilson of 
Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz School said Friday. 
 
More than 80 percent of the decline in violent crime was attributed to a plunge in simple assaults, 
by 15 percent. Those assaults accounted for nearly two-thirds of all violent crimes in 2010. 
 
The numbers come from the National Crime Victimization Survey, which gathers information on 
nonfatal crimes against people aged 12 or older by questioning a nationally representative 
sample of U.S. households. 
 
Turning to rates of crime per thousand residents, which takes into account population growth 
over time, it's clear that the decline in violent crime is part of a long-term trend that began in 
1993. 
 
From 1993 through 2010, the rate of violent crime has declined by a whopping 70 percent and 
the rate of property crime fell by 28 percent. 
 
Wilson added that "the victimization survey is basically confirming" the FBI's preliminary 
figures from last May on crimes reported to police during 2010. That early, incomplete FBI data 
showed reported crime fell across the board last year, extending a multi-year downward trend 
with a decrease in both violent crime and property crime.  
 
The victimization survey figures are considered the government's most reliable crime statistics, 
because they count crimes that are reported to the police as well as those which go unreported. 
Over the last decade, the government has found that only about half of all violent crimes and 
only 40 percent of property crimes are reported to police. 
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Because the survey is based on interviews with victims, it gathers no data on murder. But the 
FBI's crime figures, based solely on what is reported to police, do provide murder figures, and 
they are considered quite reliable because murder has always been the least likely crime to go 
unreported.  
 
Wilson asserts that the message to be taken away from these statistics is one of confidence:  
“These findings indicate that the average U.S. citizen is much safer today than they were at this 
time a year ago.” 
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Manipulation Check #1 – Violent Crime 
 
1.  Based on the information in the news article, how big of a problem do you think violent crime 
is in the United States today? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not a problem          Somewhat of a problem           A major problem 
   at all 
 
2.  How big of a problem do you think violent crime is where you live, specifically? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not a problem          Somewhat of a problem           A major problem 
   at all 
 
3.  How safe from violent crime do you feel in the city of Richmond? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not safe           Somewhat safe         Very safe 
   at all 
 
4.  How safe do you feel from violent crime on campus? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not safe           Somewhat safe         Very safe 
   at all 
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High Danger Manipulation #2 – Disease 
 
 
New Data Shows Swine Flu Pandemic is Near 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has raised its pandemic flu alert level to five, signaling 
that a global swine flu pandemic is imminent. 
WHO director-general Dr. Evelyn Wynne urged all countries to take immediate action, saying a 
pandemic would put "all humanity under threat". 
The move came after a toddler in Texas became the first confirmed death outside Mexico from 
the new H1N1 swine flu strain. 
The WHO said the alert level hike was a signal to governments, the pharmaceutical industry and 
the business community to take action. 
"No matter what the situation is, the international community should treat this as a window of 
opportunity to ramp up their response," Dr Wynne said. 
"It is really all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic." 
She also warned that current WHO antiviral stocks were too low and said the organization 
needed more donations from companies and governments. 
Level five, one step short of a full pandemic on a six-point scale, is characterized as a "strong 
signal that a pandemic is imminent and that the time to finalize the planned mitigation measures 
is short," according to the WHO's global emergency planning. 
A level five alert means human-to-human transmission has happened in at least two countries. 
Nearly a week after the threat of the pandemic emerged in Mexico, that country remains the 
hardest hit, with up to 159 people killed. 
Spain has reported its first case of the virus in a person who has not recently visited Mexico, 
taking the number of confirmed Spanish sufferers to 10. 
Three cases in Germany, one in Austria and three more in Britain mean the flu has travelled to 
four European countries. 
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Given that the disease is showing up in most developed nations and that the supply of vaccines is 
currently low, countries around the world are being urged to take whatever precautions are 
necessary to minimize the chances that the disease will spread and develop into a full-blown 
pandemic. 
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Low Danger Manipulation #2 – Disease 
 
 
 
New Data Shows Swine Flu Risk Has Diminished 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has lowered its pandemic flu alert level to one, signaling 
that the imminent risk of a global swine flu pandemic has passed. 
WHO director-general Dr. Evelyn Wynne advised that no immediate action is necessary in any 
country, saying that the potential for pandemic "has been avoided". 
The move came after a toddler in Texas who was thought to be carrying the H1N1 swine flu 
strain, was found to be misdiagnosed, and was merely suffering from a more common and 
treatable form of the flu. 
The WHO said the alert level drop was a signal that governments, the pharmaceutical industry 
and the business community should be recognized for their efforts. 
"No matter what the situation is, the international community has shown that they are able to step 
forward and respond," Dr Wynne said. 
"It is really all of humanity that is safer today as a result of proper planning." 
She also eased concerns by stating that current WHO antiviral stocks are more than adequate and 
said the organization is no longer in need of donations from companies and governments. 
Level one, one step above complete elimination of the disease, is characterized as a "strong 
signal that the swine flu is well under control and that the time to worry about the potential 
transmission of the disease has passed" according to the WHO's global emergency planning 
spokesperson. 
A level one alert means that human-to-human transmission has not been reported in more than 
two years. 
Nearly a week after the threat of the swine flu was officially declared over in Mexico, that 
country remains the model to the rest of the world, with no reported infections in over 159 
weeks. 
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Spain has reported that its last case of the virus in a person has been cured, officially eliminating 
the threat in a country with only 10 confirmed cases overall. 
Three cases in Germany, one in Austria and three more in Britain have all been cured meaning 
the flu has been eliminated in four more European countries. 
Given that the disease has stopped showing up in most developed nations and that the supply of 
vaccines is currently high, countries around the world are breathing a sigh of relief, knowing that 
the chances that the disease will return and develop into a full-blown pandemic are minimal. 
Manipulation Check #2 – Swine Flu 
 
1.  Based on the information in the news article, how big of a problem do you think swine flu is 
in the United States today? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not a problem          Somewhat of a problem           A major problem 
   at all 
 
2.  How big of a problem do you think swine flu is where you live, specifically? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not a problem          Somewhat of a problem           A major problem 
   at all 
 
3.  How safe from swine flu do you feel in the city of Richmond? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not safe                 Somewhat safe         Very safe 
   at all 
 
4.  How safe do you feel from swine flu on campus? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not safe                 Somewhat safe         Very safe 
   at all 
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Appendix C:  Threat Detection Accuracy Manipulation Check 
Accuracy Manipulation Check Items from Study 3 
 
 
 
1.  How well do you think you did in the picture detection task at the beginning of the study? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
I did very poorly Average I did very well 
 
2.  What was your accuracy percentage in detecting threats (please give an approximate 
percentage if you don’t remember the exact number)? 
 
3.  Overall, what is your opinion of this score? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Highly Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neither satisfied Satisfied Highly Satisfied 
   nor dissatisfied 
 
3.  How well do you think you did relative to other participants in the study? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Well below average Below average About the same Above average Well above average 
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